Monday, October 3, 2016

Arsenal - New Sensation


In many ways Arsenal enjoyed a very good 2015/16, as they finished second in the Premier League, thus clinching qualification for the Champions League for the 19th successive season. Not only was this a place higher than the previous year, but this was also achieved by overtaking Tottenham Hotspur on the last day of the season (“and it’s 5-1 to Newcastle”).

However, given that Arsenal outperformed of all the big boys (as disgraced former England Manager Sam Allardyce used to affectionately describe them), it was still something of a disappointment to finish well behind surprise package Leicester City.

As chief executive Ivan Gazidis observed, “We have to be disappointed, certainly not satisfied, to end up second. We wanted more than that and I think that there were chances during the season. You can’t say second place is a disaster, but it’s not what we are about.”

It was a classic Arsenal case of “so near and yet so far”, so perhaps should not have been that surprising to their supporters, especially as they did not purchase a single outfield player the preceding summer.

However, it has been a different story this summer, as Arsène Wenger has addressed some of the shortcomings in his squad, splashing out £93 million to recruit Granit Xhaka, Shkodran Mustafi and Lucas Perez, who have all made contributions to a promising start.


In fact, Arsenal have quietly ramped up their spending in the last four years, averaging net spend of £49 million a season, compared to net sales of £6 million over the previous seven years. As Gazidis explained, “We are in a position that we were not in four or five years ago where we don’t have to sell our best players. We can go and sign world-class players if and when the manager identifies them.”

The chief executive pointed out that since Stan Kroenke became Arsenal’s majority shareholder, the club had actually invested around £350 million in transfer fees, including the likes of Mesut Özil and Alexis Sánchez. This is true, though fails to mention that around £160 million was recouped in the same period from player sales – and that all this expenditure was funded by the football club and not the owner.

That said, the question is whether they could have done even more. The frequent criticism of the club’s innate conservatism in the transfer market has evidently touched a nerve, as there have been a series of justifications from senior executives as to why the famous, hefty cash pile has not been fully utilised.

"Mustafi Me"

Gazidis patiently explained, “What is clear is that big spending is not the solution to all problems”, adding, “it’s not just about spending money, but about how you spend your money and doing it wisely.”

Arsenal chairman Sir Chips Keswick has clearly been given the same playbook: “We are not afraid to spend substantial sums, but it is important that the money is used wisely.”

Nobody would argue with that, but even after the increased spending it does feel as if the club is not as ambitious as it could be and it does rather bring to mind the old Hamlet quote, “the lady doth protest too much.”

Three years ago Gazidis had raised the fans’ hopes when he boasted, “We should be able to compete at a level like a club such as Bayern Munich. We can do some things which would excite you. I say that this is an extraordinarily ambitious club.”

Contrast that to this summer’s lecture: “We can't afford to outgun competitors that have far more money – we have to be very careful, very selective. That means we can’t afford to make huge mistakes in the transfer market.”


This seeming desire to play the poor relation appears strange, not least because Arsenal have actually become one of the biggest spenders in recent seasons. Since 2013 Arsenal’s net spend of £197 million is the third highest in the Premier League, only surpassed by the “unprecedented” expenditure of the two Manchester clubs, City £389 million and United £342 million, though they did splash out nearly twice as much as the Gunners.

Wenger himself has always insisted that he would have no problems spending if the right players to strengthen the squad were available, “I would spend £300 million if I find the right player – and if I have £300 million”, though he has also described the current spending levels as “quite scary”.

“Le Professeur” has further explained that English clubs suffer from having to pay a premium, as everyone knows that they are awash with money from the new TV deal, though this does make it even more perplexing that Arsenal did not spend their riches before when prices were much lower.

A couple of years ago £50 million would have bought two world-class players, while it is now barely enough for one. When Wenger was asked about the rise in transfer fees, he said, “We knew that would happen, it was not difficult to anticipate.” Well, precisely, so why keep the powder dry?


In the latest accounts for the year ended 31 May 2016, Arsenal’s cash balance has very slightly fallen by £2 million to £226 million, but the upward trend remains intact despite the higher spending. In the decade since Arsenal moved to the Emirates Stadium, cash has risen by more than 500% from £36 million to nearly a quarter of a billion.

In 2015/16 Arsenal’s cash balance has been overtaken by the cash machine that is Manchester United with £229 million, but the Gunners are far higher than the rest of the Premier League with the closest challengers in 2014/15 being Manchester City £75 million, Newcastle United £48 million and Crystal Palace £29 million.

To further place this into perspective, Arsenal’s cash balance is more than Real Madrid, Barcelona and Bayern Munich combined.


The club is very sensitive on this issue with Sir Chips Keswick even noting that it was his “duty to point out that after excluding debt service reserves (£35 million) and amounts owed to other clubs on past transfers (£42 million), the balance reduces to £149 million.”

It is also true that this figure is inflated by the seasonality of cash flows, e.g. season ticket receipts for the new season and advance sponsorship, so Arsenal’s cash balance will always be at its highest when its annual accounts are prepared. The club has to pay a good proportion of its annual running expenses out of this cash, though it is equally valid that other money will flow into the club during the course of the season, such as TV distributions, including the huge new contract, and merchandise sales.

In other words, there is still substantial money available to spend. It’s clearly not as much as the £226 million in the books, but there would be enough available in the January transfer window to further boost the squad if necessary.


Looking at Arsenal’s cash flow statement, we can clearly see evidence of a change in approach: in the six seasons between 2007 and 2012 Arsenal spent just a net £4 million on player purchases, while they have spent a net £138 million in the last four seasons.

In 2015/16 Arsenal generated an impressive £94 million from operating activities, spending a net £54 million on transfers (a new record) and £41 million on other things: £20 million on financing the Emirates Stadium (£12 million interest plus £8 million debt repayments), £13 million on capital expenditure (e.g. investment in London Colney training facilities and redevelopment of Hale End Academy) and £8 million on tax.


This is nothing new. Since 2007 Arsenal have produced a very healthy £722 million operating cash flow, though a draining £251 million has had to be used for stadium financing (£159 million on loan interest and £92 million on debt repayments) with a further £117 million on infrastructure (“hugely important investments which, whilst not grabbing headlines, will help underpin our long-term future” per Keswick) and £22 million on tax.

Only 20% (£141 million) of the available cash flow has been spent in the transfer market, though virtually all of that (£137 million) has been in the last four seasons. The other notable “use” of cash in that period is to increase the cash balance, which has risen by a cool £191 million.

Major shareholder Alisher Usmanov has noted that Wenger had been put in a very difficult position, as the shareholders did not put any money in to finance the new stadium, which meant that the quarter of a billion incurred to date on stadium financing was not available to improve the squad. That’s obviously correct, but it is equally true that Arsenal have left a lot of available money in the bank to attract one of the lowest interest rates in history, while transfer inflation has been running amok.


