Wolverhampton Wanderers - After The Gold Rush

Wolves finished the 2015/16 Championship in an uninspiring 14th position, which was particularly disappointing for the grand old Midlands club, as they had only just missed out on a play-off place on goal difference the previous season.

That view was confirmed by chief executive Jez Moxey, who described the season as “very challenging”. He added, “we’re frustrated, we’re angry, and it’s not okay – it’s not good enough for Wolverhampton Wanderers.”

Much of the supporters’ criticism for this sad state of affairs has been directed at the owner, Steve Morgan, whose tenure has seen an amazing rollercoaster ride. Morgan, who made his fortune as the founder of house builder Redrow, purchased the club in August 2007 for a nominal £10 fee from Sir Jack Hayward, though he also had to pledge a guaranteed £30 million investment.

This funding helped Wolves gain promotion two years later to the Premier League, where they spent three seasons before suffering two successive relegations to League One, though they did return to the Championship at the first attempt with a record points total.

"Irish heartbeat"

Wolves stay in the Premier League was characterised by financial prudence, as shown by regular profits, low wages, no debt and high cash balances. Nothing wrong with a sensible financial strategy, of course, but in the unforgiving world of modern football, where money talks loudest, it was also a gamble that ultimately failed to pay off, leading to the club falling into what Moxey called a “tailspin”.

Wolves’ prospects were not helped by some bizarre recruitment decisions. First, Mick McCarthy, a manager who had seemed completely in tune with the Morgan/Moxey ethos, was dismissed after a poor run of form, only to be replaced by his inexperienced assistant Terry Connor, who failed to prevent relegation to the Championship.

Wolves then hired the Norwegian Stale Solbakken, who might have been an imaginative choice, but the poor results continued, so his reign lasted only six months. His replacement was former Welsh international Dean Saunders, who saw his side relegated to the third tier for the first time since 1985, whereupon his contract was terminated.

Finally, a safe pair of hands was secured in the shape of Kenny Jackett, who has been head coach since May 2013, and succeeded in guiding Wolves back to the Championship.

"God put a smile on my face"

In fairness to Morgan, he did set out his stall early doors after he made the investment into the club, “Although this is a significant amount of money, there will not be an ‘open cheque book’ approach to signing players. Instead the club will build on the current strategy of steadily and progressively developing a team of young, hungry and talented players.”

Financial stability has been the mantra with Morgan lecturing others on their cavalier approach: “We have tried to manage this as a proper business and I wish other clubs would do the same.” That’s all well and good, but many fans have wondered whether things would have gone differently if the club had made more use of its “very healthy financial position” when in the top flight. Ironically, some of the subjects of Morgan’s scorn are still in the Premier League and are now coining it from the ever-increasing TV deals.

Similarly, the lack of investment in the playing squad last summer meant that Wolves did not maintain the momentum built up over the past two seasons and left them languishing in the lower half of the Championship.

"Dominic dancing"

Moxey has said that the club’s priority is to get back to the Premier League, then “recharge the finances of the business and stay in there”, but very few clubs are capable of doing this without pushing the boat out a little. It’s true to say that Burnley have managed to achieve this feat, but they are the exception to the rule.

Instead, Wolves have focused on the development of their “young players, who are seen as the future lifeblood of the club.” This can work from two perspectives: either the players can make valuable contributions to the first team squad; or they can improve the bank balance if sold to others for good money.

This is an admirable approach, but one that is tough to execute well in the intensely competitive Championship, which is a natural domain for hard-bitten, old professionals.

It also seems unlikely that Wolves will “go for it” next season, given that Morgan put his 100% shareholding in the club up for sale last September. Although he was keen to observe that his “ongoing commitment and financial support to Wolves” would continue until a new owner is found, it is difficult to see him funding a big outlay in the transfer market.

Wolves’ desire to balance the books was once again seen in their 2014/15 accounts, which registered a £0.7 million profit, though this was £7.8 million lower than the previous season’s £8.5 million profit, largely due to a £6.2 million (19%) reduction in revenue from £32.6 million to £26.4 million.

The main driver was a £9 million reduction in the parachute payments from the Premier League, though this was partially offset by a £1 million increase in the distributions from the Football League following promotion to the Championship, so there was a net £7.6 million (37%) fall in broadcasting income from £20.6 million to £13.0 million.

The promotion impact was also seen in gains in the other revenue streams: (a) commercial income increased by £1.0 million (16%) to £7.8 million, mainly due to sponsorship and advertising; (b) gate receipts were £0.4 million (7%) higher at £5.6 million, as attendances climbed from 20,860 to 22,423. However, profit from player sales fell by £1.3 million (35%) to £2.5 million.

The wage bill rose £1.3 million (8%) from £16.4 million to £17.7 million, but other expenses were £0.9 million lower at £7.3 million. The impact of exceptional items was one again felt, as there was no impairment of player registrations (£1.0 million in the previous season), but this was largely offset by restructuring credits, which were £0.6 million lower.

The accounts for the last three years have been majorly impacted by the £27.5 million restructuring provision that was booked in 2012/13 following the two consecutive relegations, comprising £15 million for onerous player contracts that were signed when the club was competing in higher divisions and £12.5 million player impairment values.

CFO Rita Purewal explained, “The restructuring was paramount and was an important part of our financial planning. We couldn’t carry those costs going forward.” Moxey was at pains to note, “This is not a cash loss, but includes necessary provisions to reflect the position we find ourselves in.”

He added, “This draws a line in the sand under the past”. In other words, the club decided to deal with the issue in one year rather than drip-feeding it over several years, which is fairly standard business practice.

However, it has clearly distorted the financial results, e.g. the 2014/15 reported profit of £0.7 million would have been a £5.9 million loss without the provision release of £6.7 million. Similarly, the 2013/14 profit of £8.5 million would have been a £1.7 million loss without a £10.2 million provision release. On the other hand, the massive £33.1 million loss in 2012/13 would have been only £5.6 million if the restructuring provision had not been created.

Note: for 2013/14 I have taken the figure of a £10.2 million provision release stated on Wolves’ website, even though it is not immediately clear from the accounts how this is calculated. The club has not yet responded to my request for clarification.

Where we do agree is that £2.7 million of the provision was left on the balance sheet as at 31 May 2015, though the accounts expected that this would be fully utilised in the next year, i.e. benefiting the 2015/16 accounts.

