Monday, May 23, 2011

Liverpool's Future Strategy


If ever a football club’s season could be described as the proverbial “game of two halves” that would be the one experienced by Liverpool fans this year. Following Roy Hodgson’s appointment as manager last July as the replacement for the popular Rafael Benitez, the Reds endured their worst league start in more than 50 years, falling into the relegation zone in October after a dismal home defeat to newly promoted Blackpool.

Hodgson’s grim tenure came to an end in January, when he was replaced by Kenny Dalglish, who inspired a revival that took Liverpool back up the table to sixth place. Moreover, the team threw off the shackles and played some sparkling football, including wins over Manchester United, Chelsea and Manchester City. Although Dalglish’s record in his previous reign on the Mersey was highly impressive, winning three league titles and two FA Cups, some had expressed doubts about the Scot’s credentials, as he had not managed a club for more than a decade and he was initially appointed on a temporary basis.

However, the mood at Anfield has clearly taken a massive turn for the better and virtually all of the non-believers have now been converted. Thus, it was no surprise that Dalglish was duly confirmed as permanent manager a couple of weeks ago, when he was given a three-year contract along with his first team coach Steve Clarke. As new owner John W Henry said, “Kenny is a legendary figure, both as a supremely gifted footballer and successful manager.”

"John W Henry - the man with a plan"

The new ownership is, of course, the other vital change to occur at Liverpool during this momentous season with New England Sports Ventures (NESV) taking over from the reviled pair of Tom Hicks and George Gillett last October. Well known for its stewardship of the Boston Red Sox, one of the most famous baseball teams, and involvement in NASCAR, the company has now changed its name to the Fenway Sports Group (FSG), but the key executives remain the same. As far as Liverpool are concerned that means John W Henry, the principal owner, and Tom Werner, the chairman, who both hold 50% of the voting rights in the football club.

They look like a good fit for Liverpool, as explained by the club’s former chairman Martin Broughton, “New England have a lot of experience in developing, investing in and taking Boston Red Sox - as the closest parallel - from being a club with a wonderful history, a wonderful tradition that had lost the winning way, and bringing it back to being a winner.” In fact, after buying the Red Sox in 2002, NESV delivered success just two years later, as they won the World Series in 2004, ending an 86-year wait for honours, and then repeating the feat in 2007.

On the face of it, they could not be more different to their unpopular predecessors, Hicks and Gillett, who saddled Liverpool with a mountain of debt when they bought the club in March 2007. Ever since then, the Reds had been on a financial knife edge. Even though the eternally optimistic former managing director Christian Purslow claimed that he could not “conceive of a situation where Liverpool Football Club could go into administration”, the reality was that the choice had been taken out of his hands.

"Luis Suarez - happy days"

The club’s bank loans were due for repayment in January 2010, but the club failed to make the £250 million payment, and the club only survived when the bank extended the date first to March and then by a further seven months to October to facilitate the sale of the club. Liverpool’s auditors KPMG had gone public with their concern over the level of debt the previous year, when they described the issue as “a material uncertainty which may cast significant doubt on the group’s and parent company’s ability to continue as a going concern.”

UEFA were also well aware of Liverpool’s financial difficulties. Last month William Gaillard, Senior Advisor to UEFA President Michel Platini, spoke about them, while warning football dignitaries of the dangers of leveraged buy-outs, “The club has been rescued, thank God, but it was a close call. They suddenly found themselves being owned by two failed banks that had been taken over by governments.”

In fact, the Royal Bank of Scotland (or indeed Wachovia) could have put the club into administration (with a nine point penalty) at any time in the last few months of the Hicks and Gillett regime. Importantly, this meant that RBS could dictate terms, allowing them to place Purslow and commercial director Ian Ayre on a reconstituted board, while stipulating that the owners could no longer appoint new representatives to the board. This meant that when the decision to sell the club was taken, Hicks and Gillett no longer had a majority, so could be outvoted by the other board members.

"Keep calm and Carra on"

Even though he is from Texas, Tom Hicks did not know when to “fold them” and tried to block the sale, describing the transaction as “an epic swindle at the hands of rogue corporate directors.” So RBS brought a legal action before the High Court to obtain a judgment on the ability of the new board to complete the sale to NESV, which they duly won. Even the elegant Broughton could not resist putting the boot in, describing the former owners’ actions as “a flagrant abuse of their undertakings.”

Acting on behalf of the club, Barclays Capital had contacted 130 potential investors, but only two bids had been received before the deadline with NESV’s winning out. They paid a total of £300 million for the club: £218 million for the equity, effectively the amount that Hicks and Gillett owed to RBS, and £83 million to assume responsibility for other debts. This was a pretty good outcome for the club, as the acquisition debt was wiped out, leaving NESV with more funds to spend on the football side of the club – and it had the added bonus of serving up a side order of schadenfreude, as Hicks and Gillett lost their £144 million investment.

The last accounts published under the old administration reflected the club’s financial shortcomings, as they reported a £20 million loss, which was £6 million worse than the previous year, even though profit on player sales rose dramatically from £4 million to £23 million, mainly due to the sale of Xabi Alonso to Real Madrid. The wage bill climbed an incredible 18% to £113 million, which was much higher than the 4% revenue growth.

That said, for the last two years, Liverpool have only made a small loss before interest payments, £2.3 million in 2010 and £3.5 million in 2009, but the impact of interest on the loans that Hicks and Gillett took out to buy the club has been hugely detrimental with net interest payable increasing from £13 million last year to £18 million in 2010.

However, that’s not the whole story, as these are only the accounts for The Liverpool Football Club and Athletic Grounds Limited, while the majority of the club’s debt was held in the holding company. Unfortunately, the 2010 accounts for Kop Football (Holdings) Limited, the largest group company incorporated in the UK, have not yet been published, but we do know that the net interest payable at that level in 2009 was a whopping £40 million, leading to a net loss for the group of £55 million. If we make the reasonable assumption that the level of interest in 2010 is the same, this would mean that the club had paid around £125 million of interest during Hicks and Gillett’s unhappy reign.

Another interesting point is the large amounts paid out for changes in management, which amounts to £12 million in the last two years, including around £8 million for Rafael Benitez and his coaching staff in 2010 and £3 million compensation for directors’ loss of office in 2009 (reportedly Rick Parry).

In fact, Liverpool have only made a profit once in the last five years, specifically 2008, when they registered an £8 million surplus, largely due to £22 million profit on player sales, after a number of experienced players were moved on (Crouch, Sissoko, Carson, Riise and Guthrie). However, the new Premier League deal was also an important contributory factor, leading to a £16 million rise in television revenue.