While on the subject of Arsenal’s cash, a recent report by CSS Investments Limited stated that Arsenal only had £4 million to spend in the transfer market (£54 million if the club made use of an overdraft facility).

This embarrassing “analysis” simply deducted all of Arsenal’s short-term net payables/receivables from Arsenal’s cash balance to produce their £4 million figure, thus assuming that the club would have zero creditors and debtors, while generating nothing from their operations during the year.

This is patently absurd, which can be easily demonstrated by applying the same approach to the other Premier League clubs. If we do that, all but four of the clubs in the top flight would have nothing to spend, as their available cash would be negative. In any case, it’s a relief that Arsenal haven’t actually gone bust, even though they spent £86 million this summer.


Arsenal duly delivered another set of solid financial results in 2015/16 with the chairman commenting, “we’ve enjoyed a season of progress both on an off the pitch”, though profit before tax fell by £15 million from £18 million to £3 million. The decrease was smaller after tax, as the tax charge was £2 million lower, but this still declined by £13 million to £2 million.

The fall in profit was despite revenue growing by £21 million (6%) from £329 million to £351 million (excluding £3 million from property development that brought total revenue to £354 million), mainly due to strong growth in broadcasting income, which rose by £16 million (13%) to £141 million. This was due to the new Champions League deal and record Premier League distributions.

This was supported by commercial income rising by £4 million (4%) to £107 million and  player loans being £2 million higher at £3 million, though match day revenue dipped slightly to just under £100 million.

"The Leader"

On the other hand, profit from player sales was £27 million lower at just £2 million, while a “quiet year” for property development reduced profit from this segment by £11 million to just £2 million.

Continued investment in the squad resulted in the wage bill climbing £3 million to £195 million and player amortisation rising by £5 million to £59 million. Against that, depreciation and other expenses were £3 million lower.

Interest payable was down £6 million, though this was partly due to the implementation of accounting standard FRS 102, which meant that the prior year comparative was increased by £6 million (to reflect the change in fair value of the interest rate swap used to fix the interest rate on the floating rate stadium bonds).


Traditionally Arsenal have been one of the few profitable football clubs, but the impact of  the last TV deal has helped change this with only six Premier League clubs reporting a loss in the 2014/15 season. In fact, Arsenal’s £25 million profit (before restatement) was only the 5th highest that season, behind Liverpool £60 million, Newcastle United £36 million, Burnley £35 million and Leicester City £26 million.

Only three Premier League club have so far published their 2015/16 accounts with Arsenal’s £3 million pre-tax profit being just ahead of Stoke City £2 million, but a long way behind Manchester United’s impressive £49 million.


Profit from player sales can have a major influence on a football club’s bottom line, as best shown in 2014/15 by Liverpool, whose numbers were boosted by £56 million from this activity, largely due to the sale of Luis Suarez to Barcelona. Similar large sums were made that season by Southampton £44 million, Chelsea £42 million and Tottenham £21 million.

In this way, the lack of major sales adversely impacted Arsenal’s bottom line in 2015/16. The main element in their £2 million profit was a sell-on fee for former youth player Benik Afobe’s transfer to Bournemouth.


Despite the improving profits at other clubs, Arsenal’s financial record is still one of the most consistent around with the club reporting profits 14 seasons in a row. You have to go back as far as 2002 to find the last time that they made a loss. Since then, they have made total combined profits of £278 million.

This is an astonishing achievement in the cutthroat world of football where success is very largely bought, though it is worth noting that profits have been much lower as of late. Indeed, the 2015/16 £3 million profit is the lowest in the Emirates Stadium era.

However, Arsenal’s 2014/15 profit was boosted by £29 million of player sales and £13 million from property development. In fact, over the years much of the club’s excellent financial performance has been down to profits from player sales (e.g. £65 million in 2011/12, £47 million in 2012/13) and property development (e.g. £13 million in 2010/11, £11 million in 2009/10).


These are likely be lower in future, as Arsenal no longer have to make “forced” player sales, while the property development is largely coming to an end, which means that Arsenal will be more reliant on their core business.

The chief financial officer Stuart Wiseley confirmed this view, “Improved player retention is a direct consequence of the club’s improved financial position over the last five years with a clear trend away from transfer profits as an essential component of the profit and loss account.”

There was limited activity in the property business profit in 2015/16 with profit of just £2 million. There should be money coming from the sale of the development sites at Holloway Road and Hornsey Road, though various complex agreements still need to be concluded.


To get an idea of underlying profitability, football clubs often look at EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Depreciation and Amortisation), as this strips out player trading and non-cash items. On this basis, Arsenal’s profitability has improved considerably in the last three seasons after many years of decline, with EBITDA rising from £25 million in 2013 to £82 million in 2016.


That’s one of the best in the Premier League (around the same level as Manchester City), but it is still over £100 million below Manchester United’s astonishing £192 million. Now that United have reduced their financing costs to a more manageable level, they basically have at least £100 million more than any other English club to spend on players – every season.


Arsenal’s revenue hardly moved at all between 2009 and 2011, but has grown by an impressive 44% (£108 million) since 2013. Most of the growth (£55 million) is down to improved TV deals, which have driven a 63% increase in broadcasting revenue, though the previously under-performing commercial division has risen by £44 million (71%), mostly due to new deals with Emirates and Puma. Match day income has also increased in that period, but only by £7 million (8%).

Despite Arsenal’s revenue rising by £21 million (6%) to £351 million, the gap to Manchester United has significantly widened to £164 million, as the Red Devils’ grew their revenue by £120 million (30%) to £515 million.

In fairness, United are in a class of their own in the Premier League, while Arsenal are now almost the same level as Manchester City (£352 million) and ahead of Chelsea (£314 million) and Liverpool (£298 million), though all these clubs are likely to increase when their 2015/16 figures are announced.


It should also be emphasised that Arsenal’s revenue is well ahead of the other English clubs: £150 million more than Tottenham (£196 million) and at least £200 million more than everybody else, including champions Leicester City, who only earned £104 million.

Clearly having more revenue is important, with Wenger stating that budget is closely correlated with success on the pitch, “The clubs who have better financial resources have the better teams”,

However, the Frenchman has also argued that it is not the be all and end all, “Manchester United is the richest club in the world, so not many teams can compete on a financial amount, but I feel that it doesn’t make any difference, because on the pitch we can compete and that is most important. Football is not a financial competition: Leicester has shown that last year.”


Arsenal stood at seventh place in the Deloitte 2015 Money League, only behind Real Madrid, Barcelona, Manchester United, Paris Saint-Germain, Bayern Munich and Manchester City, which is obviously excellent. However, there are three major challenges for Arsenal here.