Wolves were one of only six profitable clubs in the Championship in 2014/15, but almost all of these are due to special factors. As we have seen, Wolves £1 million was boosted by a £7 million provision release, but others also benefited from similar movements.

Ipswich Town were the most profitable with £5 million, but that included £12 million profit on player sales. Cardiff’s £4 million was boosted by £26 million credits from their owner writing-off some loans and accrued interest. Reading’s £3 million was largely due to an £11 million revaluation of land around their stadium. Birmingham City were helped by a £10 million parachute payment.

The only club to make money without the benefit of once-off positives was Rotherham United, who basically just broke even – and ended up avoiding relegation to League One by a single place.

However, the harsh reality is that the majority of Championship clubs lose money with four reporting losses above £15 million: Bournemouth £39 million, Fulham £27 million, Nottingham Forest £22 million and Blackburn Rovers £17 million. As Moxey wryly observed, “A lot of clubs spend a lot more than they can afford.”

This is clearly not the case at Wolves. That man Moxey again, “When Steve Morgan came in, he said… we would try to be self-sufficient.” Obviously, relegation from the Premier League has taken its toll with small underlying losses in the last three years (excluding the impact of the restructuring provision movements), but Wolves more than achieved their sustainability objective in the top flight.

In 2012 Wolves went down with a £2.2 million profit on their books, the same as the previous year, though even these were left in the shade by the hefty £9.1 million profit they made in 2010, their first year back.

In total, Wolves made £13.5 million of profit during their three seasons in the Premier League, which might not sound enormous these days, but was a rare accomplishment at the time. Fine, but the consequent relegations bring to mind the old saying, “Penny wise, pound foolish.”

Profit from player sales can have a major impact on a football club’s bottom line, but it’s not an enormous money-spinner outside the Premier League with the most profit made by Norwich City £14 million, followed by Ipswich £12 million, Leeds United £10 million and Cardiff City £10 million.

Wolves made less than £3 million from this activity in 2014/15, though this will increase to at least £10 million in the 2015/16 accounts, thanks to the sale of star striker Benik Afobe to Bournemouth for £10 million and player of the year Richard Stearman to Fulham for £2 million.

Moxey has previously indicated that the business plan includes selling some players to recoup some money, but this has obviously accelerated following relegation from the Premier League with £22 million profits in the last three seasons compared to just £8 million in the preceding three seasons.

Even though the chief executive claimed that the club did not need to sell its best players, it still raised “considerable sums” (£15 million) in the summer of 2012, mainly from selling Steven Fletcher to Sunderland, Matt Jarvis to West Ham and Michael Kightly to Stoke City.

To get an idea of underlying profitability, football clubs often look at EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Depreciation and Amortisation), as this strips out player trading and non-cash movements. It is therefore effectively cash profit-

This has been positive at Wolves in five of the last six years, albeit on a downward trend, falling from a peak of £21 million in the Premier League to £1 million in 2015, compared to £8 million in 2014 (the difference essentially being the lower parachute payment).

Most revealingly, Wolves generated a total of £53 million EBITDA during their time in the Premier League, some of which could surely have gone on improving a defence with the worst record in the division.

Some might think that £1 million of EBITDA is nothing to write home about, but to place this into context, only three Championship clubs had a positive EBITDA in 2014/15 (Birmingham City and Rotherham being the others) with Wolves having the highest. In stark contrast, in the Premier League only one club (QPR) reported a negative EBITDA, which is testament to the earning power in the top flight.

Wolves’ revenue in recent years has been essentially a tale of promotion and relegation. After they were promoted to the Premier League revenue in 2010 shot up by £42 million to £61 million, but relegation to the Championship saw revenue in 2013 fall by £29 million to £32 million, somewhat cushioned by a parachute payment of £16 million.

Surprisingly, revenue actually slightly rose to £33 million in League One, in 2014 though this was entirely due to the parachute payment increasing thanks to the new three-year broadcasting deal.

Annual revenue in 2015 was around £34 million (56%) lower than the last season in the Premier League (£39 million if you consider the peak revenue for each revenue stream from the time spent in the top flight). As well as lower TV money, there have also been steep reductions in gate receipts (30%), due to falling attendances, and commercial income (25%), due to reduced contractual sponsorship agreements in the lower leagues.

The importance of parachute payments is clear: in the three years up to 2015, Wolves received £45 million. The last payment was due in 2016 and was worth £10.5 million, giving a total of £56 million for the four-year cycle.

The lack of a parachute payment in 2016/17 will have a substantial, adverse impact on Wolves’ finances, as they will have to find £10 million from somewhere – either other revenue streams (unlikely), cost cuts or player sales.

That’s what makes Wolves’ limited assault on the Championship last season all the more perplexing. In 2014/15 they enjoyed the sixth highest revenue of £26 million, only behind Norwich City £52 million, Fulham £42 million, Cardiff City £40 million, Reading £35 million and Wigan Athletic £28 million. With that sort of firepower, a play-off place should be a legitimate aspiration.

Of course, these revenue figures are distorted by the parachute payments made to those clubs relegated from the Premier League, e.g. in 2014/15 this was worth £25 million in the first year of relegation.

However, if we were to exclude this disparity, Wolves would still be in a healthy seventh place and the revenue differentials would be smaller, albeit they would be behind different clubs, e.g. the top three would then be Norwich City £29 million, Leeds United £24 million and Brighton and Hove Albion £24 million.

Following the £9 million reduction in parachute payments in 2014/15, which Purewal described as “quite substantial”, broadcasting now only accounts for 49% of Wolves revenue (down from 63% the previous season). As a result, commercial’s share rose from 21% to 30% and match day increased from 16% to 21%.

In the Championship most clubs receive the same annual sum for TV, regardless of where they finish in the league, amounting to just £4 million of central distributions: £1.7 million from the Football League pool and a £2.3 million solidarity payment from the Premier League. Wolves secretary Richard Skirrow admitted, “Without the Sky deal, clubs would be in all sorts of turmoil.”

However, the clear importance of parachute payments is once again highlighted in this revenue stream, greatly influencing the top eight earners, though it should be noted that clubs receiving parachute payments do not also receive solidarity payments.

However, it should be noted that these payments are not a panacea, so Middlesbrough secured promotion last season, even though their broadcasting income of £6.2 million in 2014/15 was less than half of Wolves’ £13 million.

Looking at the television distributions in the top flight, the massive financial chasm between England’s top two leagues becomes evident with Premier League clubs receiving between £67 million and £101 million, compared to the £4 million in the Championship. In other words, it would take a Championship club more than 15 years to earn the same amount as the bottom placed club in the Premier League.

