Tuesday, May 10, 2011

Lille's French Revolution


Although Lille’s faltering form in recent weeks has caused a few to doubt their ability to sustain their sparkling challenge in Ligue 1, this weekend’s victory over Nancy restored a four point lead at the top of the table. With just four games remaining until the end of the season, Les Dogues are well on course to win their first French title since 1954.

Even though this should not be too unexpected, given that Lille finished last season in fourth place (and were the league’s leading scorers), it is still somewhat of a surprise to see a small provincial side ahead of traditional powerhouses like Marseille and Lyon. Indeed, Lille are actually chasing a domestic double, as they face Paris Saint-Germain in the French Cup Final next Saturday at the Stade de France.

Their success has been built on an impressive attacking style of play, which once again has the Northern side leading the scoring charts, with the African combination of the powerful Moussa Sow and the pacy Gervinho netting 35 goals between them so far this season. The splendidly dreadlocked Gervinho made a distinct impression for the Ivory Coast at the World Cup in South Africa, but the Senegalese Sow has been transformed since arriving on a free transfer from Rennes last summer.

The hub of Lille’s progressive formation is comprised of a trio of diminutive midfielders, like a less lauded version of Barcelona, featuring French internationals, Rio Mavuba (the club captain) and Yohan Cabaye, plus the experienced Florent Balmont.

"Gervinho - more than a haircut"

However, the undoubted star of the show is the young Belgian winger Eden Hazard, who has been named Ligue 1’s most exciting young player in each of the last two seasons, and is being chased by virtually all of Europe’s leading clubs, as well as most French defences. This young man, as Ray Wilkins would inevitably describe him, has got the lot: speed, dribbling skills, a powerful shot and the ability to create chances. One of Lille’s youth coaches did not want to go overboard in his praise, but could not resist a stirring comparison: “You have to keep perspective, as he is still very young, but he is like Lionel Messi.”

Lille’s development in the last couple of seasons is all the more remarkable, as it follows the departure of the inspirational Claude Puel, the coach who had transformed them into a truly competitive team, twice guiding unfashionable Lille to qualification for the Champions League during his six-year tenure. When Puel, a protégé of Arsène Wenger, left for champions Lyon in 2008, this could have been a hammer blow to Lille’s prospects, but instead the relatively inexperienced Rudi Garcia, recruited from Le Mans, has maintained the progress.

Famed for his ability to get results on a limited budget, Garcia has added an extra dimension to Puel’s pragmatic, hard-working side, as he let loose the attacking instincts of Les Dogues of war, resulting in Lille twice qualifying for the Europa League and potentially going one step better this season.

"Give yourself a round of applause, Michel"

Nevertheless, the principal driving force behind Lille’s ascent to the top is president Michel Seydoux, a French businessman and film producer, who became the club’s majority shareholder in 2004. Although Lille attained a startling second place in his first full season as president in 2004/05, Seydoux’s approach is the polar opposite of those owners who demand short-term success. He has not been a benefactor in the traditional football club sense of pumping in vast sums of cash and demanding instant results, but has followed the sound business principles of establishing a strategy (“to challenge Lyon in 2012”) with achievable objectives, bringing in good people to support the plan and delivering steadily improving results.

The club has adopted a long-term view, first developing a state-of-the-art training facility at the Domaine de Luchin and then working with the local authority to build a magnificent new 50,000 stadium at the Grand Stade Lille Métropole, reinforced by admirable continuity in the management team. In fact, Lille have only had two managers (Puel and Garcia) in the last nine years, a rare statistic in the uncompromising world of football.

Since Seydoux has taken control of Lille Olympique Sporting Club, often shortened to LOSC, this unheralded side has featured twice in Europe’s flagship competition, the Champions League. They qualified for the first time ever in 2005, repeating the feat the following season, when they reached the knockout stages, before being eliminated by Manchester United in controversial circumstances, as Ryan Giggs scored from a quickly taken free-kick.

Competing at such rarified levels is heady stuff for a club with a budget as relatively low as Lille. Although on the face of it, they have little to complain about, as they sit in fifth place in the French money league with a turnover of €55 million, this is considerably less than Lyon, Marseille, Bordeaux and Paris Saint-Germain. In fact, the first two have budgets nearly three times as high (Lyon €146 million, Marseille €143 million), while Bordeaux’s revenue is twice as much. Granted, this sizeable disparity owes a lot to the Champions League money those three clubs received last year, but gate receipts and commercial income are also significantly higher than LOSC.

Given that money usually does buy success in football, as the teams with the highest turnover (and consequently wages) are most likely to win, this only makes the fact that Lille currently lead the league even more praiseworthy. To place that into context, Lens, who have almost exactly the same turnover as Lille with €52 million, are currently struggling in second to last place in the table.

Similarly, Lille are resolutely mid-table in terms of profits and losses, having reported small losses in each of the last two seasons: €1.1 million in 2009/10 and €0.3 million in 2008/09. This stability is not too bad, when you consider that the number of clubs making losses doubled from seven to fourteen last year with aggregate losses in Ligue 1 significantly rising from €24 million to €108 million, though to be fair over half of that came from just two clubs: Lyon €35 million, a big reversal from the previous year’s profit, despite reaching the semi-finals of the Champions League, and Paris Saint-Germain €22 million, continuing their series of poor financial results.

One point that stands out from the P&L league table is that Lille made more profit on player sales (€23 million) than any other French club last year, which is doubly striking, as total profits from player sales in France fell by more than 40% (€90 million) compared to 2008/09. This has been a recurring feature of Lille’s business model with the club making around €80 million from such player trading in the last four seasons. There are two ways of looking at this from a financial perspective. On the one hand, it’s a vindication of Lille’s ability to make money from developing players; on the other hand, it underlines that the club has needed to sell its prize assets in order to compensate for large operating deficits, which average €23 million over the last three seasons.

That said, the DNCG, the organisation responsible for monitoring and overseeing the accounts of football clubs in France, has stated that Lille enjoy a “healthy financial situation” despite the recurring losses at an operating level. Indeed, Lille actually reported profits three years in a row before the last two periods’ small losses (2006 €6.9 million, 2007 €5.1 million and 2008 €6.6 million), though the first two of these seasons were boosted by revenue from the Champions League.