(1) The leading clubs continue to grow their revenue at a faster rate, e.g. in 2015/16 Real Madrid and Barcelona increased revenue by £25 million and £31 million respectively, compared to Arsenal’s £21 million, even before their massive new kit supplier deals commence.

(2) The weakening of the Pound since the Brexit vote means that continental clubs will earn much more in Sterling terms, e.g. the 2015 Money League was converted at €1.31, while the current rate is around €1.15.

(3) The Money League highlights the increasingly competitive nature of England’s top flight with no fewer than 17 Premier League clubs in the top 30 – even before the lucrative new TV deal.


The growth in broadcasting income in 2015/16 means that this now accounts for 40% of Arsenal’s total revenue, ahead of commercial income 30%. The importance of match day income, even though it is around £100 million, has consequently diminished from 44% to 28% since 2009.

Nevertheless, Gazidis noted, “Whilst our match day revenue is now ranked behind both broadcasting and commercial as a source of income, it remains vitally important to the club and is a key differentiator to competitor clubs with smaller, less modern venues.”


This can be seen by looking at the importance of match day revenue to Premier League clubs in the 2014/15 season, where Arsenal were the only one above 30% with the nearest being Manchester United and Chelsea at 23%. In fact, no club in the Money League top 30 generates a larger proportion of its revenue from match day.

However, match day income did dip slightly by £0.5 million to £99.9 million in 2015/16. Even though Arsenal staged the same number of home games (27), the mix was different with one Champions League game less plus no involvement in the FA Cup semi-final.


This meant that Manchester United overtook Arsenal’s match day income with £107 million following their return to the Champions League. This was boosted by their average attendance of 75,000, though Arsenal’s is the second highest in England at just under 60,000.

Of course, Arsenal do have very high ticket prices, arguably the highest in the land depending on how you view the number of games included in the season ticket package.

The good news is that the club has frozen ticket prices for the 2016/17 and 2017/18 seasons, which means that ticket prices will have been held flat for nine of the 12 seasons at the Emirates Stadium with inflation-only increases in the other three years. Arsenal are also providing a further £4 discount for their away supporters attending Premier League matches in addition to the £30 cap announced by the Premier League.


Arguably, Arsenal could still do more here in light of the massive new TV deal and there is no doubt that the fans are not delighted to contribute so much money to effectively grow the club’s bank balance. As a comparison, Everton reduced season ticket prices by more than 5% this season.

Gazidis said that the board wished to “strike a balance between the expense of coming to games for our supporters and the club’s ever-increasing costs and expenditure as it develops on and off the pitch”, but he slightly ruined the effect by adding, “demand for tickets continues to far exceed supply”, reducing it to an issue of basic economics.


Arsenal’s share of the Premier League television money rose £4 million to £101 million in 2015/16, as they received a higher merit payment for finishing one place higher and received more facility fees for being broadcast live more often. This represented the highest distribution in the top flight, even ahead of champions Leicester City, as the smaller merit payment for finishing one place lower was more than offset by higher facility fees for having 12 more games broadcast live.

This is even before the increases from the mega Premier League TV deal in 2016/17. Based on the contracted 70% increase in the domestic deal and estimated 40% increase in the overseas deals, the top four clubs will receive around £150 million, i.e. around £50 million more a season.

"Beautiful Vision"

Although this is clearly great news for the clubs, it is somewhat of a double-edged sword for the elite, as it makes it more difficult (or at the very least more expensive) to persuade the mid-tier clubs to sell their talent.

As Gazidis put it, “In the past the big clubs could financially bully the smaller clubs. It would be unthinkable that a smaller club would be able to hold on to its best player if Manchester United or Arsenal came knocking at the door.” Wenger validated the new paradigm: “The clubs don’t need the money in England and maybe that’s why they only weaken if the price is high.”

Sir Chips confirmed that this was one of the reasons why Arsenal had spent more this summer: “The new broadcast revenue has provided a further competitive stimulus to the Premier League. We know that competition will be even tougher this season. Accordingly, we have made further significant investment into what was already a very competitive squad.”


Arsenal did not announce how much they received from the Champions League, but my estimate is  €51 million, up from €36 million in 2014/15, based on the increases in the 2016 to 2018 cycle, namely higher prize money plus significant growth in the TV (market) pool, thanks to BT Sports paying more than Sky/ITV for live games.


The Champions League payment is partly influenced by a club’s progress in the tournament, but it is also dependent on where it finishes in the previous season’s Premier League. In this way, Arsenal’s 2016/17 revenue will be boosted by finishing second in the 2015/16 Premier League, compared to third the year before, exacerbated by the stronger Euro exchange rate.

Wenger has played down the value of Champions League qualification to Arsenal, “What has changed over the years is that the impact of the finances in the Champions League is not as big any more. For a period in the past the money was vital to us.” That said, it is clear that it is still financially beneficial, especially if it is compared to the Europa League, where Tottenham, for example, only earned €6 million in 2014/15.


Even though Arsenal have not done that well recently, i.e. the last time that they got past the last 16 was 2010, it is still a major revenue differentiator to their domestic rivals. For example, in the five years up to 2014/15 they received €153 million, over €100 million more than Tottenham and Liverpool.


Commercial revenue increased by £4 million (4%) from £103 million to £107 million, comprising £82 million from commercial deals and £25 million from retail and licensing, largely due to new secondary partnerships.

This was a much lower growth rate than the previous two years, but the club had called this out, when announcing that both the primary partnership deals, with Emirates and Puma, are in place for the medium-term. It also pales into insignificance compared to Manchester United, whose commercial income shot up by 36% in 2015/16 to £268 million, which is an astonishing £161 million more than Arsenal.


United may be out of sight in England, but it is disappointing that Arsenal’s commercial income is still lower than Manchester City £173 million, Liverpool £116 million and Chelsea £108 million. Of course, Arsenal are in turn miles above other Premier League clubs, e.g. Tottenham £60 million, Aston Villa £28 million and Everton £26 million.


Arsenal’s commercial shortcomings can be clearly seen if we compare their revenue with the other nine clubs in the 2014/15 Money League top ten. OK, the £123 million shortfall against PSG is largely due to the French club’s “friendly” agreement with the Qatar Tourist Authority, but there are still major gaps to other clubs in commercial terms, e.g. Bayern Munich £108 million, Real Madrid £85 million and Barcelona £82 million.

Arsenal’s £150 million Emirates deal covers a 5-year extension in shirt sponsorship from 2014 to 2019 plus a 7-year extension in stadium naming rights from 2021 to 2028. The club has not divulged how much of the deal is for naming rights, so I have used the straightforward £30 million annual figure, though my own estimate would put the pure shirt sponsorship at around £26 million.


That’s pretty good, but it has since been overtaken by new sponsorship deals at Manchester United with Chevrolet (around £56 million a year at the latest USD exchange rate) and Chelsea with Yokohama Rubber (£40 million).