Like all football clubs, the additional riches provided by the ever-increasing TV deals has been a critical factor in Liverpool’s revenue growth, contributing almost half (£29 million) of the £64 million rise in turnover since 2005. However, the fastest growing activity is commercial income, which has risen an impressive 68% in the same period. Match day revenue has also grown from £33 million to £43 million, but remained relatively flat compared to the other revenue streams. On the plus side, Liverpool’s revenue is fairly evenly distributed among the three main revenue streams, which means that they are not unduly reliant on one area.

There are a couple of ways to look at Liverpool’s revenue of £185 million. On the one hand, this puts them in a more than respectable ninth place in the Deloitte’s Money League, which ranks clubs in order of revenue, but, on the other hand, they are still a long way behind the clubs at the top of the (money) tree. In particular, the Spanish giants generate considerably more income with Real Madrid and Barcelona earning £359 million and £326 million respectively, approaching twice as much as the Reds. Moreover, bitter rivals Manchester United earn £100 million more than Liverpool every season, which is a considerable competitive advantage.

Furthermore, Liverpool dropped a place in the Money League last season and can expect a further decline next year, as they will not have the benefit of Champions League revenue, while Manchester City’s commercial revenue is likely to climb again under their Middle East owners. This would mean that four English clubs will receive more money than Liverpool (United, Arsenal, Chelsea and City), which would be a concern, unless the new owners can address the club’s weaknesses.

One obvious issue is the wage bill, which has soared to £114 million, up from £96 million the previous year, mainly due to contract extensions. This has increased the important wages to turnover ratio to 62%, the first time that it has gone above 60% in that period. In fairness, this is still below UEFA’s recommended maximum limit of 70% and is much better than most other clubs in the Premier League, notably big-spending Manchester City (107%) and Chelsea (82%). What is worrying, however, is that performance on the pitch has worsened, while the wage bill has risen, which is the opposite of what usually happens in football, culminating in the team failing to qualify for the lucrative Champions League.

That was then, this is now.

The recently appointed managing director, Ian Ayre, described the results as “a footnote in our history”, as he suggested that the club was now “moving forward.” It is entirely appropriate that we concentrate on the new owners’ future strategy, not least because John W Henry made his fortune as a futures trader.

Actually, I say “fortune”, but everything’s relative. While his estimated worth of £375 million might be enormously impressive to the proverbial man in the street, it’s small change compared to the billions owned by other prominent owners of football clubs, such as Sheikh Mansour, Roman Abramovich, Stan Kroenke and even the Glazers. It’s actually even lower than the likes of Peter Coates at Stoke City and David Sullivan at West Ham.

Therefore, Liverpool fans should not expect a classic sugar daddy. Instead they have got a group of savvy businessmen with proven expertise and a superlative record in sports management. Nevertheless, the new owners will still need to access substantial funds in order to strengthen the squad and address the stadium situation (either build a new stadium or redevelop Anfield), so the obvious question is how will this be financed? Liverpool fans would not want to see the club take on large levels of debt once again, so Henry’s team really has to address the club’s faltering business model.

Although we are not privy to their strategic plan, we can make some fairly good guesses at where they will try to turn around Liverpool’s finances, based on their announcements to date, which I have attempted to summarise in a 15-point plan.

1. Put your shirt on it

While discussing the most recent financial results, Ian Ayre stated, “We have had significant commercial growth since these accounts were published.” He can point to the shirt sponsorship deal with Standard Chartered starting next season, which “can generate up to £81 million” over four years. Although it is understood that some of this may be performance related, this implies £20 million per annum, which is £12.5 million higher than the current deal with Carlsberg. This is in line with Manchester United’s Aon deal, but Barcelona’s £25 million deal with the Qatar Foundation has raised the bar again - even higher than Bayern Munich’s £24 million deal with Deutsche Telekom.

Last month it was reported that Liverpool had secured a £25 million kit deal with Warrior Sports, a subsidiary of New Balance, from the 2012/13 season, though this has not been officially confirmed. This is an example of the synergy that FSG can bring to the party, as Warrior recently announced a deal to manufacture kit for the Red Sox. The deal would more than double the amount received from Adidas, who currently pay £12 million a year. Although the press reported this as a record for English football, it is actually slightly lower than Manchester United’s Nike deal, which had a contractual step-up from £23.3 million to £25.4 million this season, but it’s still a mighty impressive increase.

In total, the two shirt deals will deliver a substantial revenue increase of around £25 million a season (Standard Chartered £12.5 million, Warrior £13 million).

2. Going global

Liverpool’s commercial income of £62 million is already pretty good, being sixth highest in the Money League, though it is only half the amount earned by Bayern Munich and Real Madrid and it actually fell last year if you consider that LiverpoolFC TV Ltd was brought in-house in July 2009. In fact, Liverpool sell more shirts than any other club except Madrid, Barcelona and United.

An important element of the club’s strategy is therefore to “leverage the club’s global following to deliver revenue growth”, which Tom Werner emphasised, “We consider Liverpool to have untapped potential globally.” This is clearly one of the key drivers for American investors, as explained by Don Gerber, head of Major League Soccer, “There’s a belief that there’s a valuable global franchise with these clubs.”

In particular, Werner has stated that the club is focused on Asia (“The support the club has there is already considerable”), hence the pre-season tour to China and South Korea. However, this has lead to club sponsor Standard Chartered, who make much of their income in Asia, somewhat crassly suggesting that they would like Liverpool to sign players from that region, citing the example of Park Ji-Sung at United.

Liverpool fans would have been equally perplexed at the news that basketball star LeBron James had bought a stake in the club, but this is part of his marketing deal with FSG and has helped raise Liverpool’s profile in the States.

More worrying is Ian Ayre’s apparent support for the 39th game, a proposal to play an extra round of Premier League matches at neutral venues outside England: “We have a duty to fans around the world to give them access to the product.” I’m not sure that the fans on the Kop would necessarily agree with that sentiment.

3. Nothing succeeds like success

While it is true that success on the pitch should lead to financial strength, this is not always the case, which is amply demonstrated by the distribution of Premier League revenue. In Liverpool’s case, their share of the revenue only fell £2.3 million in 2009/10 to £48 million, even though they dropped from second to seventh place.

This is because of how the Premier League distribution model works with half of the domestic money and all of the overseas rights being split evenly among the 20 clubs. It’s true that 50% of the domestic rights are still up for grabs, but that does not make a big difference for the leading clubs: (a) 25% is for merit payments with each place in the league worth £800,000; (b) 25% is paid in facility fees, based on how often a club is shown live on television, which will always be a lot for a club like Liverpool.

