Showing posts with label France. Show all posts
Showing posts with label France. Show all posts

Tuesday, May 10, 2011

Lille's French Revolution


Although Lille’s faltering form in recent weeks has caused a few to doubt their ability to sustain their sparkling challenge in Ligue 1, this weekend’s victory over Nancy restored a four point lead at the top of the table. With just four games remaining until the end of the season, Les Dogues are well on course to win their first French title since 1954.

Even though this should not be too unexpected, given that Lille finished last season in fourth place (and were the league’s leading scorers), it is still somewhat of a surprise to see a small provincial side ahead of traditional powerhouses like Marseille and Lyon. Indeed, Lille are actually chasing a domestic double, as they face Paris Saint-Germain in the French Cup Final next Saturday at the Stade de France.

Their success has been built on an impressive attacking style of play, which once again has the Northern side leading the scoring charts, with the African combination of the powerful Moussa Sow and the pacy Gervinho netting 35 goals between them so far this season. The splendidly dreadlocked Gervinho made a distinct impression for the Ivory Coast at the World Cup in South Africa, but the Senegalese Sow has been transformed since arriving on a free transfer from Rennes last summer.

The hub of Lille’s progressive formation is comprised of a trio of diminutive midfielders, like a less lauded version of Barcelona, featuring French internationals, Rio Mavuba (the club captain) and Yohan Cabaye, plus the experienced Florent Balmont.

"Gervinho - more than a haircut"

However, the undoubted star of the show is the young Belgian winger Eden Hazard, who has been named Ligue 1’s most exciting young player in each of the last two seasons, and is being chased by virtually all of Europe’s leading clubs, as well as most French defences. This young man, as Ray Wilkins would inevitably describe him, has got the lot: speed, dribbling skills, a powerful shot and the ability to create chances. One of Lille’s youth coaches did not want to go overboard in his praise, but could not resist a stirring comparison: “You have to keep perspective, as he is still very young, but he is like Lionel Messi.”

Lille’s development in the last couple of seasons is all the more remarkable, as it follows the departure of the inspirational Claude Puel, the coach who had transformed them into a truly competitive team, twice guiding unfashionable Lille to qualification for the Champions League during his six-year tenure. When Puel, a protégé of Arsène Wenger, left for champions Lyon in 2008, this could have been a hammer blow to Lille’s prospects, but instead the relatively inexperienced Rudi Garcia, recruited from Le Mans, has maintained the progress.

Famed for his ability to get results on a limited budget, Garcia has added an extra dimension to Puel’s pragmatic, hard-working side, as he let loose the attacking instincts of Les Dogues of war, resulting in Lille twice qualifying for the Europa League and potentially going one step better this season.

"Give yourself a round of applause, Michel"

Nevertheless, the principal driving force behind Lille’s ascent to the top is president Michel Seydoux, a French businessman and film producer, who became the club’s majority shareholder in 2004. Although Lille attained a startling second place in his first full season as president in 2004/05, Seydoux’s approach is the polar opposite of those owners who demand short-term success. He has not been a benefactor in the traditional football club sense of pumping in vast sums of cash and demanding instant results, but has followed the sound business principles of establishing a strategy (“to challenge Lyon in 2012”) with achievable objectives, bringing in good people to support the plan and delivering steadily improving results.

The club has adopted a long-term view, first developing a state-of-the-art training facility at the Domaine de Luchin and then working with the local authority to build a magnificent new 50,000 stadium at the Grand Stade Lille Métropole, reinforced by admirable continuity in the management team. In fact, Lille have only had two managers (Puel and Garcia) in the last nine years, a rare statistic in the uncompromising world of football.

Since Seydoux has taken control of Lille Olympique Sporting Club, often shortened to LOSC, this unheralded side has featured twice in Europe’s flagship competition, the Champions League. They qualified for the first time ever in 2005, repeating the feat the following season, when they reached the knockout stages, before being eliminated by Manchester United in controversial circumstances, as Ryan Giggs scored from a quickly taken free-kick.

