Fulham - Penthouse And Pavement

For many years Fulham enjoyed a great deal of success. Funded by substantial investment from their then owner Mohamed Al Fayed, the club rose from the third tier of English football to reach the top flight and then became an established Premier League club. They finished as high as 7th one season, followed by a memorable run to the Europa League final, where they were narrowly defeated by Atletico Madrid after extra time. As Al Fayed noted, the breathtaking 4-1 victory over the mighty Juventus en route to that final was “probably the greatest game ever seen at Craven Cottage.”

That was then, this is now. In July 2013 Al Fayed sold the club to Shahid Khan, the owner of NFL side Jacksonville Jaguars, which seemed like a perfect fit at the time, but has proved fairly disastrous to date. In his brief tenure Khan has dismissed three managers (Martin Jol, René Meulensteen and the hapless Felix Magath) before confirming former Fulham stalwart Kit Symons as manager in October 2014.

Unsurprisingly, this frenetic turnover has not produced the best of results and after 13 consecutive years in the Premier League, Fulham were relegated at the end of the 2013/14 season. Not only that, but they then flirted with relegation to League One before finishing 17th in the Championship.

"Bryanstorm"

Maybe understandably, Al Fayed has criticised the efforts of the new owner, “In football you cannot be an absentee landlord, as I fear Shahid Khan is most of the time.” While it is certainly true that Khan’s trigger-happy approach has not helped matters, it should be acknowledged that he did provide a tidy sum to buy new players in his first transfer window, even if the calibre of the purchases left an awful lot to be desired.

It is also evident that he inherited an aging squad, which suffered from a lack of investment in the latter stages of the Al Fayed era. Once the Egyptian had decided to sell up, it very much looks like he did not want to invest as much as he had in previous years. So, when Fulham lost the influential trio of Clint Dempsey, Danny Murphy and Mousa Dembélé in 2012, they were not adequately replaced, which arguably started Fulham’s decline.

It might be a little harsh to lay some of the blame for the subsequent deterioration at Al Fayed’s door, given that it was his money that was behind the club’s revival in the first place, but football can be a harsh mistress – especially when the funds dry up.

Matters were no better off the pitch, as Fulham reported a hefty £33 million loss in 2013/14, considerably worse than the £2 million loss in the previous season. This took some doing, given that their revenue rose £18 million from £73 million to a record £91 million off the back of the new Premier League TV deal.

However, there were two major factors influencing the higher loss: (a) a “significant” £17 million impairment charge to reduce the value of player registrations following relegation; (b) a £21 million reduction in profits from player sales with the previous year boosted by the transfers of Dembélé and Dempsey to Tottenham.

There were also other increases in the cost base: £3 million in player amortisation; £2 million in wages; and an unexplained £6 million in other expenses, which rose 38% from £16 million to £22 million, though this might include severance payments to Jol and Meulensteen.

In fact, Fulham’s £33 million loss was the highest in the Premier League in 2013/14. Thanks to the higher TV money, 15 of the clubs in the top flight were profitable with only five clubs reporting losses. Apart from Fulham, the other four clubs that lost money were Manchester City £23 million, Sunderland £17 million, Cardiff City £12 million and Aston Villa £4 million.

Clearly Fulham’s financial results were greatly influenced by the £17 million impairment charge, which contributed half of the reported loss. To better understand the reasons for this charge, we need to look at how football clubs account for player purchases. Importantly, transfer fees are not fully expensed in the year a player is purchased. Instead, the cost is written-off evenly over the length of the player’s contract via player amortisation – even if the entire fee is paid upfront.

As an example, if a player was bought from for £10 million on a four-year deal, the annual amortisation in the accounts for him would be £2.5 million. After two years, the cumulative amortisation would be £5 million, leaving a value of £5 million in the accounts. However, if the directors were to assess the player’s achievable sales value, taking into consideration the prevailing conditions in the transfer market, as £3 million, then they would book an impairment charge of £2 million. Impairment could thus be considered as accelerated player amortisation.

From Fulham’s perspective, the 2013/14 impairment charge has definite advantages in terms of Financial Fair Play (FFP). As clubs are permitted to make far higher losses under the Premier League regulations (£105 million over three years) compared to the Championship (currently £8 million a year), it makes perfect sense to book impairment charges in the Premier League accounts. This approach has the added benefit of reducing annual amortisation charges in future years (from £2.5 million to £1.5 million in our example).

Fulham are by no means the only club to employ this fancy footwork in their accounts, though their £17 million impairment charge was only surpassed by Chelsea in 2013/14 (£19 million). The other clubs relegated that season also booked impairment charges, but much lower amounts: Cardiff City £7 million and Norwich City £2 million.

Although impairment was obviously a major reason for Fulham’s overall £33 million loss, the club cannot simply hide behind this factor. If impairment were to be excluded, Fulham would still have made a loss of £16 million, only “beaten” by Manchester City’s £23 million.

