“Good
old Sussex by the sea, Good old Sussex by the sea, Oh we’re going up….”
Brighton and Hove Albion’s famous song goes on to refer to
winning the cup, but these days the Seagulls are firmly focused on going up to
the Premier League. The club has transformed itself from relegation candidates
in a “disappointing” 2014/15 to viable promotion contenders this season.
Indeed, the Albion currently sit proudly on top of the table
and after 19 games are the only remaining unbeaten side among the 92 Football
League clubs. As chairman Tony Bloom commented, this represents “a tremendous
improvement and progress in the past 12 months.”
Under the guidance of manager Chris Hughton, who replaced
Sami Hyypia on New Year’s Eve after the Finn had finally been “binned”,
Brighton are once again playing some effective football.
The proverbial “safe pair of hands”, the knowledgeable Hughton
first ensured that Brighton stayed up and has since “reshaped the squad into
one capable of competing at the top end of the Championship.” As Hughton said,
“We knew it was going to be a big recruitment summer. We lost nine players and
knew we had to bring in nine, which is really too many.”
"Marching orders"
Nevertheless, they have recruited well, signing a good blend
of experience and youth including Liam Rosenior, Jamie Murphy, Uwe Hünemeier,
Gaetan Bong, Tomer Hemed, Niki Mäenpää, Elvis Manu and Connor Goldson. They
also captured James Harper, the promising “kid from Madrid”, and delivered the
icing on the cake in the form of returning hero Bobby Zamora.
Last season was particularly frustrating after the club’s
development over the past few years. Following promotion from League One in
2011, Brighton had qualified for the Championship play-offs two years in
succession in 2013 and 2014.
The recent success tastes all the sweeter when the many
years of adversity are considered. In the early 90s the Goldstone Ground was
sold to property developers, ostensibly to pay off the club’s debts, though the
vast majority of fans considered this to be a blatant act of asset-stripping by
the reviled chairman, Bill Archer, and his partner-in-crime, chief executive
David Bellotti.
In 1997 Brighton avoided relegation out of the Football
League to the Conference by the skin of their teeth, as a 1-1 draw at Hereford
United condemned their opponents to the dreaded drop, but there then followed
years of struggle, exacerbated by the problems of finding a suitable ground.
"Let's get serious"
First came exile to Kent, where a ground share with
Gillingham meant a 140-mile round-trip for Albion fans to attend their “home”
games. After two long years the club made its weary way back to Brighton in
1999, but the destination was Withdean, an old council-owned athletics stadium
where the facilities were far from ideal. Largely open to the elements, the
“theatre of trees” was arguably the worst stadium in the whole of the Football
League with totally inadequate facilities, but at least chairman Dick Knight
had brought the club back home.
It took 12 years, but finally Brighton moved to the
magnificent new Amex stadium in Falmer. The major investment required to build
the stadium (and indeed a superb new training centre) was financed by Tony
Bloom, a lifelong fan who became chairman with Knight taking the role of life
president.
It is now a realistic aspiration for Brighton to seek
promotion. Although the club has never been in the Premier League, it did play
in the old First Division, which was then the top tier of English football, for
four seasons between 1979 and 1983, when they also came within a kick of
beating the mighty Manchester United in the 1983 FA Cup Final (“and Smith must
score”).
So the club has made great strides off the pitch in the past
few years, but the financial results for the 2014/15 season “reflected a
difficult season”, though the £10.4 million loss was a slight improvement on
the previous year’s £10.6 million.
There was a small decrease in turnover of £0.3 million (1%)
from £24.0 million to £23.7 million. Although there was solid growth of £0.7
million (8%) in commercial income to £8.9 million, as a result of the
sponsorship of the American Express Elite Football Performance Centre and the
Academy grant increasing from £0.5 million to £0.9 million for Category 1 status,
the other revenue streams fell.
Gate receipts were £0.6 million (5%) lower in line with the
fall in attendances, while broadcasting income dropped £0.5 million (9%), as
the club featured less on live TV.
On top of that, all cost lines were higher. Wages rose £0.3
million (2%) to £20.6 million, while other expenses surged £2.3 million (19%)
to £15.0 million. There were also increases in the non-cash expenses, as
depreciation was up £1.4 million (41%) and player amortisation rose £0.3
million (14%) to £2.4 million.
The deterioration in ongoing revenue and costs was
compensated by a significant £4.9 million increase in profits on player sales
from £3.8 million to £8.7 million, largely due to the sales of Leo Ulloa to
Leicester City and Will Buckley to Sunderland.