The size of the prize goes a long way towards explaining the loss-making behaviour of many Championship clubs. This is even more the case with the astonishing new TV deal that starts in 2016/17, which will be worth an additional £30-50 million a year, to each club depending on where they finish in the table.

As an example, I have (conservatively) estimated that the club finishing bottom in the Premier League next season will receive £92 million, which is £87 million more than a Championship club not receiving parachute payments. There is never a good time for a club to be relegated, but Wolves dropped out of the top flight at one of the worst times, as the Premier League has since seen two new blockbuster TV deals come in, and they now risk being left behind.

Moxey is painfully aware of this, but it does not sound like it will provoke a change in policy: “This illustrates the massive difference between being in the Premier League and being in the Championship. We will have to look at our strategy and think what we can do to improve our chances of promotion without going bankrupt. How much can you spend and be able to deal with that outlay if you still don’t get there? There has to be a semblance of sanity.”

From 2016/17 parachute payments will be higher, though clubs will only receive these for three seasons after relegation. My estimate is £75 million, based on the percentages advised by the Premier League (year 1 – £35 million, year 2 – £28 million and year 3 – £11 million). Up to now, these have been worth £65 million over four years: year 1 – £25 million, year 2 – £20 million and £10 million in each of years 3 and 4.

There are some arguments in favour of these payments, namely that it encourages clubs promoted to the Premier League to invest to compete, safe in the knowledge that if the worst happens and they do end up relegated at the end of the season, then there is a safety net. However, they do undoubtedly create a significant revenue disadvantage in the Championship for many clubs.

Despite rising 7% to £5.6 million, partly due to having one more home cup fixture, Wolves’ match day income was still in the bottom half of the table in the Championship. It was far lower than clubs like Norwich City £10.7 million, Brighton £9.8 million and Leeds United £8.8 million.

This was even though average attendances increased from 20,860 to 22,423 in 2014/15 with the sale of season tickets up 18% to 13,998, which meant that Wolves had the sixth largest crowds in the Championship, only behind Derby County, Norwich, Brighton, Leeds United and Nottingham Forest.

However, the 2014/15 increase was something of a blip, as Wolves’ attendances have been declining since relegation from the Premier League. In fact, attendances fell again by more than 2,000 to 20,157 in 2015/16. That meant that Wolves have lost more than 8,000 fans since the peak of 28,366 in 2009/10. That’s a lot of money left on the table right there.

It’s difficult to criticise the fans, who averaged more than 20,000 in League One, including the first 30,000 plus attendance since building an all-seater stadium in the early 90s. Nevertheless, the season ticket campaign for 2016/17 has seen a drop in sales, leading Moxey to admit, “We’re concerned about attendances, of course.”

The club has been pro-active in its pricing strategy, e.g. 2015/16 season tickets were held at the same level as the 2012/13 Championship season, while 2016/17 prices have again been frozen with reduced costs for children. The board stated, “We are fully aware of the financial challenges many supporters face in these difficult times and we are committed to helping fans to support the team with the most cost effective pricing policies for matches at Moline.”

Wolves “remain committed to a medium to long term redevelopment project for the Molineux stadium and its surrounding areas”, leading to a purchase of a nearby property in 2014/15 to create new parking spaces.

The club had already developed the Stan Cullis stand into two tiers for the 2012/13 season, raising capacity to 31,700, though the second stage, namely the rebuilding of the Steve Bull stand to increase capacity to 36,000, has been indefinitely postponed.

Although investment in a new stadium is usually a sound move, it is debatable whether it made sense for a club in Wolves’ position, when the money could have been used to strengthen the squad to give a better chance to return to the riches of the Premier League.

After rising 16% to £7.8 million, Wolves’ commercial income was among the largest in the Championship, only behind five clubs: Norwich City £12.8 million, Leeds United £11.3 million, Brighton £8.9 million, Watford £8.6 million and Derby County £8.5 million. This is perhaps more an indication of Wolves’ historical strengths, rather than their current status.

There has been some controversy about Money Shop, the new shirt sponsor from the 2016/17 season for a minimum of three years. Many are unhappy with the name of a payday lender being on the front of the famous old gold shirt, though the club has described this as a “significant commercial agreement”. This deal replaces Silverbug, a provider of IT services, that was worth “well over six figures”.

In March 2013 Wolves signed a four-year kit supplier deal with Puma until the end of the 2016/17 season. This is worth £1 million a season regardless of which division Wolves are in.

The wage bill rose by £1.3 million (8%) from £16.4 million to £17.7 million, though for an unexplained reason the prior year comparative has been restated from the £20.5 million included in the 2014 accounts. Either way, this is considerably lower than the £38 million wages in the Premier League. As Steve Morgan explained, “You have to cut the cloth when you go down.”

That has equally applied to the highest paid director, assumed to be Moxey, whose annual remuneration has fallen from £1.2 million to £0.5 million – though he has earned a total of £5.5 million in the last seven years, including £3.5 million in the halcyon days of the Premier League alone.

What is striking is how low the wages were in the top flight, as Moxey confirmed: “We stayed up for three years on a relatively small wage bill.” In fact, Wolves were demoted in 2012 with the 17th largest wage bill in the Premier League, so it was not a major surprise that they ended up in the relegation zone.

Over that three-year period, Wolves wages to turnover ratio averaged 57%, which is on the low side. That’s fine for clubs with high revenue like Manchester United and Arsenal, but not for clubs with Wolves’ revenue levels. However, just to prove that all that glitters is not gold, Wolves went down from the Championship with the fourth highest wage bill in the division.

In 2014/15 Wolves prudent approach was summed up by their 67% wages to turnover ratio, which was only higher than Rotherham United in the Championship. Invariably, wages to turnover looks terrible in this division with no fewer than 10 clubs “boasting” a ratio above 100%, including Bournemouth 237%, Brentford 178% and Nottingham Forest 170%, so Wolves’ ratio is strangely low.

In fact, Wolves’ wage bill of £18 million was only the 15th highest in the Championship, compared to having the 6th highest revenue. To place this into perspective, their Midlands rivals Nottingham Forest had a wage bill of £30 million (though admittedly they are not exactly the poster boy of football finances).

Moxey argued, “We’re trying to be smarter than the other clubs. We’re outperforming some of them and they are spending so much more than we are.”