However, the key point here is that a club’s revenue will effectively go up by default, simply from its presence in the Premier League, as each new TV deal increases the size of the pot available to distribute. The three-year deal for 2004-2007 was worth £1.45 billion, while 2007-10 rose to £2.5 billion and the latest contract for 2010-13 is worth an incredible £3.4 billion. Figures have not yet been released for 2010/11, but the increase for Liverpool will be at least £7 million.

4. We are the champions

The relatively small difference between the leading clubs in terms of Premier League distributions only emphasises the importance to Liverpool of qualifying for the Champions League. Last season the Reds earned £26 million from this competition, even though they were eliminated at the group stage, supplemented by £3 million after parachuting into the Europa League and reaching the semi-finals. That figure does not include extra gate receipts or higher payments from success clauses in commercial deals.

Liverpool’s failure to qualify for Europe’s flagship tournament for the last two seasons has cost them dearly. Given that UEFA’s prize money has been increasing on the back of higher TV deals, all in all, it’s probably now worth at least £35 million a season. It is therefore imperative that Liverpool reclaim their traditional place among Europe’s elite.

5. The revolution will be televised

While TV rights as a whole have been rising, the really interesting aspect is that overseas fans that have been behind the explosive growth with the revenue doubling each time the rights are re-negotiated: 2001-04 £178 million, 2004-07 £325 million, 2007-10 £625 million and 2010-13 £1.4 billion.

As Steve McMahon, the former Liverpool player turned executive at the Singapore-based Profitable Group, said, “It is a global game. The television figures when Liverpool or Manchester United play are 600 or 700 million.” These figures dwarf the Super Bowl, hence the interest of American investors in the Premier League.

This is particularly relevant to Liverpool, as FSG have substantial expertise in this sphere, owning 80% of New England Sports Network, a regional cable television network, while Tom Werner is an experienced television producer. Although English football clubs have clearly benefited from television money, they are strictly amateurs compared to their cousins across the water. To give an idea of the size of the prize, the value of the New York Yankees’ official cable network is three times as high as the club itself.

Perhaps the most intriguing question is how Premier League clubs react to new technology. To date, digital rights have been treated as little more than an afterthought to the main TV deal, but the emergence of fast, broadband networks might just be the catalyst for clubs to interact directly with fans, when revenue could potentially explode.

6. A fair day’s work for a fair day’s pay

On completing due diligence, John W Henry said that Liverpool’s wage bill was one of “a number of unpleasant shocks”. Specifically, he thought that it was a huge payroll for a squad with little depth. It stands to reason that the £114 million wage bill should be reduced, especially when you consider that it is so much higher than Tottenham’s £67 million. That does not imply a “slash and burn” approach, more a case of the club getting better value for money, as Henry explained, “We have to be more efficient. When we spend a dollar, it has to be wisely. We cannot afford player contracts that do not make long-term sense.”

7. Steady as she goes

One obvious way to cut costs would be to stop sacking managers. Including the £7.3 million reportedly paid to Roy Hodgson (after just six months), this adds up to the best part of £20 million in the last three years. Encouragingly, Henry said, “Our goal in Liverpool is to create the kind of stability that the Red Sox enjoy. We are committed to building for the long-term.” That said, Tom Werner did say that he saw “no reason why Roy can’t be our coach this year and in the future” only two months before he was given his P45, though, in fairness, Hodgson was not FSG’s appointment. The new owners will also try to bring continuity by adopting the director of football model, which has not always been successful in England, but has worked very well at clubs like Lyon.

"Cheer up, Fernando. You just made Liverpool £50m"

8. The art of the deal

One possibility that would help reduce the wage bill is offloading players who are no longer wanted. We can anticipate Liverpool selling the likes of Jovanovic, Poulsen and Aurelio at generous prices in order to get them off the books. There are also quite a few players currently out on loan that are likely to leave, including Aquilani, Konchesky and Degen.

Such sales have a triple whammy effect, as they also reduce player amortisation, which is on the high side at Liverpool, and potentially bring in a profit on sale (if the sales price is higher than the remaining value in the accounts). Liverpool will report a very high profit on sale in this year’s accounts, mainly due to the £50 million sale of Fernando Torres to Chelsea, but also Javier Mascherano to Barcelona for £17 million and Ryan Babel to Hoffenheim for £6 million, and next year’s profit could also be on the high side if the new owners clean house.

Babel is a good example of how this works in accounting terms. Purchased from Ajax in 2007 on a five-year contract for £11.5 million, you would assume that his £6 million sale in January would have produced a loss. In total, that would be correct, but in this year’s accounts the club will actually show a £2.6 million profit, as the player’s value in the books had been written-down to £3.4 million (£11.5 million cost less 3.5 years amortisation at £2.3 million a year).

9. Can’t buy me love

Liverpool have effectively been a selling club during the Hicks and Gillett era with the net spend dramatically slowing down after their arrival. Some have speculated that the new owners will be equally cautious, referring to FSG’s belief in the application of statistical analysis made famous by Moneyball, Michael Lewis’ best seller about the innovative methods adopted by Billy Beane at the Oakland Athletics baseball club. However, there is a bit more to their transfer market strategy, as explained by Larry Lucchino, president and CEO of the Red Sox, who said that they “take some of the quantitative analysis approaches and overlay them with the resource advantages of our market.”

In other words, they have used their financial muscle to complement best value purchases by also spending big on the right players. It’s more like the Barcelona method, rather than the Arsenal strategy they have publicly praised. Henry underlined this willingness to splash the cash when necessary by pointing out that the Red Sox had been second in spending over the last decade in major league baseball.

"Andy Carroll - big fee for a big man"

A more obvious example occurred in January when Liverpool paid £35 million for Andy Carroll and £23 million for Luis Suarez. Incidentally, Henry has explained that the seemingly exorbitant Carroll fee still fits in with FSG’s principles, as they were happy to pay this, as long as they secured £15 million more when selling Torres.

With all the likely ins and outs, my guess is that Liverpool fans and director of football Damien Comolli can expect a very busy summer in the transfer market.

10. Give youth a chance

So FSG’s preferred model is one with top quality stars supplemented by home grown youngsters, as outlined by Henry, “We have been successful through spending and through securing and developing young players.” Tom Werner added, “We certainly feel we can do a better job bringing in more players that are home grown”, as he promised to invest in the scouting network.

This makes complete sense in the Financial Fair Play era, as youth development costs are excluded from UEFA’s break-even calculation. In addition, any profit on the sale of players that don’t quite make it at Liverpool is useful in balancing the books.

In fairness, the academy set up by Rafa Benitez is already prospering with many players involved in first team action this season (Jay Spearing, Martin Kelly, John Flanagan and Jack Robinson). Last month, the progress was endorsed by no fewer than seven Liverpool youngsters being named in England’s Under-19 squad, following the selection of four players in the Under-17 squad.