To be fair to Brighton, almost all clubs in the Championship
lose money and are reliant on owners’ funding. In 2013/14, the last season when
all clubs have published their accounts, losses were reported by 21 of the 24
clubs – in stark contrast to the Premier League where the new TV deal, allied
with wage controls, has led to a surge in profitability. The only clubs to make
money in the Championship were Blackpool (and their model is not one to be
recommended), Wigan Athletic and Yeovil Town.
As Bloom noted, “Any Championship club wishing to compete
for promotion will inevitably make significant losses, so it remains a delicate
balancing act for the board, recruitment team and manager as we strive to
achieve our ultimate aim.”
That said, Brighton’s loss of £11 million in 2013/14 was one
of the highest in the league, only surpassed by six clubs: Blackburn Rovers £42
million, Nottingham Forest £23 million, Leicester City £21 million,
Middlesbrough £20 million, Leeds United £20 million and Millwall £12 million.
This was despite Brighton making a fair amount from profits
on player sales with only three clubs generating more money from this activity
in 2013/14. Again, Championship clubs rarely sell players for big bucks, at
least compared to the Premier League, but this has become increasingly
important to Brighton, rising from £3.8 million to £8.7 million in 2014/15.
It is believed that Brighton have received additional
payments of around £2 million for Ulloa and Buckley helping their clubs stay
up. Although it is not completely clear whether these payments were included in
the 2014/15 accounts, the contingent receivables on transfers have fallen from
£4.3 million to £2.1 million, so it is a reasonable assumption that they have
been booked.
Of course, losses are nothing new for Brighton. The last
time that they made a profit was back in 2007/08 – and that was less than £1
million and only arose because of a £3.6 million exceptional credit, due to a
change in the accounting for the Falmer stadium expenses incurred to date.
Since then, the club has made cumulative losses of £62
million. In fact, their losses have increased as the stakes have got higher,
i.e. targeting promotion to England’s top flight, where the financial rewards
are enormous. This has produced £46 million of losses in the four years since
promotion to the Championship, averaging more than £11 million a season. As
Tony Bloom put it, “most Championship clubs are currently loss-making as a
means of supporting their own ambitions.”
As we have seen, the 2014/15 figures were flattered by hefty
profits on player sales. Traditionally Brighton have made very little from the
transfer market until 2013/14 when the club sold Liam Bridcutt to Sunderland
and Ashley Barnes to Burnley.
Next year’s accounts will be interesting, as no major sales
were made this summer. In fact, Brighton demonstrated their ambition by
resisting Fulham’s offer of £4-5 million for central defender Lewis Dunk, who
is not even guaranteed a starting place.
That said, Bloom admitted, “It would be ridiculous for me or
any owner to say that a player is never for sale. There’s always a price for
any player.” In particular, Brighton have a number of players that could
attract tempting bids from bigger clubs, e.g. Solly March, Dale Stephens, Beram
Kayal and that man Dunk.
Brighton’s strategy is more clearly seen by the club’s
alternative presentation of the profit and loss account, which highlights the
increase in the football budget last season, funded by making the
administrative and operational costs more efficient plus improvements in player
trading.
This has been driven by chief executive Paul Barber, who
explained the approach in this way, “I’m obsessive about reducing our
operational costs, cutting waste, getting better supplier deals, and making the
club more efficient, because it's the only way that we can maintain a
competitive playing budget without breaking Financial Fair Play (FFP)
regulations.”
Finance director David Jones added, “We have continued to
increase our investment in football, and in particular player wages, in order
to give ourselves the best possible chance of success on the pitch.” This
enabled Brighton to invest an additional £3 million in the club’s football
budget in 2014/15.
In fact, Brighton’s managers have benefited from a
significant increase in this football budget of around 80% since 2012, as it
has grown from £13.1 million to £23.7 million.
This was a notable achievement, especially in a season that
Barber described as “unexpectedly difficult”. He added, “Ticket sales fell,
merchandising sales fell and, on top of that, our Football League income fell
too. Against such a backdrop, keeping our turnover ticking over was the first
priority. Give or take, we managed to keep our overall income static, despite
reductions in key areas.”
To put this into perspective, Brighton’s revenue has grown
by almost 500% since 2009, surging from £4 million to £24 million, largely due
to what can de described as the "Amex effect", though the promotion
from League One to the Championship in 2011 has obviously also helped.