Competing at such rarified levels is heady stuff for a club with a budget as relatively low as Lille. Although on the face of it, they have little to complain about, as they sit in fifth place in the French money league with a turnover of €55 million, this is considerably less than Lyon, Marseille, Bordeaux and Paris Saint-Germain. In fact, the first two have budgets nearly three times as high (Lyon €146 million, Marseille €143 million), while Bordeaux’s revenue is twice as much. Granted, this sizeable disparity owes a lot to the Champions League money those three clubs received last year, but gate receipts and commercial income are also significantly higher than LOSC.

Given that money usually does buy success in football, as the teams with the highest turnover (and consequently wages) are most likely to win, this only makes the fact that Lille currently lead the league even more praiseworthy. To place that into context, Lens, who have almost exactly the same turnover as Lille with €52 million, are currently struggling in second to last place in the table.

Similarly, Lille are resolutely mid-table in terms of profits and losses, having reported small losses in each of the last two seasons: €1.1 million in 2009/10 and €0.3 million in 2008/09. This stability is not too bad, when you consider that the number of clubs making losses doubled from seven to fourteen last year with aggregate losses in Ligue 1 significantly rising from €24 million to €108 million, though to be fair over half of that came from just two clubs: Lyon €35 million, a big reversal from the previous year’s profit, despite reaching the semi-finals of the Champions League, and Paris Saint-Germain €22 million, continuing their series of poor financial results.

One point that stands out from the P&L league table is that Lille made more profit on player sales (€23 million) than any other French club last year, which is doubly striking, as total profits from player sales in France fell by more than 40% (€90 million) compared to 2008/09. This has been a recurring feature of Lille’s business model with the club making around €80 million from such player trading in the last four seasons. There are two ways of looking at this from a financial perspective. On the one hand, it’s a vindication of Lille’s ability to make money from developing players; on the other hand, it underlines that the club has needed to sell its prize assets in order to compensate for large operating deficits, which average €23 million over the last three seasons.

That said, the DNCG, the organisation responsible for monitoring and overseeing the accounts of football clubs in France, has stated that Lille enjoy a “healthy financial situation” despite the recurring losses at an operating level. Indeed, Lille actually reported profits three years in a row before the last two periods’ small losses (2006 €6.9 million, 2007 €5.1 million and 2008 €6.6 million), though the first two of these seasons were boosted by revenue from the Champions League.

This explains why Lille’s revenue has actually declined since its peak of €68 million in 2006 to €55 million in 2010, as the Europa League is far less lucrative than the Champions League. Like all French clubs, Lille are hugely dependent on television money and actually had the third highest reliance in France last season at 69%, only behind Auxerre and Lorient. At less than €5 million a season, gate receipts are miserably low in comparison to leading clubs in other European leagues, but that’s pretty much the norm in France with only four clubs earning more than €7 million a year, namely the usual suspects: Lyon, Marseille, Bordeaux and PSG.

Lille have done much better with TV revenue, earning €38 million, the fourth highest in Ligue 1 last season, comprising €35 million from domestic deals and €3 million from their run in the Europa League.

The domestic TV money is allocated among clubs as a mixture of fixed and variable components. The fixed element comprises 50% of the total media rights and is distributed equally among all Ligue 1 clubs, worth around €12.5 million a season, while the remainder is distributed based on league performance 30% (25% for the current season and 5% for performance over the last five seasons) and the number of times a team is broadcast 20% (15% for the current season and 5% for the last five seasons).

Although this structure is reasonably egalitarian, it does tend to favour the leading clubs, especially the broadcast element. Let’s see how this worked out for Lille last season: their fourth place was worth €11.8 million, compared to the €17.9 million received by champions Marseille. However, because clubs like Marseille and Lyon are shown on television more frequently than the provincials, Lille lose out on the notoriété with Marseille earning more than twice as much: €17.4 million compared to €7.6 million. So, in summary, last year Lille finished just three places behind Marseille in Ligue 1, but received €16.7 million less TV revenue.