This explains why Lille’s revenue has actually declined since its peak of €68 million in 2006 to €55 million in 2010, as the Europa League is far less lucrative than the Champions League. Like all French clubs, Lille are hugely dependent on television money and actually had the third highest reliance in France last season at 69%, only behind Auxerre and Lorient. At less than €5 million a season, gate receipts are miserably low in comparison to leading clubs in other European leagues, but that’s pretty much the norm in France with only four clubs earning more than €7 million a year, namely the usual suspects: Lyon, Marseille, Bordeaux and PSG.

Lille have done much better with TV revenue, earning €38 million, the fourth highest in Ligue 1 last season, comprising €35 million from domestic deals and €3 million from their run in the Europa League.

The domestic TV money is allocated among clubs as a mixture of fixed and variable components. The fixed element comprises 50% of the total media rights and is distributed equally among all Ligue 1 clubs, worth around €12.5 million a season, while the remainder is distributed based on league performance 30% (25% for the current season and 5% for performance over the last five seasons) and the number of times a team is broadcast 20% (15% for the current season and 5% for the last five seasons).

Although this structure is reasonably egalitarian, it does tend to favour the leading clubs, especially the broadcast element. Let’s see how this worked out for Lille last season: their fourth place was worth €11.8 million, compared to the €17.9 million received by champions Marseille. However, because clubs like Marseille and Lyon are shown on television more frequently than the provincials, Lille lose out on the notoriété with Marseille earning more than twice as much: €17.4 million compared to €7.6 million. So, in summary, last year Lille finished just three places behind Marseille in Ligue 1, but received €16.7 million less TV revenue.

However, there is a darker cloud on the horizon. The current television deal, which is worth €668 million a season, runs from 2008 to 2012, but is soon up for re-negotiation. The indications are that it will be renewed for a lower sum, as one of the existing broadcasters, Orange, has decided to withdraw from the bidding process, leaving Canal+ as the only game in town. This is potentially extremely bad news for French clubs, as only Serie A among major European leagues is more reliant on TV revenue, with Reuters estimating that the reduction may be as much as €200 million.

The French deal is currently the third most valuable in Europe, only behind the Premier League €1.2 billion and Serie A €0.9 billion, but ahead of the Bundesliga €412 million (La Liga has individual club deals). Most of the shortfall compared to the Premier League is due to overseas rights, which the English have managed to sell for an incredible 20 times as much as Ligue 1’s €30 million. Indeed, one of the suggestions made by Michel Seydoux, who has been commissioned by his peers to examine the TV issue, is for the league to spread matches over the weekend, including lunchtime kick-offs, to produce higher ratings in the emerging Asian market and address this weakness.

Of course, French clubs can boost their income by participating in the Champions League, which is what helped Lille produce what they described as “exceptional” financial results in 2006 and 2007, when they earned €21 million and €22 million respectively, not including any uplifts in sponsorships. In the latter year, this was split £18 million central TV distributions from UEFA and £4 million gate receipts. Of course, this can be a double-edged sword, as the year afterwards in 2008, Lille’s revenue plunged €24 million (or 38%).

Last year’s tournament was even more rewarding for the French representatives, who each earned an average of €25 million: Bordeaux €30 million, Lyon €29 million and Marseille €17 million. The more observant among you will have noticed that Bordeaux received more money than Lyon, even though they only reached the quarter-finals compared to Les Gones’ semi-final. This is because, as well as participation and performance payments, the clubs receive a share of the TV market pool, which is partly dependent on where a team finished the previous season in its domestic league. Therefore, apart from the natural pride at winning the championship, from the financial angle it would be better for Lille to qualify for the Champions League as winners rather than runners-up.

The Europa League is nowhere near as lucrative as its big brother with Lille €3.1 million and Toulouse €2.2 million earning peanuts (relatively speaking) for their efforts last season. Indeed, if a club battles its way through the seemingly endless series of matches to win the damn thing, it only receives the paltry sum of €6.4 million. Better than a smack in the head, but less than a club earns for simply reaching the group stages of the Champions League, even if it loses all six games.

"Moussa Sow celebrates yet another goal"

As we saw earlier, gate receipts of €4.9 million are incredibly low compared to Lille’s counterparts overseas. For example, Manchester United, the club leading the Premier League, earned €122 million match day revenue last season, which is an amazing 25 times as much as Lille. Another way of looking at this is that United generate €3.6 million a match, so they earn more in just two matches than Lille do in an entire season. Even Hamburg, from a land which is well known for its low ticket prices, earned €49 million – ten times as much.

Of course, Lille are far from unique in France in facing a tough financial challenge with their gate receipts, as amply demonstrated by another statistic: there is not a single French club in the Deloitte Money League top 20 clubs for match day revenue. The nearest are Lyon and Marseille, who both earn around €25 million, but this is still less than clubs like Valencia (19th position) and Werder Bremen (20th position), who earn about €28 million. Gate receipts in Ligue 1 have been on the low side for a while, as stadiums tend to be old, in need of renovation and have limited earnings potential, but worryingly they fell by 8% last season, though that was partly due to the impact of the recession.

Attendances have continued to fall at many clubs this season, though Lille have unsurprisingly bucked the trend following the surge towards the title with their average crowds rising an impressive 9% from 14,940 to 16,286, which represents more than 90% of the capacity of their current temporary ground, the Stadium Lille Métropole, where they moved a few years ago in anticipation of redeveloping their permanent stadium, the Stade Grimonprez-Jooris.

Instead, they have opted for the spectacular new 50,000 capacity Grande Stade Lille Métropole, which will have the highest possible 5 star UEFA rating. Featuring a retractable roof that will allow the ground to be easily converted into an indoor arena that can be used for concerts, exhibitions and other sporting events, this stadium is central to Seydoux’s ambitious plans.

The cost to Lille is limited, as the stadium is being built by the local authority, who will rent it out to the football club. However, all the revenue generated will go into Lille’s coffers, including ancillary activities such as food and beverages, merchandising and other commercial opportunities. Importantly, there will be 7,000 places for corporate hospitality, which the English clubs have demonstrated deliver significantly more bang for your buck.