Another way of looking at this is that Wolves had the second smallest wage bill of those clubs receiving parachute payments, though there is obviously a difference in the size of those payments depending on when a club was relegated.

The reduction in Wolves’ parachute payments is clearly a factor in the club’s thinking, as Purewal confirmed, “That’s why it was important to move on big earners who were no longer part of the plans.”

That challenge was exacerbated in League One, as there were no relegation clauses for demotion to that division. There had been 40% cuts after going down to the Championship, but few envisaged the second drop. That’s why the club had to discard the so-called “bomb squad”, i.e. under-performing players on chunky, long-term contracts such as Jamie O’Hara, Roger Johnson, Stephen Hunt and Kevin Foley.

In a similar way, the 2015/16 wage bill will benefit from the departure of high earners such as Bakary Sako, Richard Stearman and Sam Ricketts.

Another aspect of player costs that has decreased is player amortisation, which is the method that most football clubs use to expense transfer fees. This has fallen from the peak of £10.2 million in 2013 to £2.4 million in 2015.

As a reminder of how this works, transfer fees are not fully expensed in the year a player is purchased, but the cost is written-off evenly over the length of the player’s contract via player amortisation. As an illustration, if a club were to pay £15 million for a new player with a five-year contract, the annual expense would only be £3 million (£15 million divided by 5 years) in player amortisation (on top of wages).

However, Wolves’ financial results have also been influenced by the £13.6 million of impairment charges they have booked since 2013. This happens when the directors assess a player’s achievable sales price as less than the value in the accounts.

Going back to our example, if the player’s value were assessed as £4 million after 3 years instead of the £6 million in the accounts, then they would book an impairment charge of £2 million. Impairment could thus be considered as accelerated player amortisation. It also has the effect of reducing the annual player amortisation going forward.

As a result, Wolves’ £2.4 million is towards the lower end of the Championship, significantly surpassed by most other clubs, especially those relegated from the Premier League in recent times, i.e. Norwich City, Cardiff City and Fulham.

The other side of that coin is that player values on the balance sheet have also decreased, falling from £23.0 million in 2012 to £4.2 million in 2015. That is the accounting value in the books, but the actual market value would be much higher if Wolves were to sell any of its players.

This was explained by Purewal, who said that no value had been ascribed in the accounts to players who had progressed through the Academy, such as Dominic Iorfa, Danny Batth and Carl Ikeme, as no transfer fees had been paid.

Since Morgan bought the club, Wolves’ activity in the transfer market can be split into three distinct phases. First, little expenditure in the Championship; then a reasonable outlay in the Premier League when net spend averaged £12 million a season; finally, a return to net sales following relegation.

Moxey argued, “We have a massive net purchase of players under Steve Morgan because of his patronage”, but the figures do not really bear this out – unless you consider total net purchases of £10 million over this period to be “massive”.

The chief executive seemed to be nearer the mark earlier this year, when he admitted, "What we’re not doing is buying Premier League or top Championship players. We’re not in that position. That’s the reality. We have only a certain amount of money. Mostly, they came from Leagues One and Two.”

As a result of the sales of Afobe and Stearman, Wolves actually had £6 million of net sales over the last two seasons. This meant that they were comfortably outspent by the likes of Derby County £29 million, Middlesbrough £23 million and Burnley £14 million. In fact, the two automatically promoted clubs and the four that qualified for the play-offs filled six of the seven top places in the net spend league.

Incredibly, Wolves have been in the happy position of having net funds in seven of the last eight years. Basically, they have no financial debt, though their cash balance is now down to just £1 million compared to last year’s £7 million, having been as high as £26 million in 2011. It should be noted that they also owe other clubs £2 million in transfer fees.

Most Championship clubs carry a lot of debt, with four clubs having borrowings over £100 million, including Brighton £148 million, Cardiff City £116 million and Blackburn Rovers £104 million. Bolton Wanderers have not yet published their 2015 accounts, given their much-publicised problems, but their debt was a horrific £195 million in 2014.

That said, the vast majority of this debt is provided by owners and is interest-free, so the amounts paid out by Championship clubs in interest is a lot less than you might imagine.

The decrease in the cash balance is concerning, with Purewal sounding a note of caution: “Cash flow is difficult in this business, but we do have some in hand. We’re not overdrawn. Going forward, depending how the team does that is, potentially, another story, with the parachute payments stopping.”

Unfortunately the club accounts do not include a cash flow statement for 2007/08 (Steve Morgan’s first season), but in the seven years since we can see how the club has used his £30 million capital injection, though this was also boosted by £30 million generated from operating activities and £2 million of interest received.

Around £16 million has gone on net player registrations (£66 million of purchases less £50 million of sales), but the vast majority £35 million has gone on capital expenditure, largely the stadium redevelopment and the Compton Park Academy (which cost around £10 million including land acquisition).

Arguably, the real cost of this investment has been Wolves’ place in the Premier League, especially as £14 million of this infrastructure investment took place after relegation, which has hamstrung any attempt to return to the top table.

Although grateful for Morgan’s £30 million funding, many supporters believe that his lack of investment since then has hurt the club’s prospects. They would look enviously on the money provided by other owners in the Championship, e.g. Tony Bloom has put in over £200 million at Brighton, Steve Gibson at least £130 million at Middlesbrough and Matthew Benham £76 million at Brentford.

In any case, Morgan put the club up for sale last October, also stepping down as chairman. There has been much speculation for his reason for doing so. It might be as simple as re-assessing his commitment, especially after a divorce and meeting a new partner, though others believe that he might be unwilling to put enough money in to fund a genuine promotion campaign, especially now that the parachute payments have run out.

"I could be happy"

Whatever his reason, finding a new owner can be a lengthy process, as Moxey explained: “Despite what many people think there are not many people around with tens of millions that want to buy a football club. So many clubs are up for sale. So few get sold. They require constant funding to keep them afloat.”

He added, “We don't just want to sell to anybody. Many of our older fans remember when this club nearly went out of business. We don't want a return to those days.”

In the meantime, Wolves are gambling on youth, underpinned by its Category 1 Academy accreditation status. In fact, Wolves are one of only 23 clubs in the entire country to hold such a licence.

"Coady Island"

The danger, of course, is that the club will have to sell some of their acclaimed young players to help balance the books. It’s also asking a lot of these youngsters to achieve the club’s stated objective of gaining promotion back to the Premier League as soon as possible.

It does look as if a change in ownership might be the best thing for Wolves. Moxey hinted at this: “We would like new investment if we can get it. A new owner potentially comes with new investment policies.”