Following the move from Withdean, gate receipts are more than four time higher, increasing from £2.3
million to £9.8 million.
In addition, the new stadium has brought more commercial
opportunities, leading to income climbing from £3.1 million to £8.9 million.
The club could negotiate better deals with sponsors in the higher division (up
from £0.8 million to £5.6 million), increase retail sales, e.g. from the
stadium megastore (up from £0.5 million to £1.2 million) and make more from
catering, i.e. pies and the famous Harveys beer (up from £35k to £1.0 million).
In 2013/14 Brighton’s revenue of £24 million was the 8th
highest in the Championship, but the clubs with the three highest revenues
(QPR, Reading and Wigan Athletic) were more than 50% higher with £37-39
million.
Money often talks in football, so it is no surprise that two
of the four clubs with the highest revenue were promoted that season: QPR and
Leicester City. The exception to the rule was Burnley, who had the 11th largest
revenue, £4 million less than Brighton, so it is still possible to get out of
the Championship on a modest budget.
Of course, these revenue figures are distorted by the
parachute payments made to those clubs relegated from the Premier League, e.g.
in 2013/14 the first year of relegation was worth £24 million. If we were to
exclude this “disparity” (as Barber calls it), then Brighton’s revenue would
have been the 3rd highest in the Championship, only behind Leicester City and
Leeds United.
As Barber observed, “Championship clubs need to be spending
the sort of money we are spending to be competitive, but it is certainly easier
to do this if you have higher incomes supported by parachute payments.”
Following last season’s movements, the club’s revenue mix
has also changed, though the majority (41%) still comes from gate receipts
(down from 43%). Commercial income’s share has increased from 34% to 38%, while
broadcasting has reduced from 23% to 21%. This is a not untypical mix for
Championship clubs, as opposed to the Premier League where TV is by far the
largest source of income – up to 80% for some clubs.
Clearly, Brighton are more reliant on match day income than
most clubs. In fact, in 2013/14 only two clubs were more dependent on this
revenue stream: Charlton Athletic 50% and Nottingham Forest 44%.
However, Brighton’s gate receipts fell 5% (£0.6 million)
from £10.4 million to £9.8 million in 2014/15, driven by a decrease in average
attendance from 27,110 to 25,649 and one less cup game being staged at the
Amex. Despite the reduction, this is still likely to be the highest match day
revenue in the Championship, as they were far ahead of the closest challengers
the previous season (Leeds United £8.6 million and Nottingham Forest £7.2
million), partly due to the transport levy paid to rail and bus companies.
After having the highest attendances in the Championship for
two seasons in a row, Brighton fell back to 3rd place in 2014/15, behind Derby
County 29,232 and Norwich City 26,343.
Since the move to the Amex, attendances had been steadily
rising from the 7,352 at Withdean, as the new stadium finally met latent local
demand for tickets. Capacity has been increased twice since the original move:
in July 2012 it grew from 22,500 to 27,444 after the Upper tier of the East
Stand was extended; and in March 2013 there was a further increase to 30,750
after all four corners were completed.
Although the reduction in attendances must be of concern,
Brighton’s potential was highlighted by a new record crowd of 30,278 being set
in the FA Cup 4th round tie against Arsenal in January 2015.
Ticket prices are among the highest in the Championship.
According to the BBC’s Price of Football survey, Brighton have the second
highest cheapest season ticket (only below Hull City) and the fifth highest
most expensive season ticket (behind Fulham, Ipswich, Sheffield Wednesday and
QPR).
However, Barber argued: “Once the cost of travel is
deducted, our average ticket price is very much in line with the Championship
and wider Football League average prices.” He also pointed to the magnificent
facilities that are second to none, including free wifi and VIP padded seats,
In 2014/15 Barber “kept season ticket prices as low as
possible”, which meant an average increase of 3%, though there was a price
freeze for juniors. The good news is that in 2015/16 the club froze season
ticket prices, extended the subsidised travel zone and introduced a new age
bracket for fans under 21.
Brighton’s broadcasting revenue fell from £5.4 million to
£4.9 million in 2014/15, which was attributed to the club being shown less on
live TV, but was also due to not appearing in the play-offs. In the
Championship most clubs receive the same annual sum for TV, regardless of where
they finish in the league, amounting to just £4 million of central
distributions: £1.7 million from the Football League pool and a £2.3 million
solidarity payment from the Premier League.