It’s a similar story with the Puma kit supplier deal, which is worth £30 million a year. This is one of the best kit deals around, but is still dwarfed by Manchester United’s extraordinary £75 million deal with Adidas, while Chelsea will switch to Nike for £60 million from the 2017/18 season.


At the time it was signed, United described theirs as the “largest kit manufacture sponsorship deal in sport”, though it has since been reportedly overtaken by new agreements signed by Barcelona (Nike) and Real Madrid (Adidas), which would be worth £125 million and £115 million respectively (at the current exchange rate).

Despite an increase in the number of partnerships, the concern is that Arsenal’s commercial performance will continue to place them at a competitive disadvantage relative to other leading clubs, even though owner Stan Kroenke believes that the Arsenal brand is a “big opportunity” for the club.

However, further substantial increases are only likely to come as a result of success on the pitch, which again makes you wonder why the available cash has not been spent on strengthening the squad.


Arsenal’s wage bill increased by 2% (£3 million) to £195 million in 2015/16, though the underlying growth was higher, as the prior year comparative was inflated by a double charge for Champions league qualification bonuses (August 2014 via a play-off).


However, as a result of the revenue growth, the wages to turnover ratio was cut from 58% to 56%. This is higher than the 46-50% achieved between 2008 and 2010, but is still very reasonable and is at the lower end of the Premier League.

Arsenal’s wage bill has risen by 57% (£71 million) since 2011, one of the fastest growth rates. This was justified by the CFO thus: “In light of the strong correlation between player wage expenditure and on-field success, a progressive wage bill, where growth is rational and responsible, should be regarded as a positive outcome.”


Manchester United’s high growth in 2015/16 means that their wage bill of £232 million is once again the highest in England, at least until Manchester City and Chelsea publish their accounts. Their gap to Arsenal has thus increased from £11 million to £37 million.

Of course, Arsenal’s wages are way ahead of most other Premier League clubs with the nearest challengers (in 2014/15) being Liverpool £166 million, Tottenham £101 million and Aston Villa £84 million.


Arsenal need to consider the Premier League’s Short Term Cost controls, which  restrict the annual player wage cost increases to £7 million a year for the three years up to 2018/19 – except if funded by increases in revenue from sources other than Premier League broadcasting contracts.

This will be a challenge, as Arsenal soon need to extend the contracts of Özil and Sánchez. Given the limited opportunity to raise ticket prices, this again places pressure on Arsenal to grow commercial revenue.

It also helps explain Arsenal’s caution in the transfer market, as Wenger explained, “If clubs are wrong, they will have these players with high wages who cannot move anywhere else.”

What is more difficult to explain is the 15% increase in Ivan Gazidis’ remuneration from £2.299 million to £2.648 million. Nice work if you can get it.


Although there is a natural focus on wages, other expenses also account for a sizeable part of the budget at leading clubs, though Arsenal’s decreased by £2 million to £70 million in 2015/16. These cover the costs of running the stadium, staging home games, supporting the commercial partnerships, travel, medical expenses, insurance, retail costs, etc.

The good news is that Stan Kroenke’s company has waived its “entitlement” to any fee for “strategic and advisory services”, which were apparently worth £3 million the previous year.


Another cost that has had a major impact on Arsenal’s profit and loss account is player amortisation, reflecting the recent increased investment in transfers. This expense has shot up from £22 million in 2011 to £59 million in 2016.


As a reminder of how this works, transfer fees are not fully expensed in the year a player is purchased, but the cost is written-off evenly over the length of the player’s contract. As an example, Özil was reportedly bought for £42.5 million on a five-year deal, so the annual amortisation in the accounts for him is £8.5million.


However, Arsenal's player amortisation is still by no means the largest in the Premier League. Those clubs that are regarded as big spenders logically have the highest amortisation charges, e.g. Manchester City £70 million and Chelsea £69 million in 2014/15, while Manchester United’s cheque-book strategy since Sir Alex left has driven their annual amortisation up to an incredible £88 million in 2015/16.

There have been a few misguided reports in the media that Arsenal have paid off their stadium debt, but the reality is that the debt incurred for the Emirates development continues to have an influence over Arsenal’s strategy.


Although this has come down significantly from the £411 million peak in 2008 to £233 million, it is still a heavy burden, requiring an annual payment of around £20 million, covering interest and repayment of the principal. Arsenal’s debt comprises long-term bonds that represent the “mortgage” on the stadium £194 million, derivatives £24 million and debentures held by supporters £14 million.


The interest payable of £13 million is more than twice as much as any other Premier League club (£5-6 million at Sunderland, West Ham, Manchester City and Tottenham) – with the notable exception of Manchester United, even though they reduced this to £20 million in 2015/16.


Although the net debt stands at only £6 million, thanks to those large cash balances, the gross debt of £233 million remains the second highest in the Premier League, only behind Manchester United, whose borrowings rose to £490 million, largely due to the impact of unfavourable exchange rate movements on the USD denominated debt.

Apart from financial debt, it is worth noting that Arsenal also owe a net £42 million to other football clubs for transfers, though this is down from £66 million the previous year, and have spent more than £90 million on new players since the financial year-end.

"The patience of a Santi"

Even though some other clubs are still well ahead financially, Arsenal are still better placed than most. Gazidis, for one, is bullish: “We are in a strong position to continue moving forward at every level of the club. Our ultimate ambition is clear: to win major trophies and make Arsenal fans at home and around the world proud of this great club.”

That sounds a lot better than Stan Kroenke’s throwaway comment that “If you want to win championships, then you would never get involved”, which hardly inspires confidence that the board is committed to maximising the club’s chances of competing at the top level.

"Come on, Alex, there's nothing to it"

It would be a fitting tribute to Wenger’s 20-year anniversary at Arsenal to go one step better than last season by winning the Premier League again, but the competition this year looks stronger with City resurgent under Guardiola, and United, Liverpool, Chelsea and Tottenham all looking to bounce back from their various misfortunes.

Unfortunately, Arsenal failed to invest their available cash when this would have gone a lot further, which very much feels like a missed opportunity. Obviously, spending big is in itself no guarantee of winning trophies, but it does tend to give a club its best chance of success.

However, this summer Arsenal did start to act like a big club, finally recognising the new realities of the transfer market. Allied to exciting Academy products like Alex Iwobi and Hector Bellerin, this gives cause for quiet optimism for the future, though it’s still too early to say whether this team will deliver.

Tuesday, September 20, 2016

Manchester United - Power In The Darkness


Manchester United fans always suspected that Sir Alex Ferguson would be a tricky act to follow, but they probably did not anticipate it being quite so difficult. Since the Scot’s virtually unprecedented 27-year reign concluded in 2013, United have had to employ four managers in just over three seasons (including Ryan Giggs’ interim appointment).