"Green light for the new stadium"

Like all major investments, there is clearly an element of risk in this project, but the DNCG have no doubts that this is the way forward: “The arrival of a new stadium in 2012 will allow the club to cover its structural operating deficit and so meet its ambitious objective of balancing its books without taking into account transfers.” Assuming no Champions League revenue, that would imply an increase in revenue of €20 million, which would indeed be ambitious, but is not completely unrealistic.

There must be some concern that a leap from an 18,000 ground to a 50,000 stadium will be over-kill, but Lille would be encouraged by achieving near sell-outs in the 80,000 Stade de France, when they have moved home games there in the past, both against Lyon in Ligue 1 and for some Champions League encounters. General Manager Frédéric Paquet said, “We know it won't be easy, but we're expecting gates to average between 37,000 and 40,000,” though he recognised that this was in part dependent on Lille continuing to be successful on the pitch.

The hope for French football is that Euro 2016 will have a similarly beneficial impact on its stadiums as the 2006 World Cup had on grounds in Germany. Numerous clubs, such as Le Mans, Lyon and Le Havre, have initiated new stadium projects, while others like Marseille are looking to refurbish and redevelop their existing grounds.

Lille are also fair to middling when it comes to commercial income with their total of €12 million leaving them eighth highest in Ligue 1, though there is definitely room for improvement. As you might expect, Marseille €46 million and Lyon €43 million once again lead the way, but Bordeaux and PSG also do fairly well here, both earning around €35 million.

Even though the value of shirt sponsorship has significantly increased in France, thanks to the decision to finally allow gambling websites to advertise, the top clubs in Europe are still a long way ahead of French clubs in terms of commercial revenue with Bayern Munich €173 million and the Spanish giants, Real Madrid €151 million and Barcelona €122 million, setting the pace.

Lille’s commercial income actually fell last year from €13.8 million to €12.3 million, presumably due to the harsh economic climate, but things should improve in the future, as they announced two major deals last spring. Key shareholder Isidore Partouche’s casino operator Groupe Partouche, who have been the club’s shirt sponsor since 2003, extended their deal by five years to 2015; while Umbro replaced Canterbury, who went into administration, as the club’s kit supplier in a six-year deal.

Like most football clubs, Lille have struggled to contain their costs, even though they emphasised the importance of doing so in both the 2006 and 2007 accounts. The fact is that expenses were only just higher than revenue five years ago, but shot up as soon as the club qualified for the Champions League and have been rising ever since, even though revenue has not been growing at the same rate. In this way, while revenue rose by a respectable 55% since 2005, costs have significantly outpaced this with 160% growth.

As is always the case, the wage bill is the most important element in Lille’s costs at €49 million, which has resulted in a wages to turnover ratio of 88%, far higher than UEFA’s recommended maximum limit of 70%. Wages have been rapidly growing in the last couple of seasons from €35 million in 2008, though the revenue growth has kept the wages to turnover ratio at the same level, albeit a concerning level.

Traditionally, Lille are a low paying club, which is evidenced to some extent by the fact that they do not have one player in the list of top 20 best paid players in France, which is dominated by Lyon 7, Marseille 5, PSG 4 and Bordeaux 2. Almost unbelievably, at least to this observer, Gabriel Heinze is apparently the best paid player, followed by Yohann Gourcuff and Lucho Gonzalez.

However, Lille now find themselves in an awkward spot. As they are fifth highest in last year’s wages league, they are ahead of most other French clubs, but they are a long way behind Lyon €112 million and Marseille €92 million. In order to catch up with these behemoths and compete on a consistent basis, they will almost certainly need to spend more. As LOSC CFO Reynald Berghe put it, “The huge investment by big clubs forces small clubs to over-spend.” This is indeed what is starting to happen at Lille with the coach Rudi Garcia and five players extending contracts, including Hazard, Mavuba, defenders Mathieu Debuchy and Franck Béria, and goalkeeper Mickaël Landreau, the last of these reportedly doubling his salary.

The tax situation in France does not help either. As the tax rate is very aggressive, football clubs have to pay a higher gross salary than their competitors in other countries to ensure that the net salary is at the same level. That’s bad enough, but recently the government abolished the rule on collective image rights that had previously allowed clubs to claim an exemption on some social charges.

Another factor that potentially could adversely impact Lille is higher bonus charges, the so-called price of success, which cost Marseille €5 million last season, though general manager Paquet has claimed that the club is well equipped to handle this (whatever that means).

What is not beyond dispute is Lille’s ability to make money from player trading. Over the last decade, the club has registered net sales proceeds of €55 million, including €45 million in the last four years alone, which has been absolutely integral to their financial stability. At times, Seydoux has acted with an icy objectivity, for example in 2007 he sold all three of the previous season’s top scorers: Peter Odemwingie, Kader Keita and Mathieu Bodmer.

In many ways, they have a lot in common with Arsenal. First, the club has rarely splashed out large sums, but likes to act astutely in the transfer market. As Paquet explained, “What's important to us in signing players is not the figure, but whether it's the right price. We try to buy well and sell well. Today the biggest transfer fee we have ever paid was for Gervinho, who cost €6 million.” In addition, many players sold for big money leave their best days behind them in northern France, examples being Jean II Makoun, Keita and Bodmer, as is also the case for the north London club (Overmars, Petit, Henry, Vieira, Kolo Toure, etc).

It is impossible to discuss Lille’s transfer policy without examining their relationship with Lyon, which is questionable to some, given that Michel Seydoux’s brother Jérôme is a board member at Les Gones. As is often the case, you can look at this positively or negatively. On the one hand, Lyon have to an extent funded Lille’s progress, paying them €64 million over the last seven years for just five players: Michel Bastos €18 million, Keita €16.8 million, Makoun €14 million, Eric Abidal €8.5 million and Bodmer €6.8 million. On the other hand, it seems strange that Lille would effectively act as a feeder club to one of their principal opponents, also of course giving them their successful coach, Claude Puel.