Either way, few fans would disagree with the chief executive’s assertion that, “Ideally, we want to be challenging for promotion regardless of ownership. I think being in the top six, if at all possible, is a minimum requirement.”

Wolves' Premier League Gamble

There are many aspects of this season’s Premier League that have made it one of the least predictable for a long time, not least the battle to avoid relegation, which is shaping up for a thrilling finale. Despite memorable home victories against reigning champions Chelsea and league leaders Manchester United, Wolverhampton Wanderers find themselves firmly ensconced in this struggle.

Last season Wolves finished in a very creditable 15th place, which was a superb achievement for the team’s first season back in the top flight after winning the Championship the previous year. In fact, this represented the club’s highest league position in 30 years and was the first time that Wolves had survived a season at the highest level since 1981.

Nevertheless, the club is now experiencing the classic second season syndrome, which has been exacerbated this year by the promotion of more experienced, wealthier clubs like Newcastle United and local rivals West Bromwich Albion. Sixteen defeats in 29 games have left Wolves languishing second from bottom of the Premier League, albeit only two points adrift from safety.

"Kevin Doyle - good bet to score"

Better news for the club came a couple of weeks ago, when chief executive Jez Moxey announced that Wolves had recorded an impressive £9 million profit on their return to the Premier League in 2009/10. On the face of it, the contrast between results on and off the pitch could not have been much starker, but the club’s financial success was not greeted with overwhelming enthusiasm by the fans, as this provided little consolation for being in the relegation zone. Questions were asked about whether some of that surplus should have been invested in a couple more players in the January transfer window in order to give the team a better chance of remaining in the top tier.

In fairness, this is Wolves’ most successful period for quite a while. Since 1984 the club has only spent three seasons in the top flight, one solitary year back in 2003/04 and two including the current season after the 2009 promotion, which marked the West Midlanders’ return to the Premier League after a six-year absence.

Paradoxically, this still feels like a big club, as it has a commendable roll of honour, including three league titles, though all of those came at least 50 years ago, and four FA Cup wins. Wolves were among the founder members of the Football League and were even more influential in the 1950s, when Stan Cullis’s exciting team staged a series of floodlit matches against top European opposition, which arguably paved the way for the introduction of the European Cup.

These days, even though they have played some attractive football this season, Wolves’ dazzling displays have been largely confined to their financial statements. Although it has almost become a truism that football clubs will be burdened by large levels of debt, Wolverhampton Wanderers are a glittering exception to this rule, and they are now in the happy position of being debt-free. In fact, after paying off bank loans of £3 million, the club is the envy of many others, as it is sitting on considerable surplus funds of £26 million, even generating interest for the last three years.

Indeed, Wolves have been in a very healthy financial state ever since Steve Morgan took over in 2007, when he bought the club for a nominal £10 fee from Sir Jack Hayward, though he also had to pledge a guaranteed £30 million investment. This was duly provided by the club’s parent company, W.W. (1990) Ltd, increasing its issued share capital by £30 million, which was fully paid up by Morgan (25%) and his investment company Carden Leisure Ltd (75%), a subsidiary of Bridgemere Investments Ltd, based in Guernsey.

Clearly, the fans owe Hayward a great deal for his generosity, as he wrote off well over £70 million when he effectively gifted the ownership of his beloved club to Morgan. A lifelong Wolves supporter, Hayward stayed close to his roots, even though he became a multi-millionaire running a business empire from his home in the Bahamas. He financed the redevelopment of the Molineux stadium in order to meet new government regulations in the early 1990s and provided a succession of managers with substantial funds to spend on the squad during his 17 year tenure, though he once famously complained that he was being milked like a “golden tit”.

"Sir Jack Hayward - old gold"

In his place, Wolves now have Steve Morgan, the chairman and founder of house builders Redrow, who has been listed as Britain’s 146th wealthiest individual in the Sunday Times Rich List. Despite an estimated fortune of £350 million, Morgan set out his stall early doors after he made the investment into the club, “It is intended that the new capital, over a period of time, will be used to help re-establish Wolves as a Premiership club. Although this is a significant amount of money, there will not be an ‘open cheque book’ approach to signing players. Instead the club will build on the current strategy of steadily and progressively developing a team of young, hungry and talented players.”

So, steady as she goes has been the mantra, which was once again echoed this year by Moxey, “Our financial results reflect the successful balance the Club struck between sound financial management and continuing investment in players and off the pitch infrastructure.” Indeed, the “3Ms” (Morgan, Moxey and manager Mick McCarthy) have placed stability at the centre of their strategy with the entire management team singing from the same song sheet.

Moxey explained their ethos, “We don't press the panic button at difficult times. We stick together as a club. We will show the stability we have had in recent years and look to move the club forward once more.” McCarthy for one is grateful for this support, believing that the backing he has received from the board has played a crucial role in the team’s recent mini resurgence.

"Matt Jarvis - close to an England call-up"

Nevertheless, every strategy needs to set an over-riding objective and Wolves’ is clearly outlined in the accounts, which state that the club’s “primary aim is to retain its Premier League status.” This is eminently understandable, but the lack of investment in new players in January suggests that they are taking a bit of a gamble that the current, relatively cheap squad will be good enough to beat the drop. They certainly have enough money to have purchased, say, a commanding central defender in January, which might just have made all the difference in the crucial last few games.

Funnily enough, you could argue that Wolves gambled financially in the other direction the year before, when they spent almost all of their turnover on wages and recorded a £5 million loss, in an attempt to secure promotion from the Championship. Obviously, that bet paid off handsomely, as Wolves reached the riches of the Premier League, but it could just as easily have failed in that ultra-competitive division.

That said, Wolves’ last few seasons in the Championship were remarkably consistent, at least in terms of financial performance, with the net result remaining in a narrow range of a £3 million profit and £5 million loss, suggesting that this is one club that strives to balance its books.

Therefore, it should probably come as no great surprise that the club made a profit in the Premier League with its far more lucrative TV deal, but the £9 million profit is still worthy of praise, given that only three other clubs have to date announced profits for 2009/10, namely Arsenal, Birmingham City and Burnley, with the rest all revealing hefty losses (though not all clubs have published their results yet for last season).