11. Grounds for hope

Although Anfield is a wonderfully atmospheric old ground, its capacity is only 45,400, which is much less than Old Trafford (76,000) and The Emirates (60,400). Liverpool’s match day revenue of £43 million is less than half of Manchester United (£100 million) and Arsenal (£94 million), while even Chelsea, whose Stamford Bridge ground is even smaller (41,800), generate more than them (£67 million). Liverpool only earn around £1.6 million from each home match, which is significantly less than United (£3.6 million) and Arsenal (£3.5 million).

The previous owners felt that the only way to increase match day income was to build a new stadium, but they put the plans for Stanley Park on hold, due to the economic crisis. However, FSG are also looking at the option of redeveloping Anfield. The Red Sox chief operating officer Sam Kennedy summed up the situation, “We have the expertise for building new and renovating old, and both options are definitely still on the table.”

The ownership built new stadiums in Baltimore and San Diego, but perhaps more pertinently redeveloped Fenway Park, the iconic Red Sox stadium, applying creative techniques such as more seats, concessions, advertising and corporate hospitality, which increased match day income by 50%.

Given that the accounts state that nearly £50 million of previously capitalised stadium development costs are “highly likely” to be written-off, the implication is that the preference is for redevelopment at Anfield, not least because Henry admitted that the previous stadium move proposals “just didn’t make any economic sense or they would have been built.”

Whichever route is taken, it will still cost a lot of money, e.g. the Fenway Park renovation cost north of £200 million. As the costs are so high, the possibility of ground sharing with Everton cannot be ruled out, but the counter-argument is that any future revenue would also have to be shared.

"Pepe Reina has his say"

12. You’ll never walk alone

The downside of staying at Anfield is that fans are likely to have to pay more for their tickets. To compensate for the revenue shortfall at the Red Sox, ticket prices have rocketed in Boston. Indeed, season tickets next season have already gone up 6.5%, though 2.5% of that is to cover the VAT increase, with the cheapest tickets on the Kop now costing £725, the most expensive £802. Surprisingly, the entry level tickets are more expensive than any other team in the Premier League except Arsenal, according to a survey by Sporting Intelligence. This is on top of significant price increases last season.

13. What’s in a name?

Ian Ayre has confirmed that Liverpool would actively look for a stadium naming rights partner – but only if they move to a new stadium. Not many English clubs have succeeded in securing naming rights, but it is more common in America and could provide up to £10 million a season, maybe more with FSG’s contacts.

14. Never was so much owed by so many to so few

Liverpool’s debt had reached shocking levels under the previous unwanted regime. Although there was “only” £123 million net debt in the football club, the full picture was revealed in the holding company where debt had grown to over £400 million, including £280 million owed to the banks, which had surged after the bank applied penalty fees for the loan extension, and £144 million owed to Hicks and Gillett.

The really good news is that Henry has confirmed that the change in ownership has removed all the debt except for £37 million for development work on the proposed new stadium, which is part of a £92 million credit facility agreed with RBS. Normal working capital requirements mean that £87 million of this had been used by 31 January this year.

This is enormously significant to the club’s finances, as the prohibitively expensive annual interest payments of £40 million have been drastically reduced to just £3 million, which means that Liverpool are “able to invest more in the team rather than servicing debt” according to Ian Ayre.

Of course, debt could substantially rise again for future stadium developments, but Henry does not appear overly concerned, “I think fans will understand that stadium debt is different from acquisition debt.”

"Steven Gerrard reflects on the first half of the season"

15. All’s fair in love and war

John W Henry has praised UEFA’s forthcoming Financial Fair Play rules that aim to make clubs live within their means, while curbing excessive spending, “UEFA is doing a great thing in making clubs sustainable and that’s good news for us.” In fact, UEFA’s William Gaillard claimed that the main reason why Henry (and indeed Thomas di Benedetto at Roma) had invested in European football was the new regulations, as “they make a much more predictable environment, more similar to what they are used to in American sport.”

Although the new owner is concerned that other clubs might seek to find ways around the rules, especially after Chelsea’s massive spending spree in the January transfer window, this will not be the Liverpool way: “We've always spent money we've generated rather than deficit spending and that will be the case in Liverpool. It's up to us to generate enough revenue to be successful over the long term. We will not deviate from that.”

So, FSG have plenty to offer in their play book, but some have wondered whether their proficiency in American sports will mean much in England. Turning round the Red Sox is one thing, but Liverpool football club is (quite literally) a different ball game. While Liverpool share many similarities with the Red Sox, such as a glorious history, passionate fanbase, small stadium and, er, they both play in red, there are also quite a few differences in the two sports.

"Lucas and Meireles reinvigorated by King Kenny"

In particular, Premier League football clubs do not have a salary cap, have to deal with powerful agents and need to worry about the threat of relegation. That last point may not apply to Liverpool, but at the other end of the table they are concerned with the financial consequences of missing out on the Champions League. It is also fair to say that Boston is a wealthier city than Liverpool, so FSG’s strategy of raising ticket prices may not be appropriate on the Mersey, though you have to think that the new owners are too smart to squeeze the orange too hard.

Of course, an owner’s nationality should not be an issue. As Martin Broughton said, “There’s nothing wrong with being American. Ask Sunderland, Ellis Short is a great owner there. Wherever you come from you need the right people. These are the right people.” There might be a nagging concern that they will not bring the same level of commitment to Liverpool as to their American franchise, but if that were the case, it begs the question of why they would get involved in the first place.

Fundamentally, they are businessmen, who will have been attracted by Liverpool’s “fire sale” price and enormous potential, but Henry has said that investors in sports franchises are not in it for the money, “I don’t think you go into sport to make a profit.” He has asserted that all the money NESV has made in baseball has been ploughed back into the Red Sox, be it the team or the club’s infrastructure. Ultimately, money can be made from football if and when the value of the club appreciates, but that is likely to mean a long-term investment.

"Anfield of Dreams"

Let’s not forget that Liverpool football club is one of football’s great institutions with an incredible history: winning the Champions League and European Cup five times, the English League championship eighteen times and the FA Cup seven times. In business terms, it remains one of the leading sports brands, with the club competing in the most watched domestic league on the planet.

Arguably, John W Henry has got himself a bargain here, though there is much to do to strengthen the club’s business model. As the club’s sponsor said, “I don’t think English Premier League clubs know how valuable they are.” If Henry can help instill the winning mentality back into Liverpool, as his group did with the Red Sox, this could be a licence to print money. Of course, the fans are more interested in whether the team does the business on the pitch. Over to you, Kenny.