Even in the last two years, when the volume of transfers has been slashed in France, Lille have still managed to produce profits in the transfer market, mainly due to the sale of Bastos, with only Toulouse and Nice showing higher net surpluses. In stark contrast, the traditional big spenders Lyon, Marseille and PSG have continued to splash the cash. For Lille to be ahead of these clubs in the league, given their parsimonious policy, is highly commendable and a sign of excellent management and indeed coaching.

French clubs’ accounts have been badly hit by the downturn in the transfer market, as they have traditionally balanced their books by selling players. The graph below clearly highlights the magnitude of the problem, as net profits in Ligue 1 have gone down very much in line with lower profits from player sales. There’s an almost perfect correlations with net profits of €25 million dropping to a loss of €114 million, a decline of €139 million, while in the same period profits on player sales decreased from €266 million to €125 million, a decline of €141 million.

Interestingly, the vast majority of that reduction (€102 million) came from sales abroad, as Europe’s leading clubs tightened their purse strings, partly as a result of the economic conditions, partly due to the advent of UEFA’s financial fair play rules, which aim to clamp down on big spending.

This provoked the DNCG to talk of French football being in a “serious financial crisis” in their annual report even quoting Winston Churchill, “if you’re going through hell, keep going.” However, the Ligue 1 club presidents have protested that the official document paints too gloomy a picture, in particular underlining the relatively low level of debt in France compared to other European clubs, notably those in England and Spain. Of course, it’s the unrestrained spending in those leagues that has helped fund French clubs in the past, so they should not complain too much.

Any road, they do have a point, as every club in Ligue 1 has reported net assets, as opposed to the debts at clubs abroad. Lille’s balance sheet is particularly strong with no bank debt and hardly any money owed to other football clubs, resulting in total debts of €23 million, compared to assets of €47 million. That gives them a very healthy debt ratio of 48%, one of only three clubs below 50% along with Auxerre and Lyon.

In the past, clubs have used IPOs (Initial Public Offerings) to raise cash, but this seems unlikely (and unnecessary) for Lille, whose CFO Reynald Berghe said, “An IPO could be an option, but not at this point.” It’s not as if Lyon’s 2007 share offering provides an encouraging example for other French clubs, as the stock price has performed disappointingly ever since.

Having said that, the increase in payroll and higher stadium costs will weigh heavily on Lille’s finances, unless they are boosted by Champions League money. Seydoux has estimated an operating deficit of €30 million, which falls to €25 million once the €5 million transfer of Adil Rami to Valencia that was agreed in the winter is deducted, so there might be pressure to compensate in the standard LOSC manner, i.e. by selling more players.

If Hazard were to be sold, for example, his fee would cover the shortfall on its own, while the other members of Lille’s formidable attacking trident, Gervinho and Sow, might bring in another €25 million. At the moment, Lille are playing a straight bat to such questions with Seydoux arguing, “We have an ambitious policy. We see that in the biggest foreign clubs, the turnover of players each season is very light.” He claims that all the long-term deals “show the club’s ambition”, but equally this could just be a device to increase the selling price if push comes to shove.

"Adil Rami - off to Valencia at the end of the season"

Ultimately, it usually comes down to the player’s desire to stay or go. Gervinho has so far refused to sign a new deal and rumour has it that he will head off to the Premier League in the summer. Hazard is a different case, having extended his contract, but Rudi Garcia has admitted that he could still leave, but only if Lille were to receive a “super offer” for the talented young Belgian. Certainly, there would be no shortage of interest if he became available, though Hazard himself has said, “Real Madrid and Arsenal are the clubs I dreamed of joining as a child.”

Even if some of Lille’s stars were to jump ship, this would not necessarily turn out to be a disaster, as the club has proved highly adept at unearthing unpolished gems and taking them to a higher level, as happened with Sow this season. They have also begun to set their sights higher with Saint-Etienne’s French international Dimitri Payet being mentioned in dispatches as a possible replacement if Gervinho departs.

"Rudi can't fail"

However, much of Lille’s success has been built on their youth academy. As Seydoux explained, “We don't recruit the best players, but we help them grow better than others, because of the great care we bring to nurturing our youngsters.” That policy has been further strengthened by the opening four years ago of a wonderful new training ground at a cost of €20 million at Domaine de Luchin, which, according to France Football, is “more impressive than any other in Europe, including those at Arsenal, Manchester United and Barcelona.” To date, Lille have focused on local youngsters, but Paquet has also spoken of looking at working with regional academies in the future.

Lille’s commitment to youth development will stand them in good stead in the era of UEFA’s financial fair play regulations for two reasons: first, costs incurred for such activities are excluded from the break-even calculation; second, they will be able to enhance profits by later earning useful transfer fees on players developed in-house.

In fact, FFP could be beneficial to clubs like Lille, as similar rules have applied in France for 20 years, so they are very accustomed to operating within such constraints. Lille’s CFO Reynald Berghe is quietly enthusiastic about UEFA’s initiative, “It will help bring about more equality at the European level. It could be positive for French clubs.” Of course, it will also benefit those clubs who generate the most revenue, hence the desire to maximise receipts from ticket sales, which is the main driver for Lille to build a spanking new stadium.

"His name is Rio..."

That’s all future music. In the short term, Lille’s fans will understandably be concentrating on whether they can hang on to their lead at the top of one of Europe’s most competitive leagues and win their first title for 57 years. They have a tricky run-in, but proved their mettle by defeating closest challengers Marseille in the intimidating Stade Vélodrome a couple of months ago.

Lille stand on the cusp of an extraordinary achievement, namely to join Europe’s elite on a fraction of their budget. Off the pitch, they have done remarkably well to cope with a structural deficit, thanks to some skillful “wheeling and dealing” in the transfer market. It has been a triumph of long-range planning, as recognised by another football visionary, Lyon President Jean-Michel Aulas, who three years ago warned his fans, “Our next challenger as France’s biggest club will not be Marseille or Bordeaux, but Lille.” Prophetic words.


**********************************************************************************

If you like this article and others on this blog, please could you do me a favour and vote for The Swiss Ramble as Best EPL Blog and Best EPL Blogger in the EPL Talk awards? It will only take a few seconds of your time, but it would make an old man very happy. Thanks.