However, there is a darker cloud on the horizon. The current television deal, which is worth €668 million a season, runs from 2008 to 2012, but is soon up for re-negotiation. The indications are that it will be renewed for a lower sum, as one of the existing broadcasters, Orange, has decided to withdraw from the bidding process, leaving Canal+ as the only game in town. This is potentially extremely bad news for French clubs, as only Serie A among major European leagues is more reliant on TV revenue, with Reuters estimating that the reduction may be as much as €200 million.

The French deal is currently the third most valuable in Europe, only behind the Premier League €1.2 billion and Serie A €0.9 billion, but ahead of the Bundesliga €412 million (La Liga has individual club deals). Most of the shortfall compared to the Premier League is due to overseas rights, which the English have managed to sell for an incredible 20 times as much as Ligue 1’s €30 million. Indeed, one of the suggestions made by Michel Seydoux, who has been commissioned by his peers to examine the TV issue, is for the league to spread matches over the weekend, including lunchtime kick-offs, to produce higher ratings in the emerging Asian market and address this weakness.

Of course, French clubs can boost their income by participating in the Champions League, which is what helped Lille produce what they described as “exceptional” financial results in 2006 and 2007, when they earned €21 million and €22 million respectively, not including any uplifts in sponsorships. In the latter year, this was split £18 million central TV distributions from UEFA and £4 million gate receipts. Of course, this can be a double-edged sword, as the year afterwards in 2008, Lille’s revenue plunged €24 million (or 38%).

Last year’s tournament was even more rewarding for the French representatives, who each earned an average of €25 million: Bordeaux €30 million, Lyon €29 million and Marseille €17 million. The more observant among you will have noticed that Bordeaux received more money than Lyon, even though they only reached the quarter-finals compared to Les Gones’ semi-final. This is because, as well as participation and performance payments, the clubs receive a share of the TV market pool, which is partly dependent on where a team finished the previous season in its domestic league. Therefore, apart from the natural pride at winning the championship, from the financial angle it would be better for Lille to qualify for the Champions League as winners rather than runners-up.

The Europa League is nowhere near as lucrative as its big brother with Lille €3.1 million and Toulouse €2.2 million earning peanuts (relatively speaking) for their efforts last season. Indeed, if a club battles its way through the seemingly endless series of matches to win the damn thing, it only receives the paltry sum of €6.4 million. Better than a smack in the head, but less than a club earns for simply reaching the group stages of the Champions League, even if it loses all six games.

"Moussa Sow celebrates yet another goal"

As we saw earlier, gate receipts of €4.9 million are incredibly low compared to Lille’s counterparts overseas. For example, Manchester United, the club leading the Premier League, earned €122 million match day revenue last season, which is an amazing 25 times as much as Lille. Another way of looking at this is that United generate €3.6 million a match, so they earn more in just two matches than Lille do in an entire season. Even Hamburg, from a land which is well known for its low ticket prices, earned €49 million – ten times as much.

Of course, Lille are far from unique in France in facing a tough financial challenge with their gate receipts, as amply demonstrated by another statistic: there is not a single French club in the Deloitte Money League top 20 clubs for match day revenue. The nearest are Lyon and Marseille, who both earn around €25 million, but this is still less than clubs like Valencia (19th position) and Werder Bremen (20th position), who earn about €28 million. Gate receipts in Ligue 1 have been on the low side for a while, as stadiums tend to be old, in need of renovation and have limited earnings potential, but worryingly they fell by 8% last season, though that was partly due to the impact of the recession.

Attendances have continued to fall at many clubs this season, though Lille have unsurprisingly bucked the trend following the surge towards the title with their average crowds rising an impressive 9% from 14,940 to 16,286, which represents more than 90% of the capacity of their current temporary ground, the Stadium Lille Métropole, where they moved a few years ago in anticipation of redeveloping their permanent stadium, the Stade Grimonprez-Jooris.