Large losses are nothing new for Fulham: in the last 10 years they have made cumulative losses of £119 million, including £54 million in the last three years alone. They have reported (small) profits just twice in this period: £2 million in 2008 and £5 million in 2011.

Even these profits were due to specific factors, mainly high profits on player sales, which were £12 million in 2008 and £14 million in 2011, though 2008 also benefited from a £10 million write-off of a loan from one of Al Fayed’s companies. The only other “double digit” profit on player sales in this period was the £22 million made in 2013, which helped restrict the loss that year to only £2 million.

Excluding these special factors and the various impairment charges, we can see that Fulham have made consistent underlying losses of £10-20 million over the years, which raises questions over their operating profitability.

Basically, without the benefit of profitable player sales, Fulham are likely to struggle financially. That can be clearly seen in 2013/14 when Fulham’s profits from this activity were only £300,000. In contrast, three of the four most profitable clubs that season made substantial money from this activity: Tottenham £104 million (thanks to Gareth Bale’s transfer to Real Madrid), Southampton £32 million and Everton £28 million. The exception was Manchester United, largely thanks to their commercial excellence.

In this way, Fulham’s EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Taxation, Depreciation and Amortisation) had been on a declining trend from £6 million in 2010 to minus £8 million in 2013 before rising to £2 million in 2014 due to the new TV deal.

The club’s accounts specifically made mention of this £2 million operating profit, but the plain reality is that it was still the lowest in the Premier League. In fairness, few people would expect them to compete with the likes of Manchester United £130 million and Manchester City £75 million, but Fulham were a full £7 million behind WBA, the club with the next smallest operating profit.

It’s not entirely clear how this reconciles with Khan’s promise to “manage the club’s financial and operational affairs with prudence and care.”

Fulham’s revenue rose £18.3 million (25%) from £73 million to £91.3 million in 2014, almost entirely due to the new TV deal, which was up £18 million. Commercial income was up £1.3 million (12%) from £11.1 million to £12.3 million, while gate receipts were slightly down at £12.3 million.

In fact, broadcasting has been the main driver of Fulham’s revenue growth over the years, linked to the new three-year Premier League deals starting in 2008, 2011 and 2014, so TV was responsible for £44 million of the £52 million increase since 2007. That said, there has also been some reasonable growth in other revenue streams: commercial was up £5 million (65%), while gate receipts were £4 million (41%) higher.

Fulham’s Europa League experience has had an impact, most notably in 2010 when their exploits earned £12.5 million. This competition was also worth £3.4 million in 2012 after Fulham qualified via the Fair Play table.

Despite this revenue growth, Fulham’s £91 million left them as the 16th highest in the Premier League in 2013/14, just behind Norwich City £94 million and only ahead of Crystal Palace £90 million, WBA £87 million, Hull City £84 million and Cardiff City £83 million. In other words, the three relegated clubs were all in the bottom six in revenue terms, though this is a bit “chicken and egg”, as the Premier League TV distributions partly depend on where a team finishes in the league.

In their annual Money League survey, Deloitte noted that every Premier League club is in the top 40 revenue earners worldwide, which sounds very impressive, if it were not for the fact that this does not help much domestically. For example, five English clubs earn more than £250 million a season with Manchester United leading the way at £433 million – or nearly five times as much as Fulham. This really highlights the magnitude of the challenge for the smaller clubs in the Premier League.

Nearly three-quarters (73%) of Fulham’s revenue comes from television, up from the previous season’s 68%, due to the new deal. Only 14% was derived from commercial income and 13% from gate receipts.

The club notes this as a risk in the accounts, but incredibly eight Premier League clubs have an even higher reliance on TV money than Fulham with Crystal Palace and Swansea City both earning around 82% of their revenue from broadcasting.

Fulham’s share of the Premier League television money rose 40% (£18 million) from £45 million to £63 million in 2013/14. This is based on a fairly equitable distribution methodology with the top club (Liverpool) receiving around £98 million, while the bottom club (Cardiff City) got £62 million.

Most of the money is allocated equally to each club, which means 50% of the domestic rights (£21.6 million in 2013/14), 100% of the overseas rights (£26.3 million) and 100% of the commercial revenue (£4.3 million). However, merit payments (25% of domestic rights) are worth £1.2 million per place in the league table and facility fees (25% of domestic rights) depend on how many times each club is broadcast live.

In this way, Fulham falling from 12th to 19th in the league directly cost them £8.6 million, as their merit payment was only worth £2.5 million, compared to the £11.1 million that 12th placed Swansea City received. What is also clear is that Fulham’s distributions have been restricted by being broadcast live no more than 10 times, which is the contractual minimum, receiving £8.6 million, compared to, say, Aston Villa’s £13.1 million for being shown live 16 times.