Friday, April 29, 2011

Norwich City's Remarkable Transformation


When Canadian international forward Simeon Jackson struck the last-gasp winner for Norwich City against Derby County last weekend, it was incredibly the 12th goal that the Canaries had scored in the 90th minute or later this season. This is a sign of a team that never knows when it is beaten and this resilience is just one of the reasons for Norwich’s impressive surge to a highly commendable second place in the Championship. Paul Lambert’s team stand on the threshold of the Premier League, which would mean a second successive promotion and represents a remarkable turnaround in the club’s fortunes.

At the beginning of last season, Norwich played their first match in the third tier of English football for 50 years and were on the wrong end of a 7-1 hammering by the mighty Colchester United. This humiliation in front of their devoted Carrow Road fans resulted in the sacking of the manager Bryan Gunn, the popular former goalkeeper, but it’s an ill wind that blows no good, as Norwich then secured the services of the manager responsible for that spectacular defeat, a certain Paul Lambert.

A Champions League winner with Borussia Dortmund, Lambert was unlikely to be fazed by the task facing him, but even he might be a touch surprised by the magnitude of the transformation. Despite the awful start, Lambert led Norwich to the League One title and promotion back to the Championship, with prolific striker Grant Holt and attacking midfielder Wes Hoolahan thriving under his guidance. This duo have continued their fine form in the higher division, scoring 30 goals between them and being named in the PFA Championship team of the season.

"Grant Holt - the only way is up"

Norwich’s progress is all the more noteworthy when you consider that it has been achieved without bringing in a raft of big names. Indeed, the most well known of last summer’s signings were probably Andrew Surman, who only played a handful of games for Wolves in the Premier League, and Elliott Ward from Coventry City, who was loaned to Doncaster and Preston last season. Nevertheless, they have shone for Norwich, while other unheralded arrivals have also made notable contributions, including the battling Welsh midfielder Andrew Crofts, snapped up from Brighton, and John Ruddy, a goalkeeper plucked from Everton’s reserves.

The excitement at Norwich’s possible return to the top tier is a major improvement on the Norfolk club’s recent history. The last time they were in the Premier League was 2004/05, when they survived just a solitary season, before relegation back to the Championship where they languished for four miserable years prior to their demotion to League One. This period was marked by a series of poor managerial appointments with three managers (Peter Grant, Glenn Roeder and Gunn) lasting less than three years between them. This managerial merry-go-round was nothing new for Norwich, as they had employed no fewer than nine managers after the current owners took over in 1996.

This was all a far cry from the early 90s, when Norwich City were very much a force to be reckoned with. In fact, they were founder members of the Premier League, actually leading the table for much of the inaugural 1992/93 season before being over-taken by Manchester United and Aston Villa in the final furlong. During this golden age, they also memorably defeated Bayern Munich in the UEFA Cup with a spectacular goal from Jeremy Goss in the Olympic Stadium forever emblazoned in the consciousness of Norwich supporters everywhere.

"Jeremy Goss - that goal, that shirt"

However, these successes masked the growing financial problems at Norwich, which were only kept at bay by former chairman Robert Chase selling the club’s best players like Chris Sutton and Ruel Fox, a policy that adversely impacted performance on the pitch and provoked Martin O’Neill to resign after just six months as manager. Following fans’ protests against the player sales, Chase stepped down in 1996, leaving the club with large debts of £7 million. Many years later in the 2008 accounts, the club described the situation back then as “virtual disintegration.”

Former chairman, Geoffrey Watling, stepped in again, buying out Chase, before selling the majority shareholding to current owners, well-known TV chef Delia Smith and her husband Michael Wynn Jones. There followed several years of stagnation in the old First Division (then the second tier), before promotion back up to the Premier League in 2003/04.

Although the single season at the highest level provided the club with some financial stability, it did little to ease Norwich’s long-term difficulties, as the board “chose to make considerable investment, both in team strengthening and in infrastructure.” Former chief executive Neil Doncaster cautioned, “It is a sobering thought that, despite the many millions of pounds of television money we received during our short stay in the Premiership, the club's overall cash position only improved by £0.7 million that season.”

"Delia - Let's be having you!"

In 2006 the accounts drily noted that the key task facing the executive management team was “to ensure that the club does not run out of cash”, which is not a phrase likely to inspire confidence. Last year, the message was more or less the same, though a little less abrupt, as one of the principal business risks was described as the club having “insufficient cash flow to meet its obligations for the 2010/11 season.”

Despite denials at the time, it is now evident that there was a strong risk of the club going out of business in January 2010 with chief executive David McNally warning, “Clearly the financial challenges that we’re having to face up to are real.” Indeed, at the 2011 Annual General Meeting, the chairman Alan Bowkett admitted, “We couldn’t afford to pay our interest and we couldn’t afford to pay the amortisation owing on the loans on time.” Norwich City could easily have fallen into administration if they had not managed to persuade the banks to temporarily suspend repayments of interest and capital.

The level of indebtedness remains the club’s biggest financial problem, even though it was reduced by £2 million in 2010 to £20.9 million. Although this may seem trivial compared to the astronomical debt owed by many leading clubs such as Manchester United, it is far from insignificant relative to Norwich’s revenue of £17 million, which is much diminished after many years outside the Premier League.

Most of the debt was incurred for stadium improvements, in particular the construction of the Jarrold Stand (at a cost of £6.5 million) and the Norwich Union Community Stand (£3.2 million), though it also covered the cost of new offices and land purchases around the stadium.

The £22.9 million net debt comprises loan notes £11.2 million, bank loans £3.5 million, other loans £6.3 million, preference shares £1.6 million and an overdraft £0.2 million less £1.8 million cash. The outstanding loan notes represent the unpaid element of a 15-year £15 million loan from AXA Investment Managers Ltd, which was released in two instalments of £7.5 million at fixed rates of 7.67% and 7.24%. In addition, there are two bank loans: £1.0 million with the Bank of Scotland repayable over 10 years at 2% above base rate; and £2.5 million repayable in 2012 at 4.25% above LIBOR.

The loan notes and bank loans are secured on land and future income streams, but the other loans of £6.3 million (from directors past and present) are unsecured and interest-free. This is just as well, because the annual interest on the loan notes and bank loans of £1.6 million is difficult for the club to cover from normal operations with the interest rates now looking quite high by today’s standards.