Tuesday, May 17, 2011

Udinese Selling Their Way To The Top


Following back-to-back victories against Lazio and Chievo Verona, Udinese stand on the brink of achieving the improbable dream of qualifying for the Champions League for only the second time in their history. They only need one more point to guarantee their entrance through the “gates of paradise”, as Europe’s flagship competition was described by their down-to-earth coach Francesco Guidolin, but the last game of the season is against this year’s champions Milan, so this objective is still far from a fait accompli.

For a self-professed small club from the provinces, this would be a notable feat, especially as they only finished in 15th place last season and started this year’s campaign with four consecutive defeats, languishing in last place after six games. Before the season kicked-off, most pundits had predicted mid-table as the height of their aspirations, but Udinese’s free-flowing brand of attacking football (only Inter have scored more goals so far this season) has brought them many new admirers, as well as the record number of points in Serie A for Le Zebrette (little zebras).

Indeed, the venerated owner Giampaolo Pozzo proudly stated, “We play the best football in Italy”, a claim that was difficult to argue with after a series of scintillating performances, including an astonishing 7-0 win against Palermo (in Sicily), a thrilling 4-4 away draw against Milan and a richly deserved 3-1 victory against Inter. This is all the more impressive as Udinese are a young team of many nationalities with players emanating from all over the globe.

"Cristian Zapata - Colombia's finest"

Thus, the team that overcame Chievo featured four South Americans, most obviously the brilliant Chilean Alexis Sánchez, but also the pacy wing-backs, Mauricio Isla (also from Chile) and the Colombian Pablo Armero, plus the formidable centre-half Cristián Zapata (also from Colombia).

It also included two players from the African continent: midfielder Kwadwo Asamoah, who played every match for Ghana in the 2010 World Cup, and the Moroccan international Mehdi Benatia. Finally, the team contained three Europeans from smaller nations: the new Swiss captain, hard-working midfielder, Gökhan Inler, and his compatriot Almen Abdi, plus the coveted Slovenian goalkeeper, Samir Handanovič, who recently tied the league record of saving six penalties during the course of one season.

However, the bandiera of the team is the captain Antonio “Totò” Di Natale, who has been at the club since 2004, resisting all overtures to move away, including an offer last summer from Juventus. He was the top scorer in Serie A last season with an incredible 29 goals, an exploit that he is almost certain to repeat this season, as he is currently leading the capocannoniere charts with 28 goals.

"Toto Di Natale - not just for Christmas"

However, Pozzo has also paid tribute to the efforts of Guidolin, “Praise should be divided between him and the team. If you don’t have a great coach, nothing will be achieved.” After working minor miracles last year when he guided Parma to an unexpected 8th place in their first season back in the top flight, Guidolin somewhat surprisingly returned to Udinese for his second spell after a brief period in charge in 1998/99. As befitting the Friuli area, which is famous for its hard-working ethic (as epitomised by Fabio Capello), Guidolin’s motto for the team has been “humble but ambitious.” Nevertheless, after a distinctly unpromising start, Guidolin proved himself capable of making big decisions, when he “took a gamble” by moving the mercurial Sánchez from the wing to the middle, playing just behind Di Natale, which has turned out to be a masterstroke.

Despite being one of the oldest football clubs in Italy Udinese have never really won anything of note, though they do seem to have firmly established themselves in the top tier, having competed in Serie A for sixteen consecutive seasons, a record only matched by Milan, Inter, Lazio and Roma.

Furthermore, they have qualified for Europe eight times in the last 15 years, the highlight being when Luciano Spalletti’s team, built around the goals of Vincenzo Iaquinta and that man Di Natale, reached the Champions League in 2005, when they were eliminated at the group stages by a late goal from Barcelona. They also had a good run in the late 90s, when they qualified for the UEFA Cup four years in a row, initially under Alberto Zaccheroni, whose team was inspired by the prolific German striker Oliver Bierhoff. Most recently, Udinese got as far as the UEFA Cup quarter-finals in 2008/09 before being knocked-out by Werder Bremen.

"Giampaolo Pozzo - 25 years and counting"

The main man behind Udinese’s rise during this period has been the owner, Giampaolo Pozzo, an Italian businessman who bought the club at a difficult moment in 1986, when it was embroiled in a betting scandal, resulting in a nine-point penalty that meant relegation to Serie B.

History repeated itself in 1990, when the authorities imposed a four-point penalty after they deemed a phone call to Pozzo’s counterpart at Lazio on the eve of an important match as evidence of untoward activities. Since that time, Pozzo has relinquished his role as club president, leaving the day-to-day running to Franco Soldati and his son Gino, who has proved a veritable figlio d’arte (as the Italians say), following in his father’s footsteps to perfection. However, Giampaolo still very much remains the power behind the throne.

In the 90s Pozzo implemented a strategy that has become the envy of other clubs. Udinese have become famous for their skilled operations in the transfer market, especially their ability to find hidden talents all over the world, which they develop and later sell for large gains. The reputable Italian financial newspaper Il Sole 24 Ore approvingly described this business model as running “like a Swiss watch.”

In reality, Udinese have been forced to be innovative, as their budget is much lower than the leading Italian clubs. It is fair to say that Serie A is not easy for provincial clubs, as the likes of Milan, Inter, Juventus and Roma have traditionally benefited from substantial financing by industrialist owners and superior television and commercial deals. It is also difficult for the smaller clubs to attract Italian talent into their primavera, hence Udinese’s decision to cast their net further afield.

"Samir Handanovic - loves a penalty save"

The club set up a global scouting network of around 50 observers with hundreds more local contacts in order to identify the most promising young players before they had become fully established and attracted the attention of the larger clubs. Furthermore, they have focused on “alternative” markets in Africa and South America that are relatively unexploited in order to purchase youngsters at a reasonable price. They usually buy from second tier countries, examples being Chile and Colombia in South America (as opposed to Brazil and Argentina) and Switzerland and Slovenia in Europe.

This arrangement also works well for the players, who accept low salaries in return for further development, experience in one of Europe’s best leagues and the opportunity to put themselves in the shop window. Although Udinese’s policy of acting as a stepping stone for their best players may not make their fans happy, there’s no doubt that the profits from the regular sales makes a huge contribution to the club’s financial self-sufficiency.

The sensational Alexis Sánchez is a great example of how carefully Udinese nurture their talent. Although the club bought him as a precocious 16-year old talent in 2006, he did not arrive at Udinese until the summer of 2008, having been loaned out twice as part of the development process: initially to the Chilean club Colo Colo, then to River Plate in Argentina to give him experience abroad, but not too far from home.