Instead, they have opted for the spectacular new 50,000 capacity Grande Stade Lille Métropole, which will have the highest possible 5 star UEFA rating. Featuring a retractable roof that will allow the ground to be easily converted into an indoor arena that can be used for concerts, exhibitions and other sporting events, this stadium is central to Seydoux’s ambitious plans.

The cost to Lille is limited, as the stadium is being built by the local authority, who will rent it out to the football club. However, all the revenue generated will go into Lille’s coffers, including ancillary activities such as food and beverages, merchandising and other commercial opportunities. Importantly, there will be 7,000 places for corporate hospitality, which the English clubs have demonstrated deliver significantly more bang for your buck.

"Green light for the new stadium"

Like all major investments, there is clearly an element of risk in this project, but the DNCG have no doubts that this is the way forward: “The arrival of a new stadium in 2012 will allow the club to cover its structural operating deficit and so meet its ambitious objective of balancing its books without taking into account transfers.” Assuming no Champions League revenue, that would imply an increase in revenue of €20 million, which would indeed be ambitious, but is not completely unrealistic.

There must be some concern that a leap from an 18,000 ground to a 50,000 stadium will be over-kill, but Lille would be encouraged by achieving near sell-outs in the 80,000 Stade de France, when they have moved home games there in the past, both against Lyon in Ligue 1 and for some Champions League encounters. General Manager Frédéric Paquet said, “We know it won't be easy, but we're expecting gates to average between 37,000 and 40,000,” though he recognised that this was in part dependent on Lille continuing to be successful on the pitch.

The hope for French football is that Euro 2016 will have a similarly beneficial impact on its stadiums as the 2006 World Cup had on grounds in Germany. Numerous clubs, such as Le Mans, Lyon and Le Havre, have initiated new stadium projects, while others like Marseille are looking to refurbish and redevelop their existing grounds.

Lille are also fair to middling when it comes to commercial income with their total of €12 million leaving them eighth highest in Ligue 1, though there is definitely room for improvement. As you might expect, Marseille €46 million and Lyon €43 million once again lead the way, but Bordeaux and PSG also do fairly well here, both earning around €35 million.

Even though the value of shirt sponsorship has significantly increased in France, thanks to the decision to finally allow gambling websites to advertise, the top clubs in Europe are still a long way ahead of French clubs in terms of commercial revenue with Bayern Munich €173 million and the Spanish giants, Real Madrid €151 million and Barcelona €122 million, setting the pace.

Lille’s commercial income actually fell last year from €13.8 million to €12.3 million, presumably due to the harsh economic climate, but things should improve in the future, as they announced two major deals last spring. Key shareholder Isidore Partouche’s casino operator Groupe Partouche, who have been the club’s shirt sponsor since 2003, extended their deal by five years to 2015; while Umbro replaced Canterbury, who went into administration, as the club’s kit supplier in a six-year deal.

Like most football clubs, Lille have struggled to contain their costs, even though they emphasised the importance of doing so in both the 2006 and 2007 accounts. The fact is that expenses were only just higher than revenue five years ago, but shot up as soon as the club qualified for the Champions League and have been rising ever since, even though revenue has not been growing at the same rate. In this way, while revenue rose by a respectable 55% since 2005, costs have significantly outpaced this with 160% growth.

As is always the case, the wage bill is the most important element in Lille’s costs at €49 million, which has resulted in a wages to turnover ratio of 88%, far higher than UEFA’s recommended maximum limit of 70%. Wages have been rapidly growing in the last couple of seasons from €35 million in 2008, though the revenue growth has kept the wages to turnover ratio at the same level, albeit a concerning level.

Traditionally, Lille are a low paying club, which is evidenced to some extent by the fact that they do not have one player in the list of top 20 best paid players in France, which is dominated by Lyon 7, Marseille 5, PSG 4 and Bordeaux 2. Almost unbelievably, at least to this observer, Gabriel Heinze is apparently the best paid player, followed by Yohann Gourcuff and Lucho Gonzalez.