In fact, Wolves’ cash profit is even higher than the accounting profit with EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Taxation, Depreciation and Amortisation) of £21 million, not including profits on player sales of £4 million. Player disposals have not had a major impact on Wolves’ finances over the last few years with the peak year of 2007 only standing at £6 million, largely due to the transfer of Joleon Lescott to Everton. Interestingly, the 2009/10 results were boosted by the sell-on fee received following Lescott’s subsequent move to Manchester City.

Furthermore, the reported profit of £9 million has been held back by an accelerated depreciation charge of £6 million, which was booked as a result of the decision to redevelop Molineux, because this has shortened the economic life of the North and East stands. If this exceptional item were to be excluded, the profit before tax would have been a remarkable £15 million.

So how did Wolves convert a £5 million loss in the Championship to a £9 million profit in the Premier League?

The waterfall chart above explains this very clearly with green columns indicating an improvement in profit, while red columns show a deterioration. Basically, revenue has significantly increased by £42 million, very largely due to the central broadcasting deal, but this has been partially off-set by £28 million higher costs, mainly due to investment in the playing squad (wages and amortisation).

The financial benefits of being in the Premier League are evident with the huge uplift in revenue from £18 million to £61 million. As we have seen, the vast majority (£37 million) of the growth comes from television, but the other revenue streams have also increased. Gate receipts were up 43% from £7 million to £10 million, thanks to average attendances rising from 24,153 to 28,366, while commercial revenue also gained £2 million, mainly due to the enhanced value of the main sponsorship agreement with Sportingbet.

In the Championship, revenue fell from £24 million in 2005 and 2006 to £16 million in 2007, as that was the year that parachute payments following relegation from the Premier League ceased. On the other hand, revenue rose to £18 million in 2008, primarily due to the receipt of a £1.4 million solidarity payment from the Premier League, which was introduced to assist clubs that do not benefit from parachute payments. Revenue was maintained at the same level in 2009, even though the solidarity payment fell to £0.7 million, based on the club’s lower finishing position.

Despite Wolves’ notable revenue growth last season, their annual turnover of £61 million still leaves them in the bottom half of the Premier League in terms of revenue. To place this into context, when Wolves beat Manchester United 2-1 last month, they overcame a team whose revenue of £286 million is nearly five times as much as theirs. That’s a huge difference, especially when it’s repeated every season. That said, Wolves’ revenue does compare favourably with a number of clubs who have successfully competed in the top tier, such as Sunderland £65 million, Birmingham City £56 million and Bolton Wanderers £54 million, so they’re not completely disadvantaged.

Like virtually all clubs in the Premier League, the majority (64%) of Wolves’ income comes from TV, though this is far from the highest dependency with Wigan leading the way at 81%. Again, Wolves’ £39 million is nowhere near as much as the top clubs earn, mainly due to the money those teams earn from the Champions League, e.g. Manchester United receive an incredible £105 million. Almost all of Wolves’ television money comes from the Premier League’s sale of TV rights with the likes of Rupert Murdoch and other media moguls contributing nearly £36 million last season.

The distribution of the Premier League TV revenue is therefore of particular interest to a club like Wolves. Most of this is shared out equally, namely 50% of the domestic rights and 100% of the overseas rights, but not all of the money is allocated in this manner. Merit payments account for 25% of the domestic rights with each place in the final league table being worth around £800,000, which can make a big difference to some clubs. In addition, the remaining 25% of the domestic TV rights comes from the facility fee, which is based on how many times Sky broadcast a club’s matches live. Last season Wolves were shown the guaranteed minimum of 10 times, which was worth £6 million, while Manchester United were broadcast the maximum 24 times, which gave them £13 million.

Given the importance of the broadcasting revenue, the timing of new Premier League deals is particularly meaningful. The latest three-year contract commenced this season and will be worth an additional £7-10 million per annum to each club, largely thanks to the steep increase in overseas rights, once again emphasising the need for Wolves to preserve their place at the top table.

In a way, gate receipts are similar to TV revenue in that they have significantly grown after promotion, but are still not particularly high for a Premier League club at just £10 million. To place that into context, both Manchester United and Arsenal earn over £100 million a year from match day income. It should be noted that gate receipts are not exactly the same as match day income, but any re-classification from Wolves’ commercial revenue would not make a dramatic difference.

Attendances at Molineux have held up pretty well, considering the high unemployment rates in the West Midlands, which has traditionally relied on the ailing manufacturing industry to create jobs. In fact, last season’s attendances climbed 17% to stand at 28,366, which was the 12th highest in the Premier League, only surpassed by Aston Villa among neighbouring clubs, and meant that 97% of the ground’s capacity was filled.

This is particularly impressive, given that Wolves’ ticket prices are among the highest in the country. According to data from Sporting Intelligence, Wolves have the sixth most expensive entry level season tickets, ahead of Manchester United, though it should be acknowledged that most fans take advantage of “early bird” prices, so pay considerably less than the published price. The club also run a number of other pricing schemes to encourage fans, such as the occasional family special (“Wolves 4 Family Football”), which gives a family of four (2 adults, 2 children) entry to Molineux for just £40.

Nevertheless, a survey of football fans last year by Virgin Money suggested that over 50% of Wolves’ supporters were considering not renewing their season tickets, which was only behind the level of discontent exhibited at Manchester United, which is something of a special case due to the Green and Gold campaign against the Glazers, so the pricing strategy is probably not perfect.

"Steven Fletcher - he's a record breaker"

The current season is a bit of a mixed bag in terms of crowd figures. Having increased the capacity to 29,195 by reinstating a temporary stand in the south-west corner of the stadium, Wolves recorded their highest attendance ever at the new Molineux of 29,086 for last month’s 4-0 demolition of Blackpool. On the other hand, the average attendance has fallen 3.6% to 27,346, though Wolves are far from alone in experiencing such a trend, as more than half of the top 12 clubs have suffered the same fate.

In such an environment, it would be a courageous man that announces plans to redevelop the stadium to increase the capacity, but that is exactly what Morgan has just done. The chairman himself described this step as a “brave and decisive leap forward”, but explained the rationale behind the decision, “The aim is to drive the club forwards at all levels and to ensure that we put our team in the best possible position to compete at the highest level. To do that we need the best possible facilities at Molineux.”

Supported by the local council, the plan could ultimately increase the stadium capacity from 29,000 to 50,000, though as you might expect given Wolves’ financial prudence, the project has been broken down into a number of phases to enable the club to “pause and reflect” if required.