David Moyes was the first to be handed the poisoned chalice, though he did not even last a full season before being unceremoniously sacked as the club failed to qualify for European competition for the first time since 1990. Hopes were higher when the experienced Louis van Gaal took the reigns and he did guide the club back to the Champions League, though his team failed to get through the group stage, losing to both Wolfsburg and PSV Eindhoven.

Even if United did win the FA Cup for a record-equalling 12th time, this was not enough to save the Dutchman, whose stultifying brand of football had not only created many enemies, but also resulted in a disappointing 5th place in the Premier League.

As former chief executive and non-executive director David Gill admitted, it was “undoubtedly a season of under-achievement… given the investment that was made.” This was a reference to van Gall splashing out over £250 million in a vain attempt to successfully rebuild an aging squad.

"Partial to your Ibracadabra"

And so José Mourinho duly arrived in May 2016, an appointment that had seemed almost inevitable once he had left Chelsea, albeit in less than happy circumstances. The Portuguese may not be everyone’s cup of tea, but he has delivered trophies at every club that has employed him.

Even for the “Special One”, United will be a major challenge, so he has wasted little time in adding more expensive recruits, including the talented Paul Pogba from Juventus for a record-breaking £89 million transfer fee just four years after he had moved in the opposite direction for a notional sum.

Such expenditure is testament to United’s amazing ability to generate cash. The club may not be firing on all cylinders on the pitch, but it is going great guns off it, as evidenced by the excellent 2015/16 financial results. As executive vice-chairman Ed Woodward put it, “Our record fiscal 2016 performance reflects the continued underlying strength of the business.”


Indeed, United reported a very healthy profit before tax of £49 million, which represented a dramatic improvement from the previous year’s £4 million loss. Profit after tax was somewhat lower at £36 million, as there was a £12 million tax expense, compared to a £3 million credit in the prior year, though this was still a great result.

The main reason for the improvement was revenue increasing by £120 million (30%) from £395 million to £515 million, the first time that a British club has broken through the £500 million barrier. All revenue streams grew, though commercial was the star performer, rising £71 million (36%) from £197 million to an incredible £268 million, primarily due to the commencement of the new Adidas kit agreement from 1 August 2015, which included a step-up in minimum guaranteed revenue and a contribution from several businesses previously operated by Nike.

Broadcasting and Match Day were both positively influenced by the return to European competition, rising by £33 million (30%) to £140 million and by £16 million (18%) to £107 million respectively. In contrast, profit from player sales was £33 million lower, as it swung from a £24 million profit the previous season to a £10 million loss this season.

"Many happy returns"

The impressive revenue growth was partly offset by corresponding increases in the costs. The wage bill rose by £30 million (15%) to £232 million, mainly due to the renewal of existing player contracts, couple with a salary uplift due to participation in UEFA competition. Similarly, other operating expenses increased by £19 million to £91 million, primarily due to retail and merchandising costs being recognised in-house, plus an increase in match day costs due to additional home games.

Exceptional items were £13 million higher at £15 million, including a £7 million impairment charge to write-off the value of German international Bastian Schweinsteiger, who is “no longer considered to be a member of the first team playing squad.”

There was also an £8 million pay-off to van Gaal and other members of his coaching staff, which means that United have now paid out a total of around £16 million to departing managers post-Ferguson.

However, profits were boosted by player amortisation being £12 million lower at £88 million, while net finance costs were cut by £15 million (43%) from £35 million to £20 million, due to the reduction in interest payable on the secured loan term facility and senior secured notes following the refinancing in June 2015.


In 2014/15 United were one of only six clubs in the Premier League to make a loss, as most clubs have become profitable thanks to the growth in the TV deal. United’s smallish £4 million deficit was essentially due to their lack of European competition (and money), but 2015/16 represents a return to the upper reaches of the top flight, at least in financial terms.

Although United are the first Premier League club to publish their 2015/16 accounts, their £49 million pre-tax profit would only have been surpassed by Liverpool’s £60 million in the previous season.


This performance is even more impressive considering that United’s profit was delivered despite making a £10 million loss on player sales, primarily as result of Angel Di Maria’s move to Paris Saint-Germain just one season after shelling out £60 million for the Argentine winger, though they probably also lost money on Robin van Persie’s move to Fenerbahce. Profits would have been recorded on the sale of Javier Hernandez to Bayer Leverkusen and Jonny Evans to WBA.

To place United’s loss into context, Liverpool’s 2014/15 £60 million profit was very largely due to making £56 million profit on player sales (Luis Suarez to Barcelona). Similar large sums were made that season by Southampton £44 million, Chelsea £42 million and Arsenal £29 million.


United now seem poised to report regular large profits, averaging £45 million profit in the last two seasons when they qualified for the Champions League: £41 million in 2014 and £49 million in 2016.

The last time that they reported a large loss was 2010, when the £44 million deficit was largely caused by £109 million of financing costs. This was actually lower than the £117 million of financing costs the previous season, but was partly compensated by the £80 million profit on player sales, almost entirely from Cristiano Ronaldo’s move to Real Madrid.


Since that mega deal in 2009, United have only once generated more than £20 million profit from player sales. That was in 2014/15, which included the transfers of Danny Welbeck to Arsenal and Nani to Fenerbahce, the returns of Shinji Kagawa to Borussia Dortmund and Wilfried Zaha to Crystal Palace, plus Michael Keane to Burnley and Bebé to Benfica.

However, this is not a major revenue-generating activity for Manchester United, though Ed Woodward has drawn investors’ attention to China as “another useful market if we’re looking to sell any players.” Anyone know if Wayne Rooney likes Chinese food?


Of course, United’s profits would have been substantially higher if the club did not have to bear the financing costs of the Glazers’ leveraged buy-out. In fact, over the last eight years they have made total operating profits of £526 million (including £138 million from player sales), which have been very largely wiped out by net financing costs of £480 million.


The good news is that the cost of this debt has been reducing following a series of refinancings, falling from that horrific £117 million in 2009 to “only” £20 million in 2016 (£13 million in cash terms). Coupled with the club’s explosive revenue growth, this means that financing costs have been cut from 42% of revenue in 2009 to just 4% last season.

That’s obviously great for United, but a little frightening for their rivals, as the club’s capacity to produce cash has never been in doubt. The bill for the Glazers has to an extent placed a break on United’s ability to spend, but this is not such a major factor anymore (even with the addition of dividends).


Accountants often use a metric called EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Depreciation and Amortisation) to assess a club’s underlying profitability and especially how much cash it produces. On this basis, United have been the undisputed champions over the years, but they have moved into another league in 2016, as their EBITDA shot up from £120 million to a deeply impressive £192 million.


To place this into context, the next highest EBITDA reported by other Premier League clubs in 2014/15 was Manchester City’s £83 million, more than £100 million lower. As another comparison, Arsenal’s EBITDA of £63 million is only around a third of United’s.