"Wes Hoolahan - when Irish eyes are smiling"

This helps to explain why the club was in breach of certain covenants at year-end with its principal lenders, AXA and the Bank of Scotland, which explains why the debt is show within creditors amounts falling due within one year, as is the £1.4 million owed to deputy chairman Michael Foulger, as this is repayable on the earlier of promotion to the Premier League or August 2012.

The worries over Norwich’s funding issues led to auditors Grant Thornton inserting the dreaded “Emphasis of Matter” statement in the delayed 2009 accounts, warning of “the existence of an uncertainty which may cast doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern.” Although such comments do not necessarily sound a death knell to a club, they are obviously not good news, hence the importance of the agreement with the club’s lenders to defer payments. In fact, the rescheduling of debts was sufficient to remove this statement from the latest 2010 accounts.

This does not alter the fact that Norwich’s business model relies on regular injections of cash from its owners. Since Delia Smith and Michael Wynn Jones took over the club in 1996 they have put in around £12 million via share purchases and interest-free loans, which they have promised they will not ask to be repaid while the club still owes money to the banks. No wonder that former chairman Roger Munby said that “the club remains hugely indebted to their incredible generosity”, which enabled the Canaries to support a reasonable wage budget and prevent the sales of too many players.

However, they’re not the only benefactors, as fellow director Michael Foulger has also provided loans of £1.4 million and two months ago bought £2 million of new shares, increasing his stake in the club to 15% and reducing that of the Delia Smith and Michael Wynn Jones combination from 61% to 53%. This money has been ring-fenced to be used solely for the playing budget. Foulger also gifted the club £360,000 in the summer of 2009, when he matched pound-for-pound all the money not claimed by season ticket holders, who were entitled to a 20% rebate following relegation to League One.

Finally, Andrew and Sharon Turner loaned the club £2 million when they became directors in 2007, though their pledge to provide another £2 million of support unfortunately did not come to pass, as they left the board the following year for reasons unknown. The hole in the budget was closed by yet another contribution from “Smith and Jones.”

Over the last few years, the club has been living a hand to mouth existence, attempting to generate cash and balance its books with a variety of creative initiatives, such as refinancing, share offers and sales of property and land. A £1.5m share issue in 2004 helped bridge the gap left by the collapse of ITV Digital with £1 million coming from the fans and the other £500,000 from Delia and her husband.

"Andrew Crofts - the running man"

The £6 million received from selling land near Carrow Road for a housing development that year paid for the “calculated gamble” of signing three strikers (Darren Huckerby, Mathias Svensson and Leon McKenzie). Similarly, the £720,000 raised from the unclaimed season ticket rebates in 2009 allowed the purchase of Grant Holt, whose 24 goals were vital in gaining promotion from League One.

Most recently, the £2.1 million of funds received from the sale of some more land adjoining the stadium to a housing association in November 2010 were used to reduce the club’s borrowing. This was an important part of the financial restructuring agreed with the two main lenders that extended their repayment schedule: AXA’s hefty loan to May 2022; the Bank of Scotland’s £1.5 million overdraft facility to August 2011 and bank loans to October 2013. According to chairman Alan Bowkett, this move left “the long-term future of the club much more secure”, but he was less circumspect at the club’s AGM, admitting that without the rescheduling, “We would not be standing here today.”

There is little doubt that the new management team of Bowkett and chief executive David McNally, who arrived with a fine track record from his time at Fulham and Celtic, have wasted no time in addressing the club’s financial issues since their appointments in July 2009, following the resignations of Munby and Doncaster as a result of the disastrous drop to League One.

"Simeon Jackson - another hat-trick"

They have had to balance Norwich’s proud tradition of a club run for the community with the commercial needs of a modern football club, so that annual losses and debt levels can both be reduced, while keeping the squad competitive.

As an example, this means fine-tuning the ethos of “affordable family football” by raising ticket prices and reviewing the number of tickets sold on concessions (over 50%), as gate receipts have to be a key element of the club’s revenue, especially at this level. Such moves are never going to be universally popular, but fortunately for the new board most supporters understand that revenue growth is necessary to avoid less palatable alternatives, such as selling star players or the club ultimately ceasing to exist.

The new executives put together a seven-year plan to return to the top flight and become an established Premier League club, which originally included two years to get out of League One and three years consolidation in the Championship. McNally further explained, “We would then be promoted to the Premier League, allowing for immediate relegation and an immediate return. From that point we would continue to play our football in the Premier League.” This must have looked fairly optimistic to fans, but barely after the ink has dried on the new vision, they might have to rip it up and write another one, as the team is way ahead of schedule.

"John Ruddy - calm and collected"

This begs the question of whether it might actually be too soon for Norwich to be promoted to the Premier League, but as McNally pointed out, “There are 90 million reasons to make certain we are ready.” He is referring to the financial bonanza available, though it’s important to appreciate that the money does not arrive in one fell swoop. Even if a club finishes bottom of the Premier League, it earns around £40 million from the TV deal, but it is also in line for £48 million in parachute payments over the next four years (£16 million in each of the first two years, and £8 million in each of years three and four). On top of that, gate receipts and commercial income would certainly be higher, hence at least £90 million more revenue. To place that into context, that is more than five times Norwich’s current turnover of £17 million.

Such an enormous disparity explains why clubs are so desperate for promotion to the Premier League, even though the Championship is a successful league in its own right, boasting the fourth highest attendance in Europe with a total of more than 9.9 million fans ahead of Italy's Serie A (9.1 million) and France's Ligue 1 (7.6 million), though admittedly fewer matches are played in those divisions. The sad reality is that money talks and precious little of the Premier League’s wealth finds its way down the football pyramid. These days, Football League clubs cannot even rely on raising serious money from player sales, as the Premier League tends to buy from overseas or their own division.

Consequently, it is very tough for Championship clubs to break-even from operations, especially if they are carrying a wage bill that will enable them to challenge for promotion, which means that most Football League clubs almost inevitably make large losses. Therefore, they must rely on other forms of financial support. As Delia said, “Anyone outside the Premiership is going to struggle without billionaires and millionaires.”