"Project Molineux - grounds for optimism"

Phase One is scheduled to begin at the end of the current season with the redevelopment of the Stan Cullis (North) Stand. A new two-tier stand with 7,700 seats, including new corporate facilities, a megastore and a museum will be built in its place and should be open for the start of the 2012/13 season, increasing Molineux’s capacity to 31,700. This will cost £16 million, but will be funded from existing cash flow, so no additional debt will be taken on, but might provide an explanation of why the club’s profits are apparently being hoarded, especially as there will be revenue shortfalls with capacity dropping to 23,995 during the construction.

Phase Two will see the Steve Bull (East) Stand being rebuilt over a two season period (2012/13 and 2013/14), scheduled to be ready for the start of the 2014/15 season, increasing the capacity to 36,000 and taking the total project cost to £40 million.

"George Elokobi - a big old unit"

Subject to league position and supporter demand, Phase Three would add a top tier to the Jack Harris (South) Stand, growing capacity to 38,000, but this stage has not yet been costed. Plans have also been drafted for a potential Phase Four, when the Billy Wright (West) Main Stand would be completely redeveloped, increasing capacity to a magical 50,000.

The main objective is clearly to generate more revenue, not just through more bums on seats, but an expansion in the number of corporate boxes, a new banqueting hall and seminar rooms. The hope would be to replicate the Emirates effect, which has increased Arsenal’s match day income from £44 million in their last season at Highbury to around £100 million today. However, there are other advantages too, as an increase in capacity will give the club a better chance to attract the fans of the future by offering reduced price tickets to children and more family days than they can at present. This is smart thinking, as once a club has got a fan (customer) hooked, it’s unlikely he will switch his allegiance at a later date.

"Stephen Hunt - hair we go"

Of course, it’s not as easy as that, otherwise all clubs would be redeveloping their grounds, and there is normally a price to pay for investing in the infrastructure. Although Morgan has stated that the project will not be at the expense of sensible investment in new players, there has to be some concern that this will be a difficult balance to get right. It’s no coincidence that Arsène Wenger’s parsimonious policy started after the move to the Emirates and the consequent substantial increase in Arsenal’s debt.

There also have to be some misgivings over whether the full grandiose plan would come to fruition if the unthinkable were to happen and Wolves were relegated. Chief executive Jez Moxey has claimed that retaining Premier League status was never a “must” for the project to go ahead, but I somehow doubt that it would progress much beyond Phase One if the club were to find itself in the Championship.

Wolves have also done reasonably well in commercial revenue, managing to grow both their deals for shirt sponsorship and kit suppliers. Although their revenue of £11 million is a long way behind the “Sky Six” (Manchester United, Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool, Manchester City and Tottenham), it’s more or less at the same level as the next tier of clubs.

Like many other clubs, Wolves are sponsored by an online gambling firm in the shape of Sportingbet, whose four-year deal runs until the end of the 2012/13 season and is worth £1.1 million a year, up from £0.9 million the previous season. It is impossible to imagine Wolves securing a deal of the magnitude of Liverpool and Manchester United (£20 million a season), but increasing the money received to £2-3 million is plausible, provided that the club becomes a fixture in the Premier League. Similarly, Wolves announced the biggest kit deal in their history last April, reportedly worth £3 million, after replacing Le Coq Sportif with Swiss clothing brand BURRDA for three years.

However, the accounts point out that trading costs have also increased in line with commercial sales. In fact, total expenditure (including player amortisation and depreciation) has almost doubled in the Premier League from £29 million to £56 million.

Nowhere is the impact on Wolves’ costs of promotion more evident than wages, which have shot up from £17 million to £30 million, an increase of almost 80%, though the important wages to turnover ratio has actually significantly fallen from a worrying 92% to a very respectable 49%, which is one of the best statistics in the Premier League, only bettered by Manchester United. It is obvious that Wolves pay a lot of attention to this key expense, as wages growth was minimal in the Championship, though an injection of money in the last season there did not harm the club’s promotion prospects.

Even with the large increase in salaries, Wolves have one of the lowest wage bills in the top tier with only two clubs below them and one of those (Stoke City) has yet to announce its 2009/10 results, so the chances are that in reality only Burnley spent less on wages last season. Of course, these accounts are nearly a year out of date, closing on 31 May 2010, so Wolves’ current wages are almost certainly a fair bit higher, after bringing in new players and extending the contracts of others like Wayne Hennessy, Kevin Foley and Sylvan Ebanks-Blake on better terms.

The wages league table suggests that there is a high degree of correlation between wages and success on the pitch with the top four places being occupied by Chelsea, Manchester City, Manchester United and Arsenal, but it is no guarantee of success – just look at Portsmouth. That said, there is surely a happy balance to be found between Pompey’s spendthrift approach and Wolves’ extreme caution.

This is the crux of the matter for Wolves’ fans. After all, it’s remarkably easy for a newly promoted club to make a solid profit in the Premier League, as the jump in revenue is so stratospheric. As we have seen, even if the costs are doubled, there is still a healthy surplus available. Of course, it’s equally easy to spend like a demented lottery winner and make a thumping great loss. The challenge is to find that elusive balance of spending sensibly, while not compromising the team’s performance on the pitch.

In fairness, Wolves managed to achieve that last season, but one of the directors, presumably the chief executive Jez Moxey, was richly rewarded for his efforts, as the accounts reveal that the highest paid director received £1.1 million last year, a hefty £515,000 increase on the previous year’s £600,000. That’s not quite as much as Messrs. Gill and Gazidis at Manchester United and Arsenal, but, then again, they are running significantly larger businesses.

"Jez Moxey - keeping the wolves from the door"

Similar to wages, player amortisation has grown a lot, at least in percentage terms, but the £9 million expense is still far behind most of Wolves’ Premier League rivals, who are “paying” for the transfer excesses of previous years. For the uninitiated, amortisation is an “accounting” expense, which occurs as the result of transfer purchases. When a player is bought, the cost is capitalised as an intangible fixed asset and amortised (written-off) over the length of his contract. This means that the costs of buying a player are not fully reflected in the books in the year of purchase, but over time amortisation can have a real impact on the profit and loss account, e.g. Manchester City’s annual amortisation is an astonishing £71 million, and this expense is almost certain to increase again this year at Wolves.

So, rising amortisation would suggest that Wolves have spent some money on buying new players, which is indeed the case. After many years of frugality, the club has splashed out a fair amount of cash recently. OK, we’re not talking massive sums, but the relative change is striking. In the seven years up to 2008/09, Wolves’ net spend in the transfer market (purchases less sales) was just £2 million, but this has shot up to £29 million in the last two years.