Of course, in 2014/15 Fulham will receive a lot less TV money in the Championship, amounting to around £28 million. This will comprise a parachute payment of £25 million and a Football League distribution of £1.7 million plus money for cup runs, live matches, etc. That would mean a reduction in TV money of £39 million.

That might sound bad, but most clubs in the second tier receive just £4 million from television, regardless of where they finish in the league, comprising the £1.7 million from the Football League pool and a £2.3 million solidarity payment from the Premier League. Note: clubs receiving parachute payments do not also receive solidarity payments.

Parachute payments are currently worth £65 million over four seasons (£25 million in year 1; £20 million in year 2; and £10 million in each of years 3 and 4) and have a big influence on a club’s finances in the Championship.

These payments will very likely increase in 2016/17 when the recent blockbuster Premier League TV deal comes into play, but so will the distributions in the top flight. My estimate is that the bottom club’s share will rise by £30 million to £92 million, while the year 1 parachute will only increase by £11 million to £36 million. This means that the gap to the Premier League would further increase: from £35 million (£62 million minus £27 million) to an amazing £54 million (£92 million minus £38 million). It is therefore imperative for Fulham to bounce back as soon as possible.

Clearly, being in the Championship will have a huge impact on Fulham’s revenue, as acknowledged by the club: “Following the relegation of Fulham football club from the Premier League, the group is forecasting a significant reduction in income during the 2014/15 financial year and, if the club is unable to secure promotion at the end of that year, a reduction in future years.”

On top of the estimated £39 million fall in broadcasting, there will also be reductions in gate receipts and commercial. Based on cheaper tickets and smaller attendances (partially offset by more games in the Championship), I would expect gate receipts to fall by a third (£4 million) from £12 million to £8 million, while commercial income is likely to drop by at least 25% (£3 million) from £12 million to £9 million, depending on whether sponsorship deals have relegation clauses.

That would produce a total reduction in revenue of £46 million from £91 million to £45 million, though this is still likely to have been one of the highest in the Championship last season (along with Norwich City), which makes the under-performance all the more disappointing. To give an idea of the figures in the second tier, in 2013/14 QPR had the highest revenue with £39 million, followed by Reading £38 million and Wigan Athletic £37 million.

Given the team’s relegation form, gate receipts held up pretty well in 2013/14, falling just 1% (£0.2 million) from £12.5 million to £12.3 million, which was the 13th highest in the Premier League.

That’s a fairly elevated position, considering that Fulham’s average attendance of 24,977 was only the 17th highest in the top flight, implying that the ticket prices are on the high side. For example, Aston Villa only earn £500,000 more revenue than Fulham, despite their attendance being nearly 50% higher at 36,081.

Indeed, a BBC survey on ticket prices confirmed that Fulham had the most expensive season tickets in the Championship at £839, even though they did significantly cut their cheapest season tickets to £299. To be fair, Fulham have announced that adult season tickets will be reduced by 15% for the 2015/16 season, while junior season tickets have been slashed to half-price.

Something had to be done to address the steep fall in attendances, which have dropped by 27% (6,700) to 18,276 in the Championship. In the last few seasons in the top flight Fulham have consistently attracted crowds of around 25,000, restricted by the 25,700 capacity of Craven Cottage.

This is why the club is looking at the redevelopment of the Riverside Stand, which would not only increase the capacity to around 30,000, but also improve the lucrative corporate hospitality facilities. It is unclear whether this will be pursued in the Championship, though planning permission has been secured.

Commercial income rose 12% (£1.3 million) from £11.1 million to £12.3 million, largely due to the change in shirt sponsor from FXPro to Marathonbet, but this was still among the lowest in the Premier League. Clearly, clubs like Manchester United £189 million and Manchester City £166 million are out of sight, but Fulham could aspire to match, say, Stoke City – at least when they are in the top flight.

Although Fulham have made progress commercially, there is still much to do in this area, with Khan acknowledging the need to grow the brand. The Europa League exposure was not fully exploited in the past, so it will be a real test of his executive team in the Championship, especially as the shirt sponsorship is up for renewal this season.

The £5 million earned from Marathonbet was in the top 10 deals in the Premier League, but it may well be worth less in the second tier. Similarly, there may be relegation clauses in other agreements, such as the long-term kit supplier partnership with Adidas.

The wage bill was up 3% (£2 million) from £67 million to £69 million, though the underlying increase was probably higher on the assumption that bonus payments were cut following relegation. This is another drawback of having a squad full of old players, as they tend to be on a higher salary than younger alternatives. Following the revenue growth, the wages to turnover ratio improved from a frankly unsustainable 91% to a slightly more palatable 75%.

However, that ratio was still the 2nd highest in the Premier League, just behind WBA, and way above the average of 60%. In short, Fulham’s wage bill of £69 million was simply too large relative to the club’s revenue – and indeed the team’s performance on the pitch.