However, the clear importance of parachute payments is once
again highlighted in this revenue stream, greatly influencing the top eight
earners, though it should be noted that clubs receiving parachute payments do
not also receive solidarity payments.
Looking at the television distributions in the top flight,
the massive financial disparity between England’s top two leagues becomes
evident with Premier League clubs receiving between £65 million and £99
million, compared to the £4 million in the Championship. In other words, it
would take a Championship club more than 15 years to earn the same amount as
the bottom placed club in the Premier League.
As we have seen, parachute payments make a significant
difference to a club’s revenue and therefore its spending power in the
Championship. Up to now, these have been worth £65 million over four years:
year 1 £25 million, year 2 £20 million and £10 million in each of years 3 and
4.
However, the Premier League has recently announced changes
to this structure, whereby from 2016/17 clubs will only receive parachute
payments for three seasons after relegation, although the amounts will be
higher (my estimate is £75 million, based on the advised percentages of the
equal share paid to Premier League clubs: year 1 55%, year 2 45% and year 3
20%).
There are some arguments in favour of these payments, namely
that it encourages clubs promoted to the Premier League to invest to compete,
safe in the knowledge that if the worst happens and they do end up relegated at
the end of the season, then there is a safety net. However, they do undoubtedly
create a significant revenue advantage compared to clubs like Brighton.
If Brighton were to gain promotion, the financial prize for
returning to the Premier League would be immense, exacerbated by the recent
blockbuster Premier League deal that starts in 2016/17, which Barber described
as “astonishing”. I have estimated this be worth an additional £30-50 million
for Premier League clubs, depending on where they finish in the table, though
my assumption for overseas deals may prove to be a little conservative.
Even if a team were to finish last in their first season and
go straight back down, their TV revenue would increase by an amazing £87
million (£92 million less £5 million) and they would also receive a further £64
million in parachute payments (restricted for clubs only in the Premier League
for one season), giving additional funds of around £150 million. The size of
the prize helps explain the loss-making behaviour of many Championship clubs.
Of course, Brighton would also have to spend more to improve
their playing squad, but the net impact on the club’s finances would
undoubtedly be positive, as evidenced by the clubs promoted in the past few
seasons.
Commercial income was the most impressive revenue performer
in 2014/15, rising 8% (£0.7 million) from £8.2 million to £8.9 million,
comprising commercial sponsorship and advertising £5.6 million, retail £1.2
million, catering and events £0.9 million and academy grant £0.9 million.
In the new world of FFP, Bloom said that the club “had to
adapt and move quickly to establish a sharper commercial focus. We had to focus
on the inherent value of our brand.” The club’s success in this area is
reflected by Brighton having the 3rd highest commercial revenue in the
Championship, only behind Leicester City (boosted by a “friendly” marketing
deal with Trestellar Limited) and Leeds United, as befitting their fine
history.
This is despite the fact that Brighton now only report the
net catering commission in revenue, whereas in previous seasons all the gross
revenue was included in revenue with the expenses shown in costs.
"Tell me when my light turns green"
What has been particularly impressive is the increase in
sponsorship. American Express are not only shirt sponsors, but also naming
rights partner for the stadium and the training ground. This multi-year
agreement, signed in March 2013, was described by Barber as “the biggest in the
club’s history.”
Similarly, Barber said that the 2014/15 Nike deal, replacing
Errea after 15 years as the club’s kit supplier, represented “a significant
increase on our existing commercial arrangement.”
Interestingly, the club has applied for planning permission
for a 150 room hotel alongside the stadium through its subsidiary, The
Community Stadium Ltd, with a planned opening in summer 2017. This would enable
the club to host more events like the two rugby World Cup matches in September.
Brighton’s total wage bill rose by 2% (£0.3 million) from
£20.3 million to £20.6 million, though this was still lower then the 2013 peak
of £21.1 million. It is worth noting that since 2012, the first year back in
the Championship, the wage bill has grown by £6 million (41%), while revenue
has only increased by £1.5 million (7%).
Furthermore, given the significant reduction in
administrative and operational expenses, it is likely that the players wage
bill has increased by a healthy amount.
Despite this growth, Brighton’s wage bill is still only the
8th highest in the Championship, thus outside the top six, as noted by Hughton,
so promotion would indeed be a fine achievement. It was significantly lower
than the likes of Leicester City, Reading, Blackburn Rovers and Wigan Athletic,
whose wages were all above £30 million. QPR were even higher at £75 million,
but that was simply ridiculous in the second tier.