"Guidolin - where did it all go right?"

Udinese have bolstered their strategy by forming a partnership with Granada, a club playing in the Spanish second division, where they loan youngsters that need playing time, such as the Ghanaian Jonathan Mensah. Given the Friuli club’s connections with the South American market, it is no coincidence that they opted for a club in a Spanish speaking country to park their players. In total, Granada currently have an amazing 14 players on loan from Udinese.

In fact, one of the logical results of Udinese’s approach is that they end up having an extremely large squad, so they absolutely need to loan out a vast number of players every season (earning them €3.6 million in 2010). Including the players at Granada, I make the current total 63, though I may well have lost count. This is the sort of “wheeler dealing” that makes Harry Redknapp look like a rank amateur.

The problem with all these ins and outs is that it makes it difficult for Udinese to progress to the next level, but their consistent presence in Serie A’s top ten over the years is ample proof of their ability to remain competitive despite the constant departures. It is strange to say, but they have effectively sold their way to the top without weakening their squad, as seen by this small club providing no fewer than eight players at last year’s World Cup: Di Natale, Sánchez, Isla, Asamoah, Inler, Handanovič, the Italian Simone Pepe (since loaned to Juventus) and the Serb Aleksandar Luković (since sold to Zenit St. Petersburg).

Of course, like every other club, Udinese’s record in the transfer market is not perfect and they have bought their fair share of duds (also suffering from a fake passport scandal in 2000), but overall their policy has been a solid money-maker. The scouting network reportedly costs €4 million a year, but this investment has produced some staggering financial results.

In the last decade, Udinese have received over €206 million from sales in the transfer market. Deducting purchases of €94 million during the same period gives net proceeds of an astonishing €112 million. In most years since 2005, there have been at least a couple of big money sales, including the likes of David Pizzarro (Inter), Marek Jankulovski (Milan), Per Krøldrup (Everton), Vincenzo Iaquinta (Juventus), Sulley Muntari (Portsmouth), Andrea Dossena (Liverpool), Asamoah Gyan (Rennes), Fabio Quagliarella (Napoli), and last summer, Gaetano D’Agostino and Felipe (both to Fiorentina). It’s a seemingly endless production line of players who were bought cheaply, but sold on for large sums.

Even as the transfer market stagnates elsewhere, Udinese have somehow managed to keep ahead of the others. Last year, their net sales were higher than any other club in Serie A, while the previous season they were only surpassed by Milan, thanks to the truly exceptional sale of Kaká to Real Madrid.

Over the last four years, their net proceeds of almost €60 million have been far ahead of other Italian clubs. In fact, only five other clubs had a net surplus in that period. To place Udinese’s performance into context, their net gains are higher than those other five clubs put together – that’s extraordinary.

And it’s not just the players who appreciate Udinese’s ability to develop individuals. Friuli has also proved to be an ideal environment for ambitious coaches with the two most eminent graduates in recent times being Luciano Spalletti, who has gone on to win the Russian League with Zenit St. Petersburg and the Coppa Italia with Roma, and Alberto Zaccheroni, who instantly delivered a scudetto to Milan.

The reason why Udinese are so concentrated on making money from player sales is immediately apparent when you look at how small their revenue is. Although it is the tenth highest in Italy at €41 million, leaving them in mid-table respectability (or mediocrity, depending which way you look at it) in the Serie A money league, it is streets behind the leading clubs. Last season, three clubs earned more than five times as much revenue: Inter €225 million, Milan €208 million and Juventus €205 million. Roma generate three times as much revenue at €123 million, while Fiorentina, Napoli and Lazio all have turnovers more than double that of Udinese.

This really puts Udinese’s performance this season into perspective, especially when you consider that a club with the same revenue, Sampdoria, has just been relegated. If they do manage to get into the Champions League, the gap to the leading European clubs becomes more like an abyss with clubs like Real Madrid and Barcelona earning ten times as much income.

This highlights the challenge that would face Udinese in Europe. As an example, when Sampdoria crashed out to Werder Bremen in the final qualifying round for the group stages, they were facing a team whose annual budget is two and a half times as high as their own. Another interesting comparative is that Udinese’s 2009/10 revenue was lower than every single club in the Premier League, so less than the likes of Burnley, Hull City and Portsmouth, who were all relegated to England’s second tier.

Other points stand out from the analysis of the revenue mix. Udinese get a very small proportion (9%) of their revenue from gate receipts with only two clubs having a lower percentage (Siena and Juventus). On the other hand, Udinese’s reliance on TV income is very high at 64%, even without European revenue.

The importance of player trading to Udinese’s business can be seen very well in the above graph. If profit on player sales is considered as “revenue”, its contribution has been notable in the past few years, averaging 35-40% of normal turnover since 2008. Put another way, the club makes six times as much from the transfer market as gate receipts. In fact, it makes almost twice as much from player sales as gate receipts and commercial income combined. This would be very worrying if Udinese had not shown that they are more than capable of maintaining this “revenue stream” year after year.

Of course, Udinese are not unique in their ability to generate profits on player sales, but they compare favourably to other clubs who are equally renowned in this area. For example, in the last three years Udinese made €78 million, which may be less than the €91 million earned by Lyon and €111 million earned by Porto in the same period, but in fairness those clubs do have a far higher spending capacity.

In spite of their low turnover, Udinese have managed to operate a sustainable model with cumulative net profits of €3 million over the last six years. After two years of solid profits in 2008 (€7.9 million) and 2009 (€6.9 million), the club did report a small loss of €6.9 million last year. There were a number of reasons for this decline: lower gate receipts, as there was no European competition in 2009/10, €1.5 million; increase in staff costs to strengthen the squad and a payment following the departure of former coach, Pasquale Marino, €4 million; lower profit from player sales, €7 million; and a €4 million tax payment on prior years’ profits.

Essentially, the profit and loss account reiterates the importance of profit on player sales, which is used to more or less balance the books. Obviously, whether this is sufficient depends on how much money is made from player trading. Last year, profit from player sales of €23.6 million was not enough to offset the €26.1 million operating loss, but in 2009 the higher profits on player sales of €30.9 more than compensated for the operating loss of €17.4 million.

Eagle-eyed financial observers may have noticed that the revenue figures used in my money League are lower than those used in the club’s own books. The reason for the difference is that Italian accounts report gross revenue, while I have shown net income, as this is consistent with the approach used in other countries. Therefore, I have excluded the following: (a) gate receipts given to visiting clubs €0.6 million; (b) TV income given to visiting clubs €4.3 million; (c) revenue from player loans €3.6 million. Adding the €8.5 million adjustments to the €40.8 million in my analysis gives the €49.3 million reported in Italy.