In terms of wages, Fulham were solidly mid-table (11th place), above teams like West Ham (£64 million), Swansea City (£63 million), Southampton (£63 million) and Stoke City (£61 million), who all comfortably outperformed them. In fact, they were only £1 million below 8th placed Sunderland. Essentially, Fulham spent more than enough money to survive, but just spent it very badly.

Although every manager would happily spend more money, the reality is that Fulham’s demise should not have happened based on their wage bill, which has steadily risen over the years. To reinforce this point, the comparison with Aston Villa is instructive: five years ago their wage bill was £30 million less than the Midlands, club, but the difference had all but disappeared by 2014.

In 2014/15 the wage bill should have been cut considerably in the Championship, not least because the club has confirmed that player contracts include relegation clauses.

After many years of fairly sizeable player investment, there was a distinct reduction in the latter stages of the Al Fayed reign with £12 million of net sales between 2010 and 2013. Since Shahid Khan’s arrival in 2013 Fulham have once again splashed the cash with net spend of £27 million in the last two years.

Unfortunately many of these purchases have not worked out with £12 million record signing Kostas Mitroglou returning to Olympiacos after just 3 appearances, while Maarten Stekelenburg has also been loaned to Monaco.

The club explained the renewed spending: “our immediate and over-riding priority is to gain promotion back to the Premier League and we will continue to invest in the playing squad in order to achieve this aim as quickly as possible.”

In fact, Fulham have the highest net spend over the last two years of any club competing in the Championship. Granted, this comparison has to be treated with some caution, as the figures are distorted by clubs that were in the Premier League the previous season, but Fulham supporters would be entitled to expect a better return on this level of investment.

As at 30 June 2014 Fulham’s gross debt was £26 million, which was an unsecured loan from Shahid Khan via the wonderfully named Cougar BidCo London Limited. There is no fixed repayment date, but interest is payable at 0.25% above LIBOR. In addition, Fulham owed other football clubs £16 million in outstanding transfer fees and they had net expenditure of £11.7 million after the accounts closed, largely for striker Ross McCormack.

The big story here is the £212 million of loans that Al Fayed converted to equity in 2012, effectively leaving the club debt-free, which was a very generous gesture. Little wonder that the Fulham Supporters’ Trust felt it “important to recognise the immeasurable contribution our outgoing chairman has made to he history of our great club.” To place that into context, at one stage Fulham had the 3rd highest debt in England, only behind Manchester United (following the Glazers’ leveraged buy-out) and Arsenal (to finance the Emirates Stadium construction) – all owed to Al Fayed.

Although it’s very good news that Fulham’s debt has been reduced, it is worth noting that the overall debt (including transfer fees) is once again rising. In addition, their cash balance fell from £14 million to just £2 million, one of the lowest in the Premier League.

Fulham have clearly strived to be cash flow positive from operating activities, though they have not met this objective in the last two years. However, any investment in players or infrastructure has had to be financed by loans from the owners, Al Fayed up to 2013 and Khan since then. Since 2007 the club spent £66 million on players and £21 million on capital expenditure plus £8 million on interest, which was funded by £89 million of owners’ loans.

This will be a tricky balance for Fulham going forward, as they will be constrained by FFP regulations. Under the existing Championship rules, clubs are only allowed a maximum annual loss of £8 million (assuming that any losses in excess of £3 million are covered by injecting equity). Even though FFP exclude certain costs, such as youth development, promotion-related bonuses and depreciation on fixed assets, it is clear that Fulham will have to significantly cut costs to be compliant.

The current rules apply for the 2014/15 and 2015/16 seasons (though the maximum allowed loss is increased to £13 million from the second season), but will change from the 2016/17 season to be more aligned with the Premier League’s regulations, e.g. the losses will be calculated over a three-year period up to a maximum of £39 million.

"Danish Dynamite"

FFP encourages clubs to invest in youth, which Khan has frequently stressed is hugely important to Fulham’s future: “player development will be at the core of our foundation at Fulham as we build a club system that grooms youngsters while creating and stocking a pipeline of talent into our first team.” If it works, this strategy would also provide players that can be profitably sold to other clubs, which is pretty much a necessity for a club of Fulham’s size to be sustainable.

Academy director Huw Jennings used to perform a similar role at Southampton’s highly regarded equivalent, so there is much cause for optimism with the youth system, as evidenced by the emergence of talented prospects such as Dan Burn and Patrick Roberts. It is always difficult to know when to blood young players, but at least Fulham now have the right structure in place.

Relegation and the subsequent inability to bounce straight back have undoubtedly been a shock to the system, but Khan is eager to improve: “Our commitment to raising our game is uncompromising at every level of the club, and we’re eager to turn the page.”

"How will Hugo?"

Whether that can be achieved is a big question, as there are still many issues to resolve, including the need to find a better balance between old and young players in the squad, not to mention what to do with some of the more misguided acquisitions.

It is debatable whether Kit Symons is the right man for the job, though his relative inexperience might be compensated by his undoubted enthusiasm, typified by his recent observation that “promotion is not unrealistic at all.”