The remuneration for the highest paid director, who is not
named, but is surely Paul Barber, has decreased from £652k to £558k, almost
certainly due to the previous season including a large bonus for the chief
executive’s success in cutting operational expenses and renegotiating many of
the sponsorships.
Although Brighton’s wages to turnover ratio increased from
85% to 87%, which is not exactly great, it is by no means one of the highest in
the Championship. No fewer than 10 clubs “boasted” a wages to turnover ratio
above 100% in 2013/14 with the worst offenders being QPR 195%, Bournemouth 172%
and Nottingham Forest 165%.
The (relatively) prudent approach is evidently the one that
Brighton want to follow, especially in a FFP world, as noted by Bloom: “While
we do want to play at the highest level, we cannot simply open our cheque book
and start spending without care or attention.”
Other expenses rose by 19% (£2.3 million) from £12.6 million
to £15.0 million, which are the 2nd highest in the Championship, only behind
Leeds United. These represent the other side of the coin of moving to the Amex,
as the club noted: “The operational and administrative costs of running a state
of the art stadium are significant.”
Depreciation increased by 41% (£1.4 million) from £3.5
million to £4.9 million, which is by far the most in the Championship, the next
highest being Derby County £2.1 million. This represents the annual charge of
writing-off the cost of the stadium and (for the first time in 2014/15) the
training ground. These are depreciated over 50 years, i.e. 2% of cost per
annum.
Player amortisation was 14% (£0.3 million) higher at £2.4
million, but this is strictly mid-table in the Championship. To put this into
perspective, the highest player amortisation in 2013/14 was at QPR £16.6 million,
Blackburn Rovers £7.2 million, Wigan Athletic £6.8 million and Nottingham
Forest £5.7 million.
The way that football clubs account for player trading can
be confusing, but the fundamental point is that when a club purchases a player
the costs are spread over a few years, but any profit made from selling players
is immediately booked to the accounts.
So, when a club buys a player, it does not show the full
transfer fee in the accounts in that year, but writes-down the cost (evenly)
over the length of the player’s contract. Therefore, if Brighton were to spend
£10 million (if only) on a new player with a 5-year contract, the annual
expense would be only £2 million (£10 million divided by 5 years) in player
amortisation (on top of wages).
However, when that player is sold, the club reports the
profit on player sales straight away. This essentially equals sales proceeds
less any remaining value in the accounts. In our example, if the player were to
be sold 3 years later for £13 million, the cash profit would be £3 million (£13
million less £10 million), but the accounting profit would be higher at £9
million, as the club would have already booked £6 million of amortisation (3
years at £2 million).
Over the years, Brighton have not been a big player in the
transfer market, often registering net sales, though they have increased their
gross spend recently, averaging £4.4 million in the last two seasons, compared
to just £0.5 million over the previous eight seasons.
However, it is apparent that Brighton have not gone
overboard in terms of spending, especially compared to some of their principal
rivals who are really “going for it”. To illustrate this, in the last two
seasons Brighton had net sales of £2 million, while four clubs had net spend
above £10 million: Middlesbrough £15 million, Burnley £14 million, Derby County
£14 million and Hull City £12 million.
To be fair, this comparison has to be treated with some
caution, as the figures are distorted by clubs that were in the Premier League
the previous season, either because of high spend when they were in the top
flight or large sales following their relegation. Furthermore, many deals are
“undisclosed” in the Championship, so might have no reported value.
That said, it is clear that Brighton have been comfortably
outspent by many other clubs. As Hughton observed, “There are big spenders in
the Championship. We aimed to put ourselves in a challenge for the play-off
positions – no-one would have put us as favourites. But let's keep surprising
people.”
Therefore, Brighton have to box clever. They have made
extensive use of the loan system, although arguably too much, as at one stage
last season they had six loanees, one more than the maximum permitted in a
match day squad – and who could forget Leon Best, the most inappropriately
named player since Dennis Wise.
Fortunately, this season’s loan signings looks more
promising, especially the talented James Wilson from Manchester United, while
Barber has said money is available for permanent transfers: “we have some funds
to invest in January – but as ever we will do it in the right way, for the
right player, at the right price.”
Brighton’s net debt rose by £14 million from £127 million to
£141 million with the £17 million increase in gross debt to £147 million
slightly offset by cash also rising by £3 million to £7 million. Debt has been
rising over the past few years, but it is almost entirely owed to Bloom and can
be regarded as the friendliest of debt, being interest-free and repayable after
more than one year.