It is true that United are projecting a reduction in EBITDA in 2016/17, due to only competing in the Europa League, but their estimate of £170-180 million is still extremely good, driven by another increase in revenue to £530-540 million (mainly from the new Premier League television deal).


United’s revenue has grown by £152 million (42%) in the last three seasons, mostly due to the new deals with Chevrolet and Adidas, which have led to £69 million (76%) growth in sponsorship and £59 million (152%) in retail, merchandising and product licensing. There has also been a £39 million (38%) increase in broadcasting income, linked to the last TV deal in 2014.

However, it’s not been all good news, as mobile and content revenue has fallen by £12 million (53%) since 2013, due to the expiration of a few mobile partnerships, while match day income has also slightly reduced by £2 million (2%).


The 2015/16 revenue growth to £515 million has really distanced United from their domestic rivals. This is almost 50% higher than the closest challenger, Manchester City, though their £352 million is admittedly a 2014/15 figure.

The difference between United and the next clubs in the revenue league is the best part of £200 million: Arsenal £329 million (gap £186 million), Chelsea £314 million (gap £201 million) and Liverpool £298 million (gap £217 million). That is an astonishing competitive advantage for United and helps explain why they can drop £89 million on Pogba without batting an eyelid.


United stood at third place in the Deloitte 2015 Money League with revenue of £395 million, only behind Real Madrid £439 million and Barcelona £427 million, but ahead of Paris Saint-Germain and Bayern Munich. This was a notable achievement, as they were the only club in the Money League top ten not to benefit from Champions League participation, which demonstrates the underlying strength of United’s business model.

In fact, it is likely that United’s £515 million revenue will top the 2016 Money League when it is published, assuming that Deloitte maintain their approach of using the average exchange rate throughout the year. At that average rate of €1.34 to the £, Real Madrid’s €620 million is equivalent to £464 million, while Barcelona’s €612 million would be £458 million.

Of course, if we were to use the latest, post-Brexit Euro rate of 1.17, then it would be a different story: Real Madrid £530 million, Barcelona £523 million. Note: Barcelona announced total revenue of €679 million, but that included €67 million from player sales, which should be excluded for a like-for-like comparison.


If we compare the revenue of the other nine clubs in the Money League top ten, we can see United’s issue in 2015, namely the lack of Champions League TV money. This meant that United’s broadcasting income was lower than seven clubs, including Juventus who earned a staggering €89 million from Europe’s main tournament.

United were well ahead of all most clubs in terms of match day income, even without European competition, while they were only outperformed by two clubs commercially: Paris Saint-German, whose £226 million massively benefited from the French club’s “friendly” agreement with the Qatar Tourist Authority, and Bayern Munich, whose £212 million emphasised their commercial dominance in Germany.


Of course, those are the previous season’s figures, so it is entirely possible that United’s commercial income of £268 million is the highest in 2015/16. This now accounts for 52% of United’s total revenue, up from 24% in 2009. The importance of match day income, even though it is above £100 million, has consequently diminished from 41% to 21% over the same period.


Commercial activity is particularly important to the two Manchester clubs, accounting for around half of their revenue, compared to 39% at Liverpool, 34% at Chelsea, 31% at Arsenal and 30% at Tottenham.

United’s commercial income of £268 million in 2015/16 is evidence of the club’s ability to monetize its global brand through three revenue streams: (a) sponsorship – up 3% to £160 million; (b) retail, merchandising, apparel and product licensing – up 207% to £97 million; (c) mobile and content – up 4% to £11 million.


Domestically, United’s £268 million is around £100 million more than Manchester City’s £173 million (2014/15), though it will be interesting to see how their “noisy neighbours” have progressed last season. To further place this in perspective, it’s around the same as the three leading London clubs combined (Chelsea £108 million, Arsenal £103 million and Tottenham £60 million)

To give a better idea of United’s commercial might, £268 million is higher than the total revenue at all but nine of the Money League clubs in 2014/15, ahead of the likes of Juventus, Borussia Dortmund and Tottenham.


There’s an old investment saying that “elephants don’t gallop”, but United’s growth rate of 128% since 2012 outpaces all their rivals. Admittedly, those clubs could also grow more in 2015/16, but Arsenal (the team with the next highest percentage growth) would have to increase their commercial revenue by £17 million to £120 million to match United’s growth rate, which seems unlikely based on their half-year accounts.

This year’s figures include the new kit supplier agreement with Adidas, which is worth £750 million over the next 10 years, i.e. £75 million a year. This is £50 million higher than the previous Nike deal. Not only that, but it has allowed the club to take control of various activities, e.g. they have brought the management of the Old Trafford Megastore in-house and signed a number of lucrative licensing deals.


There are success clauses are built into this contract, e.g. if United fail to participate in the Champions League for two or more consecutive seasons, then the payment for that year would reduce up to 30%, i.e. £22.5 million, though this would be spread over the remainder of the contract. On the other hand, success in the Premier League, FA Cup or Champions League would bring an additional maximum of £4 million.

Nevertheless, it is still an astonishing deal, significantly higher than the £30 million agreements at Arsenal (PUMA) and Chelsea (Adidas), though Chelsea will switch to Nike for £60 million from the 2017/18 season.

At the time it was signed, United describe theirs as the “largest kit manufacture sponsorship deal in sport”, though it has since been reportedly overtaken by new agreements signed by Barcelona (Nike) and Real Madrid (Adidas), which would be worth £125 million and £115 million respectively (at the current exchange rate).


In England, United’s ability to “extract value from their sponsorship deals is almost unprecedented, as seen by the seven-year shirt deal signed with General Motors (Chevrolet) running to the end of the 2020/21 season worth a total of $559 million. As GM paid United $18.6 million in each of the 2012/13 and 2013/14 seasons for “pre-sponsorship support and exposure”, the remaining $521.8 million works out to $74.5 million a year.

At the 30 June 2015 $ rate of 1.57, that was equivalent to £47 million a year, a figure that has been widely reported, but at the 30 June 2016 rate of 1.33, it is worth £56 million, which is considerably more than the next highest English shirt sponsorship deals, namely Chelsea (Yokohama) £40 million and Arsenal (Emirates) £30 million.

United’s previous shirt sponsors, Aon, have not completely exited the scene though, as they will pay for the privilege of being United’s training kit partner until 2020/21 including renaming the training facilities at Carrington as the Aon Training Complex.

"A prisoner of the past"

On top of that, United continue to announce new sponsorships, 25 in the last two seasons alone: 11 global sponsors, 9 regional sponsors and 5 financial services, MUTV and telecom partnerships.

United also earn good money from promotional tours and exhibition matches, e.g. £10 million in 2015/16, £13 million in 2014/15. However, the Glazers have drawn the line at selling naming rights to the Old Trafford stadium, which are potentially worth £20 million a year.