That’s easier said than done, of course, and many Fulham supporters would consider promotion to be unlikely, given the scale of the rebuilding required, but a degree of (level-headed) positive thinking surely cannot hurt if the club is to have any hope of returning to the top flight.

There's Only One Debt In Fulham

After failing in their bid to secure the services of Martin Jol from Ajax, last week Fulham announced the appointment of Mark Hughes as their new manager. Jol had appeared strangely keen to leave a team that has won the European Cup four times for London, though, as always, money probably played a part in his deliberations, as the famous Amsterdam club has become a selling side, while Fulham, though not the wealthiest, do have transfer funds available.

Hughes is replacing Roy Hodgson and the former Manchester City manager acknowledged that this would be a tough act to follow, “I am joining on the back of two of the most successful seasons in the club's history and that in itself brings with it the challenges of expectation and ambition.”

Having been appointed halfway through the 2007/08 season with Fulham in the Premier League relegation zone, Hodgson rallied his team sufficiently for them to evade the drop, before leading them to an impressive seventh place the following year, which secured European qualification for only the second time ever. Last season was arguably the most successful in the club’s history, as they finished in a comfortable mid-table position in the Premier League, got to the quarter finals of the FA Cup and, most thrillingly, reached the final of the Europa League, where they only succumbed 2-1 to the more highly regarded Atletico Madrid after extra time.

"The future's so bright, I gotta wear shades"

Even though Hodgson’s role has been pivotal to Fulham’s recent achievements, he is not the most important man at the club: that description applies to the chairman, Mohamed Al Fayed, who has bank-rolled the team’s amazing rise. On buying Fulham in 1997, the then owner of Harrods, London’s world-famous department store, brashly stated that he wanted them to become the “Manchester United of the South”. This has not quite come to pass, but the club’s transformation has still been remarkable. Al Fayed also pledged to take the club from the old Division Two to the Premier League in five years and they actually achieved that in one year less, winning two divisional championships en route to the top tier.

Obviously much of the credit for the club’s progress must go to the players and various managers, but it is difficult to believe that Fulham would have reached these heights without Al Fayed’s continual funding over more than a decade. Although not possessing the riches of Roman Abramovich or Sheikh Mansour, he is estimated to have a £650 million fortune, which places him 94th on the Sunday Times Rich List and has enabled him to finance the football club.

It is clear that Fulham fans owe Al Fayed a great deal – quite literally, in terms of the club’s debts. As at 30 June 2009, Fulham’s gross debt stood at an enormous £207 million, which is the 5th highest in the Premier League, only behind the so-called Big Four. However, only £12 million of this debt comes from commercial bank loans with the vast majority (£196 million) owed to the owner via a number of group companies. Al Fayed’s generosity is highlighted by the “soft” nature of the debt with the £183 million loans from the parent company being interest-free, which really helps the club’s financials.

Furthermore, much of this debt (£83 million) is unsecured, which means that Al Fayed has no guarantee of repayment. Even though £100 million is secured on the club’s assets, the accounts contain assurances from Al Fayed’s parent company that “no repayment demand will be made which would cause the group to become technically insolvent.”

Al Fayed’s flexibility had already been demonstrated in 2007, when he restructured the loan agreements with the club to ease the repayment schedule. Previously, the loans had been repayable on demand or within the following 12 months, but this was rescheduled to become repayable in annual installments of £10 million with the first payment only due in July 2012. In yet another gesture of support, Al Fayed forgave £9.5 million of outstanding loans as part of this agreement. No wonder that Deloitte’s Sports Business Group describes such funding as “akin to equity rather than debt – where it is a contribution from a benefactor that is not necessarily requiring repayment in the future.”

"Fulham's No. 1 fan"

The £12.6 million loan from Harrods (UK) Limited did attract 7.11% interest, but this was repaid in August 2009 (after the accounts were published), as was £4.8 million of bank loans. More worryingly, £25 million of additional funding was obtained from third parties after the year-end, partly secured on future broadcasting rights and a second charge over the assets of Fulham Stadium Limited, though nearly £10 million of this has already been repaid.

Fulham’s ownership might appear complex with their financing coming from an ever-changing list of companies, but it’s really quite simple with the money effectively owed to Al Fayed. In the past, the owner used to support the club through loans from Harrods, but these have all been repaid and replaced by loans from Fulham’s parent company, AIT Leisure Limited, which is incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, and its previous parent company, Fulham Leisure Holdings Ltd. The ultimate parent undertaking is Mafco Holdings Limited, a company registered in Bermuda, which is controlled by the Al Fayed family.

People may have doubted Al Fayed’s motives when he paid £30 million to purchase Fulham, but he has since invested well over £200 million into the club, first in order to get the club into the Premier League and second to keep it there. The importance of this funding is evident when examining Fulham’s financials.