If we look at how Udinese compare to other clubs in terms of profit, a few points emerge. First, they are indeed one of the more profitable clubs with only five ahead of them over the last two years – when their result was a perfect example of how to break-even with an aggregate profit of exactly zero. Second, the significance of profit on player sales is yet again emphasised with only two clubs recording higher profit on player sales as a percentage of turnover (Parma and Genoa). Third, just look at the size of the losses made in then last two years by Inter €223 million and Milan €77 million.

Note that the profit on player sales used by La Gazzetta dello Sport are higher than mine, as they have only shown plusvalenze, leaving minusvalenze in costs. Very technical, but rest assured that the source data is identical.

By now, it should be abundantly clear to everyone that Udinese’s business model is hugely reliant on profit made by selling players, but, whisper it quietly, the winds of change may just be blowing at Udinese. Last week, Giampaolo Pozzo spoke of three factors that might grow the club’s resources outside its traditional prowess in the transfer market, namely the Champions League, television money and a renovated stadium. If these plans come to fruition, Udinese may be able to modify its celebrated strategy and hang on to its stars.

"Mauricio Isla - Udinese's other Chilean"

Along with his son Gino, he understands that for Udinese to grow, the club’s approach needs to be fine-tuned with more emphasis on other revenue streams. That does not mean that Udinese will totally jettison their “buy low, sell high” strategy, not least because they’re so damn good at it, but it does suggest that they realise that they need to do more financially to advance to the next level. As the owner put it, “We are fighting with the dagger between our teeth for the last slice of the TV money. Then, there’s the plan to improve the stadium. And Europe brings higher earnings.” Obviously, this will not be easy, but let’s look at each of these potential growth areas in turn.

Reaching the Champions League would be the biggest game changer. Last time Udinese qualified in 2005/06, they received around €12 million revenue: €9 million from UEFA’s central distribution (participation fees, prize money and TV income) and €3 million additional gate receipts. However, the sums available these days are considerably higher with the four Italian qualifiers last season earning an average of €29 million (Inter €49 million, Milan €24 million, Fiorentina €22 million and Juventus €21 million).

It’s also worth noting that while the Europa League would help boost funds, it is nowhere near as rewarding as the Champions League with last season’s three Italian representatives (Roma, Lazio and Genoa) only earning around €2 million each. Indeed, the team that actually wins the Europa League, having played countless matches, only receives €6.4 million. Udinese are well aware of this fact, having earned just €1.2 million from their UEFA Cup adventure in 2008/09, and Pozzo has spoken of the “big difference” between the two competitions, so it is very worthwhile securing that fourth place.

"Celebrate the good times"

The importance of qualification to Udinese’s plans has been underlined by the owner’s recent announcements. First, he said, “With the Champions, I would like to keep Sánchez and the other family jewels” and then went a stage further, “If we get into the Champions, then I will buy.”

Of course, they’re not there yet and have two more hurdles to clear. First, they have to cement their position in Serie A, taking at least a point from Milan, but this would only qualify them for the Champions League play-off round and they could face a very tricky tie to reach the lucrative group stage. Just look how close Spurs came to disaster in their match against the Swiss minnows, Young Boys Bern, before finally squeaking through.

The other obvious point is that it will be really hard for Udinese to qualify for the Champions League on a regular basis, especially as Italy will lose one of their four places from 2011/12, now the Bundesliga has overtaken Serie A in UEFA’s table of coefficients. In such an eventuality, Udinese would have to cope with a dramatic reduction in funds, as happened to them in 2007, when their revenue fell by more than a third from €44 million to €28 million, turning a €6.5 million profit into a €6.3 million loss.

Udinese’s domestic TV deal was worth around €26 million last season, having risen in 2008 when the new contract was introduced, but this pales into insignificance compared to the €90-100 million that Juventus, Milan and Inter have been earning from their individual deals. These vast differences have meant that the playing field in Italy has been anything but level, but years of protest finally led to a new collective agreement being implemented at the beginning of this season. We know that the total money guaranteed by exclusive media rights partner Infront Sports will be approximately 20% higher than before at over €1 billion a year, but it is still unclear what the impact will be on each club’s revenue.

There is a complicated distribution formula, which will still favour the bigger clubs, though there is likely to be a reduction at the top end. Under the new regulations, 40% will be divided equally among the 20 Serie A clubs; 30% is based on past results (5% last season, 15% last 5 years, 10% from 1946 to the sixth season before last); and 30% is based on the population of the club’s city (5%) and the number of fans (25%).

The larger clubs will lose out from the new arrangement, but the mid-tier clubs like Udinese will benefit. There is still a question over how the number of fans (worth 25% of the deal) will be calculated, leading to a major dispute between the larger clubs (represented by Milan, Inter, Juventus, Roma and Napoli) and the smaller clubs (represented by Udinese, Parma, Sampdoria, Palermo and Catania), even over which market research companies to use. Pozzo is at the forefront of this battle, as he understands the importance of the decision to the revenue of clubs like his. Whatever the final ruling, it seems reasonably certain that Udinese’s TV revenue will grow – the only question is by how much.

However, Udinese’s real Achilles heel, like so many Italian clubs, is their paltry match day income. Last season’s gate receipts of €3.6 million were exactly the same as the amount Manchester United generate in a single match at Old Trafford. In fact, the so-called theatre of dreams took in €122 million of match day income last season, which is an incredible 34 times as much as Udinese.

That is partly explained by Udinese’s ongoing struggle to attract spectators. In fact, last season’s average attendance of 17,356 was only the 13th highest in Serie A. Given the relatively small size of Udine (population 175,000), that’s perhaps not overly surprising, but it’s hardly conducive to financial stability at a football club. This also underlines the club’s need to work the transfer market, as the profit from one good player sale (€8 million) is the equivalent of Udinese tripling their gate receipts.

Nevertheless, the club has announced plans to renovate the Stadio Friuli, though interestingly the work will actually reduce the stadium’s capacity from the current (restricted) 30,667 to a more realistic 22,000. Although one objective is to increase revenue, the underlying objective is to make the stadium a “theatre of football”, which will be more attractive to local fans and tempt the crowds back. Pozzo explained, “We don’t want a cathedral in the desert.”

"Design for life"

The initial plans were for a multi-purpose development, including restaurants, hotels, gyms and a commercial area, but this met with opposition from existing concerns. Instead, the local council has in principle approved a modern, two tier stadium with all seats fully covered and the athletics track eliminated, bringing the spectators closer to the pitch, the inspirations being the Stadio Luigi Ferraris in Genoa and the Stadio Dino Manuzzi in Cesena.