However, Lille now find themselves in an awkward spot. As they are fifth highest in last year’s wages league, they are ahead of most other French clubs, but they are a long way behind Lyon €112 million and Marseille €92 million. In order to catch up with these behemoths and compete on a consistent basis, they will almost certainly need to spend more. As LOSC CFO Reynald Berghe put it, “The huge investment by big clubs forces small clubs to over-spend.” This is indeed what is starting to happen at Lille with the coach Rudi Garcia and five players extending contracts, including Hazard, Mavuba, defenders Mathieu Debuchy and Franck Béria, and goalkeeper Mickaël Landreau, the last of these reportedly doubling his salary.

The tax situation in France does not help either. As the tax rate is very aggressive, football clubs have to pay a higher gross salary than their competitors in other countries to ensure that the net salary is at the same level. That’s bad enough, but recently the government abolished the rule on collective image rights that had previously allowed clubs to claim an exemption on some social charges.

Another factor that potentially could adversely impact Lille is higher bonus charges, the so-called price of success, which cost Marseille €5 million last season, though general manager Paquet has claimed that the club is well equipped to handle this (whatever that means).

What is not beyond dispute is Lille’s ability to make money from player trading. Over the last decade, the club has registered net sales proceeds of €55 million, including €45 million in the last four years alone, which has been absolutely integral to their financial stability. At times, Seydoux has acted with an icy objectivity, for example in 2007 he sold all three of the previous season’s top scorers: Peter Odemwingie, Kader Keita and Mathieu Bodmer.

In many ways, they have a lot in common with Arsenal. First, the club has rarely splashed out large sums, but likes to act astutely in the transfer market. As Paquet explained, “What's important to us in signing players is not the figure, but whether it's the right price. We try to buy well and sell well. Today the biggest transfer fee we have ever paid was for Gervinho, who cost €6 million.” In addition, many players sold for big money leave their best days behind them in northern France, examples being Jean II Makoun, Keita and Bodmer, as is also the case for the north London club (Overmars, Petit, Henry, Vieira, Kolo Toure, etc).

It is impossible to discuss Lille’s transfer policy without examining their relationship with Lyon, which is questionable to some, given that Michel Seydoux’s brother Jérôme is a board member at Les Gones. As is often the case, you can look at this positively or negatively. On the one hand, Lyon have to an extent funded Lille’s progress, paying them €64 million over the last seven years for just five players: Michel Bastos €18 million, Keita €16.8 million, Makoun €14 million, Eric Abidal €8.5 million and Bodmer €6.8 million. On the other hand, it seems strange that Lille would effectively act as a feeder club to one of their principal opponents, also of course giving them their successful coach, Claude Puel.

Even in the last two years, when the volume of transfers has been slashed in France, Lille have still managed to produce profits in the transfer market, mainly due to the sale of Bastos, with only Toulouse and Nice showing higher net surpluses. In stark contrast, the traditional big spenders Lyon, Marseille and PSG have continued to splash the cash. For Lille to be ahead of these clubs in the league, given their parsimonious policy, is highly commendable and a sign of excellent management and indeed coaching.

French clubs’ accounts have been badly hit by the downturn in the transfer market, as they have traditionally balanced their books by selling players. The graph below clearly highlights the magnitude of the problem, as net profits in Ligue 1 have gone down very much in line with lower profits from player sales. There’s an almost perfect correlations with net profits of €25 million dropping to a loss of €114 million, a decline of €139 million, while in the same period profits on player sales decreased from €266 million to €125 million, a decline of €141 million.

Interestingly, the vast majority of that reduction (€102 million) came from sales abroad, as Europe’s leading clubs tightened their purse strings, partly as a result of the economic conditions, partly due to the advent of UEFA’s financial fair play rules, which aim to clamp down on big spending.

This provoked the DNCG to talk of French football being in a “serious financial crisis” in their annual report even quoting Winston Churchill, “if you’re going through hell, keep going.” However, the Ligue 1 club presidents have protested that the official document paints too gloomy a picture, in particular underlining the relatively low level of debt in France compared to other European clubs, notably those in England and Spain. Of course, it’s the unrestrained spending in those leagues that has helped fund French clubs in the past, so they should not complain too much.