The stark reality is that Fulham simply do not make profits. In the last five years, they have only managed to once report a profit – and that was due to some nifty accounting in 2008 when they booked the waiver of a £9.5 million loan as a cost credit. Without including that exceptional item, there would have been another loss of £8 million. Otherwise, it’s a sea of red ink. Not only do Fulham report losses, but they’re also relatively high compared to the turnover, e.g. they recorded losses of £16 million in both 2006 and 2007 on a turnover of less than £40 million.

Even though revenue has significantly increased over the past five years from £39.5 million to £67 million, largely due to the growth in broadcasting income, the club has not really improved its underlying financial position. The higher Sky television deals have only managed to contribute to smaller losses. The problem is that much of the revenue growth has been used to increase player wages and buy new players in order to give the club the best chance of surviving in the Premier League, which, in fairness, is completely understandable.

Fulham have managed to achieve an operating profit in the last two seasons, but this has been more than eaten up by player trading. The situation would have been even worse without Al Fayed subsidising the club by not charging interest on the loans. If the club had to pay a commercial rate, this would increase the interest payable (and losses) by around £10 million a year.

Given the size of Fulham’s turnover, they are bound to struggle financially. If we look at the revenue of the clubs who finished in the top ten in the Premier League in 2008/09, we can see that Fulham are rock bottom with just £67 million, which is at least £10 million lower than every other team. In particular the match day revenue of £11 million is painfully small, while the low commercial revenue of £12 million is actually inflated by including £3.8 million of unexplained “other operating income”. The real commercial revenue is tiny at just £8.6 million. Obviously, money is not the only factor in a club’s success, which can also be driven by old-fashioned positives like good coaching, tactics, developing players and team spirit, but it sure makes life easier.

As with many other clubs of this level in the Premier League, it’s all about the TV money with Fulham earning nearly two-thirds of their income from this revenue stream - £43 million out of the total £67 million. Despite this, Al Fayed believes that clubs like Fulham should receive even more from the central pool. Not only does he think that the total deal should be higher, describing those responsible at the Premier League as “donkeys who don’t understand business”, but he thinks that the distribution method favours the big clubs.

Although 50% of the domestic rights and 100% of the overseas rights are distributed equally among the Premier League clubs, much of the money is not allocated in this manner. Merit payments account for 25% of the domestic rights with each place being worth £800,000, so Fulham’s slip from 7th in 2008/09 to 12th last season will cost them £4 million. As Al Fayed put it, with a typical flourish, “we are hopelessly dependent on our end-of-season league placing to determine our share of the cash – it makes a difference of feast or famine every season.”

Less obviously, they are also reliant on how many times Sky deign to broadcast their matches live, which accounts for the remaining 25% of the domestic rights. The more a team is shown live, the higher the share of the facility fee. Each team must be broadcast a minimum of ten times a season with a maximum of 24, but this tends to benefit the big clubs. For example, in each of the last two seasons Fulham have been shown the minimum ten times, while we have had the pleasure of watching Manchester United the maximum 24 times. The difference in revenue? Nearly £7 million.

According to the latest accounts, the club’s “commercial activities continued to grow”, but there is precious little evidence of this driving significant growth with revenue still well short of £10 million – considerably lower than other clubs. As a comparison, Arsenal earn £48 million commercial revenue and they are usually considered as laggards in this area. Nevertheless, there are small signs of improvement here with a new sponsor and shirt supplier being announced for next season. FxPro, the global broker, has signed a three-year deal for over £4 million a year, replacing LG Electronics, who only paid £3m a year. Similarly, Kappa has replaced Nike as kit supplier for the next three years. Bizarrely, Fulham also have a joint marketing arrangement with the Boston Red Sox baseball team, but I can’t see that bringing in much income.

"... that's Zamora"

Nor can Fulham look to gate receipts for big bucks. Even though it’s been increasing, match day revenue is particularly low at £11 million. In comparison, clubs with substantial grounds like Manchester United and Arsenal generate over £100 million, but even other mid-size clubs earn over twice Fulham’s revenue. Of course, Craven Cottage is one of the smallest grounds in the Premier League with a capacity of only 25,478, but even this is not filled to capacity every week, so discounts are sometimes offered. Although attendances have been steadily rising from the 19,800 average in season 2004/05, there was a slight dip last year to 23,900, which means a 94% utilisation – the lowest of all Premier League clubs in London.

Fulham actually have planning permission to expand their ground to 30,000, but it is far from certain that they would be able to fill it. As other clubs have noted to their cost, the “Field of Dreams” approach (“build it and they will come”) does not always work. In fact, despite its picturesque setting, Craven Cottage has given the club a few headaches in the recent past, most notably when they were promoted to the Premier League and they were forced to ground share at QPR’s Loftus Road, while their own stadium was converted to an all-seater.