The only potential fly in the ointment is if United’s lack of success on the pitch persists, especially if the football is not in line with their swashbuckling tradition. Indeed, last season Adidas chief executive Hubert Hainer, while boasting that shirt sales had exceeded expectations, had a dig at the team’s playing style, which was “not exactly what we want to see.”


United’s match day revenue rose 18% (£16 million) from £91 million to £107 million in 2015/16, as they played 8 more games at home, largely arising from a return to European competition (4 Champions League, 2 Europa League). As a result, they have once again overtaken Arsenal’s £100 million.

These two are a long way ahead of other English clubs, e.g. Chelsea £71 million, Liverpool £51 million, Manchester City £43 million and Tottenham £41 million, which helps explain why they are all investing in stadium development/expansion.


United’s average attendance of 75,000 is far higher than any other English club (Arsenal being the nearest at just under 60,000), with Old Trafford being the largest football club stadium in the UK. Season ticket prices were frozen for the 2016/17 season, which means that prices have been held for five consecutive seasons. That said, United have the most expensive season tickets outside London.

The club places great emphasis on its premium seating and hospitality facilities in order to maximise match day revenue, as can be seen by Old Trafford (“the theatre of dreams”) having 154 luxury boxes, approximately 8,000 executive club seats, 15 restaurants and 4 sports bars. In this way, in 2015/16 United generated around £34 million from hospitality (compared to £52 million from gate receipts).


United’s share of the Premier League television money was flat at £97 million in 2015/16. They actually earned £6 million more than champions Leicester City, as the smaller merit payment for finishing four places lower was more than offset by higher facility fees for having 11 more games broadcast live. This again is down to the United brand.

This is even before the increases from the mega Premier League TV deal in 2016/17. Based on the contracted 70% increase in the domestic deal and 40% increase in the overseas deals (per United’s press release), the top four clubs would receive around £150 million, while even the bottom club would trouser around £95 million.

Although this is clearly great news for the clubs, it is somewhat of a double-edged sword for the elite, as it makes it more difficult (or at the very least more expensive) to persuade the mid-tier clubs to sell their talent, thus increasing competition.


The other main element of broadcasting revenue is European competition, though United have not done so well here recently. They have only got as far as the quarter-finals once in the last five years (under the much maligned Moyes in 2013/14), while not qualifying at all in 2014/15.

UEFA have not yet published the revenue distribution details for 2015/16, but my estimate for United’s share is €40 million, based on the increases in the 2016 to 2018 cycle, namely higher prize money plus significant growth in the TV (market) pool, thanks to BT Sports paying more than Sky/ITV for live games (worth €125 million vs. €94 million, per United’s 20-F submission).


United’s 2015/16 Champions League payment was partly influenced by their progress in the tournament, but was to an extent compromised by their 4th place finish in the 2014/15 Premier League. This is because half of the market pool is allocated based on the finishing place in the previous season’s domestic league: 1st place 40%, 2nd place 30%, 3rd place 20% and 4th place 10%.

The value of Champions League qualification is clear, especially if it is compared to the Europa League, where the most earned by an English club in 2014/15 was Everton’s €7.5 million.

Mourinho has admitted that the Europa League is “not a competition that Manchester United wants” from a sporting perspective, but Hemen Tseayo, United’s head of corporate finance, outlined the damage in financial terms. He estimated that the Europa League is worth around £30 million less than the Champions League in broadcasting income (plus another £5-6 million in gate receipts), though this is mitigated by lower salary/bonus payments and cost of staging games.


United’s wage bill increased by 15% (£30 million) from £203 million to £232 million, primarily due to player contract extensions and an uplift in salaries due to participation in the Champions League, though the wages to turnover ratio was reduced from 51% to 45% following the surge in revenue.


Not only is this the the lowest wages to turnover ratio at United since 2009, but is by some distance the smallest in the Premier League, the closest challengers being Newcastle and Tottenham with 51%. Put another way, United’s wages to turnover ratio is the best in the top flight, even though their wage bill is the highest.


Their 2015/16 wage bill of £232 million has overtaken Chelsea’s £216 million from the previous season and is around £40 million more than Manchester City £194 million and Arsenal £192 million.

Of course, United fans will be quick to point out that City’s wage bill might well have gone up in 2015/16. They will also have noted that some of City’s decrease from the English all-time high of £233 million in 2012/13 is due to a restructure whereby some staff are now paid by group companies with the costs included in external charges, as opposed to wages.


In any case, United’s wages are way ahead of most Premier League clubs with some of the nearest challengers (in 2014/15) being Liverpool £166 million, Tottenham £101 million, Aston Villa £84 million and Everton £78 million. For context, United’s wage bill is about the same as Tottenham, Everton and Leicester City combined.

The Premier League’s Short Term Cost controls restricted the annual player wage cost increases to £4 million for the three years up to 2015/16, then £7 million a year for the next three-year cycle to 2018/19 – except if funded by increases in revenue rom sources other than Premier League broadcasting contracts. In other words, United are fine here, due to their massive commercial revenue growth.


Although there is a natural focus on wages, other expenses also account for a considerable part of the budget at leading clubs. Excluding player amortisation, depreciation and exceptional items, United’s other expenses increased in 2015/16 by £19 million (26%) from £72 million to £91 million, due to retail and merchandising being recognised in-house, plus higher match day costs in line with more home games.

This is again the highest in the Premier League, ahead of Chelsea £83 million, Manchester City £76 million and Arsenal £74 million, though there have been media reports that the Glazers have demanded cuts of 15% in most departments, including the academy.


Another cost that has had a major impact on United’s profit and loss account is player amortisation, which is the method that football clubs use to account for transfer fees. As a result of the recent huge increase in spending, player amortisation has shot up from £38 million in 2012 to £88 million in 2016. Although this is £12 million lower than the previous season’s £100 million, it should shoot up again next year following this summer’s splurge.


As a reminder of how this works, transfer fees are not fully expensed in the year a player is purchased, but the cost is written-off evenly over the length of the player’s contract – even if the entire fee is paid upfront. As an example, Pogba was reportedly bought for £89 million on a five-year deal, so the annual amortisation in the accounts for him would be £18 million.


Unsurprisingly, United's player amortisation is now the largest in the Premier League, though City are likely to be close to this amount when they publish their 2015/16 accounts. Basically, those clubs that are regarded as big spenders logically have the highest amortisation charges, e.g. City £70 million and Chelsea £69 million, while Arsenal’s relatively restrained spending has left them with £54 million of player amortisation in 2014/15.

United have really ramped up their spend in the transfer market in the last few seasons, splashing out huge sums to compensate for the years of austerity (relatively speaking). In essence, Ferguson’s genius at working on a tight transfer budget delivered great results, but also resulted in a squad that needed to be substantially upgraded by his successors.