Norwich City’s financials are no exception to this rule, showing losses in each of the last three years, ever since the parachute payments from their last stint in the Premier League came to an end. Although the 2010 loss of £5.8 million might not seem a huge amount, it is equivalent to 34% of revenue. The same percentage would produce a loss of almost £100 million at Manchester United – even more than the real thing.

In fairness, the club did very well to restrict the loss to just £0.8 million more than the one recorded the previous year in a higher league, especially as they had to cover £2.6 million of exceptional charges, including £0.6 million relating to Paul Lambert’s move from Colchester United (fines, compensation, legal fees), £0.5 million for a strategic review and £0.2 million to directors and senior executives for loss of office plus £1.3 million classified as staff costs (£0.9 million promotion bonus and £0.5 million players’ compromise agreements).

Profit on player sales was also quite low at £0.8 million, including £0.3 million appearance related fees for former players, but this has never been a big money spinner for Norwich with the highest profit in the last six years being the £6.2 million made in 2005/06, mainly from the sale of Dean Ashton to West Ham. Since then, very few players have brought in large sums, even though the club have sold internationals like Robert Green and Robert Earnshaw.

The price of relegation can be clearly seen in the decline in revenue over the years with turnover falling from £37 million in 2005 (Premier League) to £17 million in 2010 (League One). Most of this decrease is due to TV, as the central distribution dropped £12 million in 2006 following relegation to the Championship, though it was held up by £7m of parachute payments in 2006 and 2007, before falling off a cliff in 2008. This was obviously a bitter pill to swallow for the club, particularly as it accounted for approximately 30% of total revenue. Commercial revenue also took a hit as a direct result of relegation, but gate receipts have held up remarkably well, which is a tribute to the fans’ steadfast support.

Even though Norwich’s revenue has fallen so much, they still have the ninth highest revenue in the Championship, based on the 2009/10 accounts. Clearly, the three clubs that were in the Premier League last season (Portsmouth, Hull City and Burnley) have the highest revenue, while the next three teams in the “league table” (Middlesbrough, Reading and Derby County) had the benefit of parachute payments. Even so, as former chief executive Neil Doncaster said, “We are in a far better position than a lot of other clubs, because our season tickets sell out and activities off the pitch.”

This is even more relevant this season, as only four clubs are boosted by parachute payments: the three relegated last season and Middlesbrough. Given that both Portsmouth and Hull City have encountered steep financial difficulties, we now have a more level playing field than in the past, at least from a financial perspective, which helps explain why the division is so competitive.

That said, Burnley’s revenue of £45 million last year was significantly higher than Norwich’s £17 million, entirely due to the difference in broadcasting income (£34 million compared to £2 million). In fact, revenue from gate receipts and commercial activities was actually higher at Norwich, even though they were two divisions lower. Following relegation to the Championship, Burnley’s projected revenue will still be more than Norwich, purely due to the £16 million parachute payments, though the gap is much closer, because of the increase in Norwich’s TV revenue to £5.5 million.

This estimate is mainly derived from three payments given to all clubs in the Championship: the £2.47 million Football League distribution; £2.2 million solidarity payment from the Premier League (up from £1 million last season); and £0.5 million share of the parachute payments given to Newcastle and WBA, as they went straight back up to the top tier. In addition, I have included £0.3 million for cup runs and facility fees (each time a team is shown live is worth £100,000 to the home team, £10,000 to the away team).

Unfortunately, the new Football League three-year TV deal signed this month, which kicks off in the 2012/13 season, is £69 million lower than the current contract at £195 million, a reduction of 26%. As there was no interest from BBC, ITV or even ESPN, the only game in town was Sky, who could accordingly lower their bid. Given that most of the money is allocated to the Championship, this is where the impact will be most keenly felt – another reason, if one were required, to push as hard as possible for promotion.

Although Norwich listed a reduction in attendances as one of their principal business risks, there would appear to be little danger of this happening, given that crowds have remained at more or less the same levels whatever league the Canaries find themselves in. Little wonder that the club formally thanked the “passionate, loyal, local support who continue to demonstrate their undying loyalty to their football club.”

In fact, their average attendance of 25,346 is the third highest in the Championship, only behind Leeds United and Derby County, and is actually higher than seven clubs in the Premier League (Birmingham City, Fulham, WBA, Blackburn Rivers, Bolton Wanderers, Wigan and Blackpool). There is no sign of this slowing down with season ticket sales for the 2011/12 campaign already standing at a record high of 21,063, considerably more than the 19,250 the last time that Norwich were in the Premier League, even though prices have been raised by an average £1.50 a game and the starting age for adult concessions has been increased from 60 to 65.

Of the clubs averaging more than 20,000 in the Championship, Norwich have by far the highest capacity utilisation at 94%, which has raised the possibility of a stadium expansion. Although 1,000 seats were added last summer, the board has discussed a plan to increase Carrow Road’s capacity from 27,000 to 35,000, though this would only be considered if the club had two consecutive seasons in the Premier League. Although it could make the club self-sufficient, the expansion would cost £20 million, which would take nine years to repay, and the club would lose £1.4 million gate receipts from lost capacity during the building phase, so this would be a momentuous decision.

"Yellow and Green Army"

Alternatively, there would be the possibility of a sale and leaseback deal on the stadium, which would raise enough money to pay off the debts and leave a useful transfer budget. Carrow Road is valued at £32.9 million in the books, though the directors believe that the market value is higher. However, every club that has followed this route now regrets the decision. Mike Reynolds of the Norwich City Supporters’ Trust summed up the fans’ views, “It would be very much selling off the family silver - once it's gone, it is gone and you can't go back and use it as an asset.” Indeed, following the restructuring, Delia promised that the ground would “absolutely not” be sold.

Commercial income of £8.5 million is quite high for a Championship club, but is bolstered by £3.8m catering revenue. That may not be too surprising, given the owner’s day job, but it’s strange to think that last season this was more than twice as much as TV revenue, though the margins will not be quite so impressive.

The current shirt sponsor is insurance giant Aviva, the parent company of Norwich Union, who extended their three-year deal in the summer of 2009 to the end of the 2011/12 season. The value of the deal has not been divulged beyond the fact that is a “substantial seven-figure sum.” The kit supplier is Xara, though McNally has told supporters that there will be a new contract from next season.