"Murphy's law"

There would be other difficulties in expanding the ground, most notably its proximity to the River Thames, but the great views offered by this attractive location make it a highly desirable piece of prime residential real estate. Indeed, many suspected that Al Fayed’s motive in buying the club was to develop luxury riverside apartments. This view was given greater credibility in 2002 when the club agreed to sell the ground to a housing developer, Fulham River Projects, for £50 million, though the deal ultimately fell through. It was later explained that the club desperately needed the £15 million deposit at the time, after Harrods suffered a poor year’s trading, meaning that Al Fayed could not make his usual cash injection.

Although it now looks like the club want to secure their long-term future at Craven Cottage, the ground’s freehold is still one of their principal assets. Valued in the books at £22 million, it is clearly worth more than that. Given the £50 million price agreed eight years ago, a conservative estimate would be £60-70 million. The other important assets are the players (a.k.a. intangible assets), which are valued at £31 million, though would almost certainly realise more on the open market. The club also has a substantial deferred tax loss of £44 million, which is no use to Fulham, so is not recognised in the accounts, but could be useful to a future purchaser.

The horrible truth is that the only way that any financial value could be realised is from the sale of these assets and no fan would be in a hurry to sell off the players or the ground. Even so, the club still has net liabilities of £166 million, up from £115 million in 2004, a sign that the balance sheet is steadily deteriorating over time.

One of the main reasons is the growth in wages, which have risen 36% in five years from £34 million to £46 million. To be fair, this salary level is by no means the worst in the Premier League. In fact, it’s the 13th highest, which is consistent with their league position of 12th. Furthermore, the important wages to turnover ratio has been improving, falling from 86% in 2005 to 69% in 2009, which is just about within the 70% maximum recommended by UEFA and Deloitte. However, it is still too large for the club to comfortably sustain, so it is little wonder that Al Fayed has been a staunch advocate of a wage cap, “They must put a cap on fees and salaries. It’s madness what’s happening.”

"Turning the world upside down"

The other expense that has been growing over the years is player amortisation, which is the annual cost of writing-down a player’s purchase price. For example, Damien Duff was signed for £4 million on a three-year contract, but his transfer is only reflected in the profit and loss account via amortisation, which is booked evenly over the life of his contract, i.e. £1.3 million a year (£4 million divided by three years). Thus, the total cost of player purchases is not immediately reflected in the expenses, but increased transfer spend will ultimately result in higher amortisation. In Fulham’s case, it has grown from £7 million to £15 million, but this is still way behind their big-spending neighbours Chelsea with £49 million. Interestingly, Fulham are one of the few clubs that explicitly include impairment losses for reducing the value of some of their players, which has cost the club almost £7 million over the last three seasons.

As stated above, the implication of the growing amortisation is that Fulham are a buying club and this is confirmed by their net transfer spend of almost £70 million since Al Fayed’s takeover, though the activity has been sporadic. Although the expenditure might seem low in the early years, it was in fact very high for the lower divisions, but it only really took off in 2001 on the club’s promotion to the Premier League, when they splashed out £32 million. Lawrie Sanchez was also given strong backing in 2007, when he bought Diomansy Kamara and what seemed like half of the Northern Ireland team, as was Roy Hodgson to a lesser extent in 2008.

The sale of Louis Saha to Manchester United for £13 million in 2003 lead to that year’s net surplus, but not many appreciate that these funds were needed to help repay the £15 million deposit (plus interest) that Fulham had received the year before as part of the proposed deal to sell their ground for housing development. Incidentally, that central London location surely helps Fulham in the transfer market when recruiting players from overseas. Unfashionable clubs in the North of England often have to pay a premium to tempt the same players away from the capital.

Despite the relatively high expenditure for a club of Fulham’s size, Al Fayed has said that he will never pay more than £15 million for a player, having had his fingers badly burned after wasting £11 million on misfiring striker Steve Marlet. Having said that, the accounts state that the club “will continue to invest in the playing squad to maintain and improve on the results achieved during the playing season.”

The fact is that the clubs needs to spend money on players in order to under-pin their basic strategy of remaining in the Premier League. The main commercial risk in the accounts is “that associated with potential failure to retain membership of the Premier League.” If that were not enough, the accounts then proceed to really spell it out: “In the event of relegation from the FAPL, the Group’s revenues would fall in the next two years to a level which would not finance ongoing contractual commitments and the Group would therefore have to take action to significantly reduce operating costs. Such action could prevent the maintenance of a playing squad capable of gaining promotion back to the FAPL.”

"Coleman's mind games were not enough"

There you have it: a perfect summary of the issue facing clubs such as Fulham. In short, they cannot afford to be relegated. This is why they will apparently over-spend on transfers and wages in order to avoid that risk becoming a reality. It is also why owners are ruthless with their managers, if the threat of relegation rears its ugly head. When this has looked like a distinct possibility at Fulham, Al Fayed has not hesitated to act, dismissing Jean Tigana, Chris Coleman and Sanchez, even though the first two had achieved their fair share of success.