Any road, they do have a point, as every club in Ligue 1 has reported net assets, as opposed to the debts at clubs abroad. Lille’s balance sheet is particularly strong with no bank debt and hardly any money owed to other football clubs, resulting in total debts of €23 million, compared to assets of €47 million. That gives them a very healthy debt ratio of 48%, one of only three clubs below 50% along with Auxerre and Lyon.

In the past, clubs have used IPOs (Initial Public Offerings) to raise cash, but this seems unlikely (and unnecessary) for Lille, whose CFO Reynald Berghe said, “An IPO could be an option, but not at this point.” It’s not as if Lyon’s 2007 share offering provides an encouraging example for other French clubs, as the stock price has performed disappointingly ever since.

Having said that, the increase in payroll and higher stadium costs will weigh heavily on Lille’s finances, unless they are boosted by Champions League money. Seydoux has estimated an operating deficit of €30 million, which falls to €25 million once the €5 million transfer of Adil Rami to Valencia that was agreed in the winter is deducted, so there might be pressure to compensate in the standard LOSC manner, i.e. by selling more players.

If Hazard were to be sold, for example, his fee would cover the shortfall on its own, while the other members of Lille’s formidable attacking trident, Gervinho and Sow, might bring in another €25 million. At the moment, Lille are playing a straight bat to such questions with Seydoux arguing, “We have an ambitious policy. We see that in the biggest foreign clubs, the turnover of players each season is very light.” He claims that all the long-term deals “show the club’s ambition”, but equally this could just be a device to increase the selling price if push comes to shove.

"Adil Rami - off to Valencia at the end of the season"

Ultimately, it usually comes down to the player’s desire to stay or go. Gervinho has so far refused to sign a new deal and rumour has it that he will head off to the Premier League in the summer. Hazard is a different case, having extended his contract, but Rudi Garcia has admitted that he could still leave, but only if Lille were to receive a “super offer” for the talented young Belgian. Certainly, there would be no shortage of interest if he became available, though Hazard himself has said, “Real Madrid and Arsenal are the clubs I dreamed of joining as a child.”

Even if some of Lille’s stars were to jump ship, this would not necessarily turn out to be a disaster, as the club has proved highly adept at unearthing unpolished gems and taking them to a higher level, as happened with Sow this season. They have also begun to set their sights higher with Saint-Etienne’s French international Dimitri Payet being mentioned in dispatches as a possible replacement if Gervinho departs.

"Rudi can't fail"

However, much of Lille’s success has been built on their youth academy. As Seydoux explained, “We don't recruit the best players, but we help them grow better than others, because of the great care we bring to nurturing our youngsters.” That policy has been further strengthened by the opening four years ago of a wonderful new training ground at a cost of €20 million at Domaine de Luchin, which, according to France Football, is “more impressive than any other in Europe, including those at Arsenal, Manchester United and Barcelona.” To date, Lille have focused on local youngsters, but Paquet has also spoken of looking at working with regional academies in the future.

Lille’s commitment to youth development will stand them in good stead in the era of UEFA’s financial fair play regulations for two reasons: first, costs incurred for such activities are excluded from the break-even calculation; second, they will be able to enhance profits by later earning useful transfer fees on players developed in-house.

In fact, FFP could be beneficial to clubs like Lille, as similar rules have applied in France for 20 years, so they are very accustomed to operating within such constraints. Lille’s CFO Reynald Berghe is quietly enthusiastic about UEFA’s initiative, “It will help bring about more equality at the European level. It could be positive for French clubs.” Of course, it will also benefit those clubs who generate the most revenue, hence the desire to maximise receipts from ticket sales, which is the main driver for Lille to build a spanking new stadium.

"His name is Rio..."

That’s all future music. In the short term, Lille’s fans will understandably be concentrating on whether they can hang on to their lead at the top of one of Europe’s most competitive leagues and win their first title for 57 years. They have a tricky run-in, but proved their mettle by defeating closest challengers Marseille in the intimidating Stade Vélodrome a couple of months ago.