There will be more hospitality areas and the club will be allowed to stage a number of events, such as music concerts and rugby matches, which will generate additional revenue, but this is not likely to be significant in my opinion. There has been no mention to date of any naming rights.

Unlike Juventus, the “new” stadium will not belong to the club, but continue to be owned by the council. In return for Udinese paying all the construction costs, which are estimated to be around €25 million, the council will give the club a 65-year lease and reduce the annual rent, which is currently €200,000 a year. The other condition that Pozzo has imposed is that the building work must commence this summer, so that the new stadium is ready in time for the start of the 2013/14 season.

It had been hoped that the new stadium would be used for Euro 2016, but that tournament has now been awarded to France. UEFA’s minimum capacity for hosting such international events is 34,000, but the plans allow for the Stadio Friuli’s capacity to be increased at a later date by adding a third tier if necessary.

There is also room for growth in the club’s commercial revenue, which actually slightly decreased in 2010 to €11.1 million, one of the lowest in Serie A. The shirt sponsorship deal with Rumanian car manufacturer Dacia (owned by Renault) was extended two years in July 2009, but is only worth €1 million a season, a lot less than other Italian clubs: Milan – Emirates €12 million, Inter – Pirelli €9 million, Juventus – BetClic €8 million, Roma – Wind €7 million, Napoli – Acqua Lete €5.5 million and Fiorentina – Mazda €4 million.

Those clubs also receive higher sums from their kit suppliers than the €1.1 million Udinese get from Lotto Sports (Inter – Nike €18 million, Milan – Adidas €13 million, Juventus – Nike €12 million, Roma – Kappa €5 million and Napoli – Macron €4.7 million). However, one of the indirect benefits of qualifying for the Champions League is higher commercial income, as sponsors see greater exposure.

Given the low revenue, the club has admitted that it is under “continual pressure to contain costs”, which effectively means the wage bill. Udinese have done a reasonable job here with wages rising in line with revenue since 2005, both with growth around 55%. The problem is that as the turnover is so small, even a minor increase in the wages has an inordinate impact on the important wages to turnover ratio, e.g. a €4 million rise in 2010 caused this ratio to worsen from 58% to 71%.

Nevertheless, Udinese’s wage bill of €31 million is still one of the smallest in Serie A and looks utterly insignificant compared to those of the “big four”, who appear to be playing in a different league altogether: Inter €234 million, Milan €172 million, Juventus €138 million and Roma €101 million. This is a double-edged sword for the club: on the one hand, it’s financially prudent, but on the other hand it makes it difficult to hold on to players. Then again, given Udinese’s high reliance on profits from player sales, maybe this is not an issue.

Only one player at Udinese, Di Natale, receives more than €1 million annual salary with the next highest paid being Sánchez €0.7 million and Zapata €0.65 million. Totó’s value looks even better, if you consider that he has scored exactly twice as many goals this season as Zlatan Ibrahimović, who is on €9 million a year.

Bonus payments can also have an impact on successful clubs, but Udinese’s players have apparently only been promised €3 million in total if they remain in the top four, described as a “cherry on the cake.”

Player amortisation, the cost of writing down transfer fees over the length of a player’s contract, is not that high at €14 million, but this is material when your turnover is only €44 million. Indeed, the increase in 2007 was noted in the accounts as one of the reasons for that year’s loss.

Udinese’s net debt has been steadily increasing in the last four years and now stands at €36 million after deducting €1 million cash. This includes €13 million bank loans and €24 million from a factoring arrangement with Unicredit. Although the bank loans are clearly not excessive, it is worth noting that only three Italian clubs have higher balances: Milan €164 million, Inter €71 million and Juventus €33 million.

This is nothing to really worry about, especially as Udinese have net balances owed to them on transfer fees of €24 million, made up of €28 million owed to other clubs and a hefty €52 million owed by other clubs. Given the way that Italian clubs do business with many stage payments, this is by no means unusual, but the fact that the balances are so high is a direct result of Udinese’s buying and selling strategy. There shouldn’t be any major issues here, though the exception that proves the rule was the dispute with Portsmouth over money owed for Muntari.

In fact, Udinese has one of the strongest balance sheets in Serie A with net assets of €38 million, only behind Fiorentina and Juventus. This fine achievement is actually under-stated, as the players are only valued at €48 million in the accounts, while the respected Transfermarkt website has estimated that a more realistic market value would be in the order of €111 million. No wonder Pozzo allowed himself to proclaim, “Fortunately the club is in the best of (financial) health.”

So what of the future?

In the accounts, the club confidently expects a “positive result” for 2010/11, based on the new collective TV rights deal and (stop me if you’ve heard this one before) “notable” profits on player sales in the 2010 summer window – already higher than the total achieved in the whole of 2009/10.

"Gokhan Inler - Swiss efficiency"

Nevertheless, other clubs will inevitably still apply pressure on Udinese to sell their talented players this summer. There would be no shortage of suitors for Sánchez, including Barcelona and Manchester United, though Manchester City are understood to be in pole position with a reported bid of €35-40 million. In some ways, although no club would want to lose a player of his calibre, this would be the ultimate vindication of the Udinese strategy, as they only paid €3 million for the little maestro. Even Guidolin admitted, “He is destined to join a top club, considering the quality he has shown for some time.”

At least a deal of this magnitude would mean that Udinese would have no need to sell any of the other players, though Asamoah, Inler and Zapata are all in demand. For the moment, Pozzo is holding firm, “Our wish is to strengthen the squad, but it’s up to the players. However, this time nobody wants to leave.” Furthermore, the players’ values should go up if they perform well in the Champions league.

Those may be the words of an astute salesman, but, as we have seen, Udinese should soon have more money from other sources. Pozzo again: “I know we are regarded as a selling club, but now things have changed, as the money in Italy will no longer just go into the pockets of the usual 4-5 big clubs.”

"Happy days for Asamoah"

Longer-term the advent of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Rules should theoretically benefit well-run clubs like Udinese, but paradoxically it also poses two threats to their strategy. First, it could reduce the value of transfer fees, as clubs do not want to carry high amortisation costs – indeed, transfer spending was down almost 30% in Europe’s major leagues in 2010. Second, more clubs will try to emulate Udinese’s success at developing youth players, so the competition will become even more intense. This is why Udinese have started to invest in facilities to house teenagers, as they search for even younger players.

The chances are that Udinese will not completely abandon their successful buying and selling strategy, but changes to the TV rights in Italy, allied with their modernised stadium should add a few more strings to their bow. In the short-term, they can hope to further enhance their financial status by qualifying for the Champions League. What a present that would be for their respected owner, Giampaolo Pozzo, who celebrates his 70th birthday next week after 25 years at the club.


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