This means that Brighton have one of the largest debts in
the Championship, though it is still not as high as Bolton’s £195 million in
2013/14. The other difference is that Brighton’s borrowings can be considered
as “good” debt, having been largely used to fund the new stadium and training
ground, as opposed to other clubs, whose debt is more to fund over-spending on
players and agents.
Brighton also have £2.3 million of contingent liabilities in
regard of transfers, which could be payable if certain defined performance
criteria are met, e.g. number of appearances.
Although Brighton’s finances are pretty robust (for the
Championship), the support of Tony Bloom remains incredibly important, as
Barber acknowledged: “In football, people talk about spending – or losing –
millions of pounds almost flippantly. It's still very important to remember
that Tony Bloom is covering our annual losses of £10.4 million – and as a
result we are not under pressure to sell players. Tony has incredibly deep
pockets but we don’t ever take his incredible generosity towards our club for
granted.”
As well as the £17 million increase in his loans, Bloom also
invested a further £11 million in shares subsequent to the year-end. It is not
clear whether this is new capital or equity conversion, but it does not detract
from the fundamental point, which is that Bloom has put in a massive amount of
funding.
As at the 2014/15 accounts, I estimate that this amounts to
£217 million, split between the current £147 million of debt, £11 million
converted to equity and £58 million of share capital. That may not be the
precise figure, but, to paraphrase Oscar Wilde, we don’t need to know the price
of everything, as the value of the owner’s contribution is crystal clear.
Looking at how Brighton have used these funds since Bloom
took charge, the majority (£153 million, or 72%) has gone on investment into
infrastructure (including £103 million on the stadium and £32 million on the
training centre), while £45 million (21%) has been used to cover operating
losses. Any spending on new players has essentially been self-funded in this
period by player sales.
Being so dependent on one individual can be a concern, but
Bloom comes from a family of Brighton supporters: “I have absolutely no
intention of selling. I think I will be here for many years to come.”
He continued: “Our ambition remains for the club’s teams,
both men and women, to play at the highest level possible – and as chairman
(and a lifelong supporter of the club) I will do everything I possibly can to
achieve that and I remain fully committed to that goal.”
"Smooth operator"
Bloom is seriously wealthy from his property and investment
portfolio (plus money earned from poker and other forms of gambling), but he would
not be able to simply buy success, even if he wanted to, as Brighton will need
to continue to comply with the Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations. Under the
previous rules, clubs were only allowed a maximum annual loss of £8 million
(assuming that any losses in excess of £3 million are covered by injecting
equity).
It should be noted that FFP losses are not the same as the
published accounts, as clubs are permitted to exclude some costs, such as youth
development, community schemes, promotion-related bonuses and depreciation on
fixed assets. In any case, Brighton have complied with FFP for the 2014/15
season.
"One better Dale"
The current rules will continue to apply for the 2014/15 and
2015/16 seasons (though the maximum allowed loss is increased to £13 million
from the second season), but will change from the 2016/17 season to be more
aligned with the Premier League’s regulations, e.g. the losses will be
calculated over a three-year period up to a maximum of £39 million.
Although Bloom said that the club was “not entirely happy”
with the increase, he did concede that the change “does provide us with greater
flexibility and the option to compete with those clubs benefiting from
parachute payments.”
FFP encourages clubs to invest in youth development, which
is an area of focus for Brighton. The splendid new training centre (“the best
I’ve ever worked in”, according to Hughton) has resulted in the awarding of the
important Category 1 academy status and will ultimately help develop players
that can push for the first team.
"Long may you run"
Brighton can only be applauded for their efforts off the
pitch, which have produced a remarkable transformation. As Hughton said, “There
is no doubt that in the ambition the club have shown in the infrastructure, the
stadium and the training ground, this can be a Premier League club.”
However, he pointed out that the Championship is “an
incredibly demanding division”, so it was good to see that the owner is also
acutely aware of this fact: “We have had a very good start to the current
season, but we all know how competitive and tough the Championship is year
after year, so it’s important we do not become complacent.”
Are Brighton Premier League ready? Absolutely, but they
still have to do it on the pitch and there’s a long way to go yet. Nobody on
the South coast is counting their chickens before they’ve hatched, but the
Albion have put themselves in a great position to realise Bloom’s dream.