That said, they have hardly gone crazy. Chairman Steve Morgan explained the club’s methodology, “What we’re about is getting really good quality players for value for money under the radar. We’ve had some incredibly astute buys in the past.” Indeed, most of the signings could be described as solid, rather than spectacular. Last summer, the newcomers featured Steven Fletcher, whose scoring record in the Premier League is not exactly scintillating, two recruits from relegated Hull City (Stephen Hunt and Steven Mouyokolo) and a couple of Belgians that were not called Steven (or any variant thereof).

Wolves have also made good use of the loan system, most recently securing the services of the dynamic Jamie O’Hara from Spurs, with Chelsea’s Michael Mancienne now on his third loan spell at Molineux.

Given this risk-averse approach, it might surprise some fans that Wolves have actually been among the biggest spenders in the last couple of years. Although there have been a few big money transfers, the majority of clubs have hung on to their cash, so Wolves’ net spend of £29 million during this period is actually the fourth highest in the Premier League, only behind Manchester City, Chelsea and Birmingham.

No wonder Morgan was dismissive of his detractors, “Anyone jumping down my throat, saying ‘we’re not buying players” is talking rubbish. We spent £18 million to make us the third highest spenders in the Premier League last summer, so we spent more than 17 other teams.” Furthermore, in that time, Wolves have twice broken their transfer record with the arrivals of Kevin Doyle for £6.5 million and Steven Fletcher for £7 million.

The club has also invested relatively high sums in its academy, including the £5 million state-of-the-art Sir Jack Hayward Training Ground, which includes a fully accredited sports laboratory, based on AC Milan’s famed Milanello facility. Morgan outlined this vision, “Developing home grown talent remains a key part of our strategy and the number of internationals within our academy ranks is an indication of the quality of players coming through.” Indeed, he believes that the current crop of youngsters is the best in years, maybe even on a par with famous youth players of the past, such as Robbie Keane and Joleon Lescott.

Such player development is important both on an off the pitch. Supporters love nothing more than home-grown talent doing the business for their team, but it’s also good business sense. As the club explained in the results announcement, such players do not appear on the balance sheet as assets, even though they have a significant value in the transfer market.

"Mick McCarthy - always looking on the bright side of life"

In fact, the value of all players is under-stated in the books, because of the accounting treatment. The reputable Transfermarkt web site has estimated the market value of Wolves’ squad to be £57 million, which is much higher than the £17 million included in the accounts. In spite of this artificially low valuation, Wolves’ balance sheet is still very strong with net assets of £70 million and net current assets of £20 million.

So what does the future hold for Wolves?

Well, it’s almost impossible to predict what will happen on then field, but financial projections are thankfully a little easier. In the case of Wolves, I think that we can confidently predict more of the same. Moxey told fans, “We will make a profit again this year, although not as much. We need to make a profit, because we also want to continue to invest in new players.” In other words, revenue will again rise, mainly due to the new TV deal, but costs will also grow, mainly for player investment.

"Karl Henry - likes a tackle"

Moxey re-iterated Wolverhampton Wanderers’ strategy, “We will not be irresponsible and fall into the dangerous trap of over-stretching the club.” This neatly summarised the heartfelt views of the owner, which he explained last year, “It’s important that this club is run for the long term. We want to be around and successful not just this year and next year, but in the future. And the only way you can do that is by managing things properly with a medium and long-term view. Two and two make four no matter what business you are in. You can’t keep hocking your future. It’s like pawning your family silver. Unfortunately, too many football clubs are spending too high a proportion of their income on meeting interest payments and paying wages that they can’t afford, and transfer fees which are unsustainable.”

Running a football club as a sustainable business should be lauded, but the nagging question remains: what would happen if the club were to be relegated?

The financial impact of relegation is identified as the club’s principal risk in the accounts, but the directors state that they would be able to “implement the necessary measures to ensure that the club can continue to operate successfully.” Moxey spelled this out, when he admitted that Wolves would have to sell players if they returned to the Championship, and you would also expect a club as financially shrewd as Wolves to have included clauses in their players’ contracts reducing salaries in the event of relegation.

"Jamie O'Hara - loan star"

Furthermore, the parachute payments paid to clubs dropping out of the Premier league have been increased to £48 million (£16 million in each of the first two years, £8 million in each of years three and four), but it should be noted that this would still represent a drastic reduction for Wolves. They can expect around £42 million distribution from the Premier League this year, so they would have to manage a £26 million decrease in their revenue, which would be a test to say the least.

Relegation is clearly a distinct possibility this season, with the points needed to survive probably higher than ever before, but the plan is to avoid being involved in such battles in future. Indeed, Steve Morgan said that is why they are redeveloping the ground, as he expects his club to become a permanent fixture in the top flight, “It’s more than a dream. I think it is a realistic target.”

If that hope becomes a reality, Wolves might even start challenging for a place in European competitions. They would certainly be well placed to handle the forthcoming UEFA Financial Fair Play regulations, which will force clubs to live within their means, if they are to be allowed to compete in Europe.

"Steve Morgan - building confidence"

Morgan has clearly cast a glance in their direction, as he revealed when commenting on the Torres and Carroll transfers: “To be honest, I think it's nuts and I don't know how certain clubs are going to get through the fair play rules which kick in next season. It just can't be done with transfers like that. To clubs like Wolves, it's completely surreal. It clearly isn't a level playing field, when some clubs can literally throw telephone numbers around and others have to live within our budget.”

There’s no doubt that Steve Morgan is a smart cookie, but some have questioned his commitment, given that he is a Liverpool fan, who tried to buy the Reds in 2004, before arriving in the West Midlands. Morgan himself has stated that Wolves have always been his second team, because he grew up watching them win league titles and the FA Cup. Of course, that criterion could apply to many other teams, but affection for his adopted club does shine through his comments: “I remember the days when Wolves were the greatest club in the land and, although times have changed, we are going to do our best to take Wolves back to where they were.”

"Dances with Wolves"

First things first, the club absolutely has to avoid relegation in order for the strategy to remain on track. On paper, they have a great chance, as their run-in looks easier than their rivals, but the team still has to secure the points required.

Wolves’ performances on the pitch are currently lagging behind the financial results, and their prudent approach may yet come back to haunt them. While it might seem strange to describe a sensible financial strategy as a gamble, that’s exactly what it is in the unforgiving world of modern football, where money talks loudest. The league position at the end of the season will reveal whether it has paid off or not.