In the five years between 2006 and 2011, United’s average annual net spend was only £3 million (gross £33 million), a paltry sum for a club of this magnitude, though this was obviously impacted by Ronaldo’s £80 million sale to Real Madrid. However, in the next three years the average net spend rose to £52 million (gross £61 million), and then accelerated again to £92 million (gross £133 million) in the last three seasons.

That’s around £400 million in the last three seasons, as United has recruited expensive new blood, including (deep breath) Paul Pogba, Eric Bailly, Henrikh Mikhitaryan, Zlatan Ibrahimovic, Anthony Martial, Memphis Depay, Morgan Schneiderlin, Matteo Darmian, Bastian Schweinsteiger, Angel Di Maria, Ander Herrera, Luke Shaw, Marcos Rojo and Daley Blind.

After the Pogba deal, Mourinho observed, “sometimes in football things happen and the club breaks the record, but this is only possible at clubs like Manchester United” in a thinly veiled jibe at Arsène Wenger and Jürgen Klopp.


Despite this massive outlay, United’s net spend of £275 million in this period was still beaten by Manchester City’s £299 million, though it was well clear of Arsenal £165 million and Chelsea £123 million. As Woodward explained, “there’s a bit more pressure on some of the bigger clubs to bring in top players, verging on world class, that are going to hit the ground running.”

Perhaps the most eye-opening signing was Martial with United paying an initial £38.5 million (€50 million) for the 19-year old forward plus a potential £23 million (€30 million) in add-ons. These comprise three bonus payments of €10 million dependent on the following achievements: 25 goals, 25 French caps and being shortlisted for the Ballon d’Or award during his time at Old Trafford.

Woodward has cautioned that the club may reduce its spending in future: “As a club we will always invest in the squad to the extent that we feel that we need to, so that we are challenging for titles, but this sustained level is probably relatively high compared to what is needed.” However, as we have seen, United generate more than enough cash in future for similar purchases – if they want to do so.


United’s gross debt rose by £79 million from £411 million to £490 million (the highest since 2010), largely due to the impact of exchange rate movements on the USD denominated debt (1.57 to 1.33). This comprises $425 million of Senior Secured Notes (3.79%, repayment 2027) and a $225 million Secured Term Facility (1.25-1.75%, repayment 2025).

However, net debt only rose by £6 million from £255 million to £261 million, as cash balances increased by £73 million from £156 million to £229 million.


The 2015 refinancing increased the debt, but extended the repayment dates with a lower interest rate, thus reducing the annual financing costs to £20 million, compared to £35 million the previous year (including a premium paid for the refinancing).

Despite the reduction, this is a lot more than any other Premier League club with Arsenal being the only other club with a double-digit interest payment of £13 million. To place that into perspective, Manchester City, Tottenham, Everton and Liverpool all had net interest payable of only £4-5 million.


Although these interest payments are clearly manageable, United supporters would prefer this money to be spent on further strengthening the squad. Former chief executive David Gill famously said that “debt is the road to ruin” before the Glazers purchased the club, which has not exactly proved to be the case for United, but it has undoubtedly been damaging to their prospects.

The only other Premier League club with anything like the same levels of borrowing is Arsenal, whose £232 million represents the debt incurred for the construction of the Emirates Stadium. There were just two other Premier League clubs with debt above £100 million in 2014/15, namely Sunderland £141 million and Newcastle United £129 million.


United’s business model only works as they are a veritable cash machine, once again evidenced in 2015/16 when they generated £201 million of cash from operating activities. They then spent a net £100 million on player registrations (£138 million of purchases less £38 million of sales), slightly more than the previous season’s £97 million. That does not even include this summer’s purchases with a note in the accounts stating that a further £160 million was spent on acquiring players.

In addition, £13 million went on interest payments and £20 million on dividends. There was also £5 million of infrastructure investment, mainly to refurbishment work at Old Trafford and the Aon Training Complex, and a £2 million tax payment. As a result, cash rose £61 million before being boosted by £13 million of FX gains to give a net increase of £73 million.


In the last seven years United have generated an incredible £1.25 billion of cash: £936 million from operating activities plus £318 million from share issues. Just over £400 million (32%) of this has been spent on player purchases and £68 million (5%) on capital expenditure, but the majority £671 million (54%) has been used to finance the Glazers’ loans: £424 million of interest payments and £247 million of debt repayments.


The good news is that there has been a clear swing in the last three years from using cash to finance debt to player purchases – “our strong commitment to invest in our squad”, as Woodward put it. In the period 2010-14, United spent an average of £158 million each year on financing debt, compared to just £32 million on players. However, in the last 3 years, the average financing expenditure has fallen to £23 million, while player spend has risen to £92 million.

This is partly due to annual interest payments being reduced to £13 million, though this has been replaced by an annual dividend of £20 million, including £2.5 million to each of Malcolm Glazer’s six children (amounting to £15 million).


Although this is rather galling to the club’s supporters, there is certainly enough cash available in the club’s coffers with United’s £229 million now just ahead of Arsenal’s £228 million in 2014/15, but miles above all other Premier League clubs, e.g. the next highest balances were Manchester City £75 million and Newcastle United £48 million. That said, there are high amounts owed for transfer fees, amounting to £156 million, up from £115 million in 2015.

In conclusion, Manchester United’s financial status is the envy of almost every other football club on the planet. They are a commercial powerhouse generating the highest revenue and cash in England (possibly the world, depending on exchange rates), which means that they can spend huge sums on player transfers and wages.

"Left to my own devices"

As Ed Woodward said, “The club is on target to achieve record revenues in 2017, even without a contribution from the Champions League. This strong financial performance has enabled us to invest in our squad, team management and facilities to position us to challenge for, and win, trophies in the coming years.”

Success on the pitch has to be the club’s top priority. There’s no doubt that money is available for United to attract star names to Old Trafford, though ironically their shining light in recent times has been local lad Marcus Rashford, an academy graduate who cost nothing.

"At the height of the fighting"

For a club of United’s size and history to be struggling so badly is a major surprise, especially as the board has loosened the purse strings since Ferguson’s departure. Of course, money doesn’t guarantee success (see Leicester City’s triumph last season), but it is normally a fairly reliable indicator, so the onus is now on the team to deliver.

Woodward described José Mourinho’s appointment as “a reflection of the club’s determination to return to the pinnacle of our sport”, but at the moment this looks a long way off. The new era has had a shaky start, not least in comparison to Manchester City, where Pep Guardiola has already got his team playing some dazzling football.

Ultimately, the question remains: can Mourinho succeed where Moyes and van Gaal have failed and lead United back to former glories? One thing is for sure, if his reign does end in disappointment, it is unlikely to be down to a lack of money.
Related Posts Plugin for WordPress, Blogger...