Other commercial revenue comes from a variety of sources, including a joint venture for the hotel at Carrow Road, a security business and hosting events at the stadium, such as a George Michael concert.

On the cost side, the wage bill is the key factor in a budget that the chairman described as one that “will allow us to compete for a top six position.” As always, this is a balancing act between spending enough to compete at the top of the Championship, while not damaging the club’s long-term security if it fails to win promotion. It is clear that Norwich have made strenuous efforts to control their wages, as these have been steadily reducing since the last Premier League season from £16.9 million to £12.2 million, though the important wages to turnover ratio has increased (worsened) from 45% to 72% in the same period, as revenue has fallen at a faster rate.

This is not too bad, given the pervasive impact of the stratospheric wage inflation in the Premier League, “where the wages of excellence are considerable.” The accounts tell us that Norwich structured their contracts to reduce in the event of relegation, though interestingly only if the team did not win back promotion in the following two seasons. If the club does get promoted, this can also affect the wage bill through performance-related bonus payments: £1.7 million in 2005 and £0.9 million in 2010.

Norwich’s wage to turnover ratio is actually the sixth best in the Championship, while their wage bill of £12.2 million is one of the lowest, placing them 16th in the wages league. Although there is seemingly not much between each team with 15 of the 24 teams having a wage bill between £10 and £20 million, that can still provide a healthy competitive advantage, for example Reading enjoy twice the budget of Watford. Of course, these figures are all at least 12 months out of date, so the position may well be different this season.

Nor have Norwich City been big spenders in the transfer market. Over the last decade, their net spend has been flat with the only year where they had relatively large net purchases (of just £7 million) being the one that they spent in the Premier League. The fallow period in the Championship featured a series of net sales, totaling £16 million, and it’s only really in the last two years that Norwich have lived up to their own description in the accounts of being a “buying club.”

To be fair, the sales came during a period when the club’s debts prevented them from splashing the cash. As the finance director said at the time, “player trading is a fact of life in football and will be used to support both the business and development of the team.” Norwich have always claimed that they were working towards a situation where they did not have to sell players for financial reasons. After the debt restructuring, they have proved true to their word and have been the second highest spenders in the Championship this season, only surpassed by QPR. OK, the figures are not that high, but everything’s relative.

Like almost every other club in the Championship, Norwich have also made good use of the loan system, bringing in promising Premier League youngsters like Henri Lansbury (Arsenal), Dani Pacheco (Liverpool) and Sam Vokes (Wolves) for meaningful roles.

Some fans have questioned Norwich’s “prudence before ambition” policy. Although there is no doubting Delia’s passion for the club (“Let’s be having you!”), nor the millions she has put in, some would still prefer wealthier investors. However, McNally for one is supportive of the majority shareholder, “Delia Smith has made an enormous contribution to Norwich City Football Club and her part in ensuring our survival should never be underestimated.”

This is very much a case of caveat venditor (let the seller beware), as not all owners would be such selfless benefactors as Delia and her husband, who have not taken any salaries, dividends or interest from the club during their fifteen years at the helm. That said, they have repeatedly asserted that they would accept a suitable offer if they felt that it was in the best interests of Norwich City.

The other salient point is that it is not that easy to find an ideal investor with the right credentials. The club has been “committed to attracting new investors” since 2008 and even appointed professional advisors Deloitte at great cost to assist in the process in 2009. They identified more than 50 potential investors globally, speaking to possible candidates in America, Europe, Far East, Middle East, Russia an Britain, but none of them have come up with an acceptable offer, even though Norwich is a club in a large catchment area with substantial potential.

"Henri Lansbury - hair today, gone tomorrow"

There has been a view that the club is against foreign ownership, but Michael Wynn Jones has clarified the couple’s views, “You have to make doubly certain about the validity and intentions of any foreign investor. They too would be welcome if we were convinced that they subscribed to the values this football club has always maintained.”

Regardless, the closest the club has ostensibly come to an investment was a couple of years ago with local insurance tycoon, Peter Cullum, the executive chairman of Towergate Partnership, who offered to put in £20 million for new shares, which would then be used to buy new players. Apparently he did not want to buy out the existing shareholders, but was told that he would need to stump up £56 million for the club: £16 million for shares, £20 million to clear the debts plus the £20 million transfer fund. At this point, he walked away, observing that “the economic environment is simply not conducive to investing in an ailing football club.”

In any case, the question has to be asked whether the club is now still under pressure to find additional investors following the successful financial restructuring, as McNally recently stated that the seven-year plan does not include any external investment. Additional cash would certainly come in useful, whether it be to reduce debt, fund stadium expansion or indeed strengthen the squad, but it would appear that it is no longer a necessity.

"Russell Martin - eyes on the ball"

As a sign of confidence, Norwich have already forecast an improvement in next year’s financials: revenue to increase by at least £5 million (to £22 million); the biggest operating profit since 2007, the last year that the club received parachute payments from the Premier League; and net debt to reduce by at least a further £1 million. The club remains focused on paying down debts from the sale of non-core, non-football assets, while McNally said that they could be debt-free if they achieve the objectives laid down in the famous seven-year plan.

Of course, the price to be paid for success includes the possibility of larger clubs tempting away your prize assets, specifically the manager and star players. Norwich have already refused one club (Burnley) permission to talk to Paul Lambert, but if a larger club came knocking at the door, it would not be a massive surprise if such an ambitious coach were to exit stage left.

"Andrew Surman - all smiles"

Similarly, covetous eyes must have been cast on success stories like Holt, Hoolahan and young striker Chris Martin, to name but three. Fortunately, all of them have recently signed new deals with the former two extending their contracts to 2014. Of course, the club might still be tempted to cash in if the price is right, but they are no longer in a position where they have to sell.

The club has certainly come a long way since the players had to pay for their own flights to Blackpool for an away game. The new executive team has pulled them back from the financial brink, while the new football manager is poised to lead his team to a second successive promotion, this time to the Premier League. It’s still too early to say that they will reach their destination, but it’s fair to say that these Canaries have already taken flight.

Related Posts Plugin for WordPress, Blogger...