Such clubs have become addicted to the Premier League’s drug of choice, namely TV money, and in particular the tempting prospect of increasing money with every three-year contract. As we have seen, Fulham’s chances of making more match day income are slim, and even though their commercial prospects have been enhanced by last season’s exposure, this is really a drop in the ocean. No, they need the television riches, especially now that they will further increase next season on the back of far higher overseas rights, which will mean an additional £10 million per annum for each club.

How much of that extra revenue will find its way to the bottom line is unclear. If past experience is any guide, much of it will end up in the players’ bank accounts via higher wages. This is why Al Fayed has to keep pumping money in, which we can see by looking at the cash flow statement. Before financing, the cash flow is negative every single year and has to be compensated by the owner. The club makes no bones about this in the accounts, “The Group’s main sources of finance, for operating losses, working capital and capital expenditure (including player transfers) in excess of funds generated internally, are interest-free loans from its parent company.” Thankfully, the accounts also state that the club has received assurances from Al Fayed that continued funding would be made available, if required – even if the team is relegated.

This support remains crucial to Fulham’s future prospects. Indeed, in both the 2006 and 2007 accounts the auditors cast doubt on “the group’s ability to continue as a going concern”, specifically noting the “significant losses” and “significant deficit of shareholder funds”, while stressing the importance of the parent company’s financial assistance. Matters have since approved in the auditors’ eyes, presumably due to the higher revenue and the debt restructuring, but these clauses do highlight Fulham’s dependence on the chairman.

"Can he kick it?"

Fortunately, Al Fayed has proved to be one of the Premier League’s most indulgent owners, seemingly happy to sink money into the club year after year, but there has to be a nagging concern over what would happen if he were to walk away. He appears perfectly happy with the club at the moment, but he could get bored, run out of money, emigrate to Switzerland (which he has already done once after a dispute with the Inland Revenue) or even die. Although apparently as energetic as ever, at 77 years old, Al Fayed’s not getting any younger. Fulham is in many respects the typical benefactor club and could be plunged into financial chaos without Al Fayed’s backing (for whatever reason), unless they could find a similarly big-hearted owner to replace him.

The other issue with benefactor clubs is that they could be prevented from playing in Europe under UEFA’s new Financial Fair Play rules, which will ban clubs that make consistent losses. At present, this is not an issue, as Fulham’s losses are within the “acceptable deviation” allowed during the first years of implementation, but UEFA aim to eventually bring this down to a genuine break-even. At least Fulham have the support of Premier League chief executive, Richard Scudamore, who has said he would “protect to the nth degree the ability of Mohamed Al Fayed to do what he has done at Fulham.”

Over the years, Al Fayed has been a somewhat controversial figure. He waged a lengthy campaign attempting to prove that Princess Diana and his son Dodi, who died in a Paris car crash in 1997, were murdered as part of a conspiracy. Despite living in Britain for decades, his applications for a British passport have repeatedly been turned down, possibly because of his long-running feud with The Observer chairman, Tiny Rowland, who battled him for control of Harrods.

"So near, yet so far"

Ironically, Al Fayed recently cashed in on the Knightsbridge store, when he sold it to Qatar Holdings for a reported £1.5 billion. After repaying bank loans of £625 million, he received net proceeds of around £900 million. Despite this dramatic change in his lifestyle, he was anxious to re-assure the club’s supporters, “It all remains the same at Fulham. Fulham is not being sold.” This was re-iterated by one of his spokesmen, “Just because you sell your house doesn’t mean you will sell your car.” Nevertheless, there has to be some concern that without his cash cow, Al Fayed will at some stage stop putting money into the club.

However, Al Fayed has frequently expressed his commitment to the club, albeit sometimes with more than a touch of hyperbole, “I own the best club in the world with the best team and the best fans. If anyone thinks I’m not committed to the game, or to Fulham, they’re wrong.” As he more prosaically explained last season, “I have nurtured my club lovingly for nearly 12 years, and I don’t plan to give it up.” And that’s the point – nobody could accuse Al Fayed of being a “here today, gone tomorrow” investor. He has been a committed owner, demonstrating real empathy with the fans. Moreover, his sons, Omar and Karim, are both active members of the Fulham board, and his attachment to the club must have been boosted by last season’s displays.

"The happy couple"

So what next for Fulham? In the short-term, Mark Hughes has inherited an ageing squad with many key players nearing the end of their contracts, so may face a rebuilding challenge. Expectations among fans are very high after two successful seasons, but the club should probably be realistic in the transfer market and aim for mid-table security, rather than shooting for the stars.

What we can say with some certainty is that Fulham have been transformed under Mohamed Al Fayed’s vision and leadership, not only rising all the way to the Premier League, but also managing to flourish there against all the (financial) odds. Despite achieving this with the help of Al Fayed’s significant investment, they have somehow managed to do it without making enemies along the way. Maybe money can buy you love after all.