Lille stand on the cusp of an extraordinary achievement, namely to join Europe’s elite on a fraction of their budget. Off the pitch, they have done remarkably well to cope with a structural deficit, thanks to some skillful “wheeling and dealing” in the transfer market. It has been a triumph of long-range planning, as recognised by another football visionary, Lyon President Jean-Michel Aulas, who three years ago warned his fans, “Our next challenger as France’s biggest club will not be Marseille or Bordeaux, but Lille.” Prophetic words.


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Tuesday, October 19, 2010

The Trade Secrets Behind Lyon's Rise


Despite their victory over Lille last weekend, Olympique Lyonnais’ start to the season has been far from convincing with manager Claude Puel reportedly being given three games to save his job. Coming off the back of two seasons where Lyon finished “only” second and third in Ligue 1, questions have been asked about whether Puel is the right man to take the team forward. Although this would have represented success for almost any other club in France, the end of domestic league dominance must have felt like failure to those supporters whose team won the League an unprecedented seven years in a row from 2002.

In fact, Lyon’s rise from relative obscurity to become the leading club in France by some distance is an amazing story. When Jean-Michel Aulas, a local software entrepreneur, bought the club in 1987, they were languishing in the second division, deeply in debt, and, in the new owner’s words, burdened with “no history and a public largely uninterested in football.” Two decades later, their finances have been revived and they are one of only four clubs to have qualified for the Champions League eleven years in a row (the others being Real Madrid, Manchester United and Arsenal), culminating in an appearance in the semi-finals last season for the first time ever.

"Jean-Michel Aulas - happy days"

This incredible transformation has not been as a result of a wealthy benefactor pumping money into the club (like Chelsea), nor is it down to a lengthy managerial dynasty (like Manchester United or Arsenal), but is the result of an exemplary strategic plan from the chairman and CEO, Monsieur Jean-Michel Aulas, which he kindly explained in the last management report, “In the first phase, from the club's purchase in 1987 until 1998, the priority was on advancing to Ligue 1 and consistent results in league play. In the second phase, beginning in 1999 when Pathé purchased a stake and lasting until 2010, the objective was to keep the club in Ligue 1's top three, and thereby take part in European championships. These objectives have been fully achieved.”

The long-term aspect of the plan has been a key element of Lyon’s improvement, as they have grown gradually. In a country famous among other things for the Tour de France, Aulas opted for a cycling analogy, “Each year we set as an objective to have progression. It’s like a cyclist: you can overtake the people just ahead of you,” though he later embraced four wheels, saying that he wants Lyon to become “the ultimate Formula 1 car, capable of shifting through the gears to cope with all types of road.”

While Aulas has received his fair share of criticism for running the club as if it were a business, his theme is that there is a virtuous circle in football: over time the more money a club makes, the more matches it will win, and the more matches it wins, the more money it will make.

Indeed, Lyon have been profitable for many years, though they suffered a large loss of €36 million in 2010 for the first time since 2004. The deficit would actually have been even higher without an €18 million tax credit, as the club reported a loss before tax of €54 million. This is somewhat of an aberration for Lyon, whose pre-tax profits had averaged an impressive €23 million in the previous four years.

Aulas has described the results as a “blip”, pointing to the generic problems facing football clubs in France, but the main reason for the changing fortunes at Lyon is obvious, as the profit made on player sales was tiny in 2010, compared to the customary €40 million or so achieved in the past few years. If this trend had continued, Lyon would once again have reported a profit in their latest accounts.

Player trading has played an important role in Lyon’s financial success with transfer fees making up a significant portion of the club’s revenue every year except the last, when the profit from player sales only reached a paltry €3 million, as no big transfer was made in the period. In the previous four years, the sale of players generated enormous proceeds of €220 million, resulting in considerable capital gains of €164 million.

"Benzema - good example of Lyon's strategy"

This is part of what the club describes as an “innovative business model”, whereby Aulas has excelled at acquiring players and selling them on for exuberant fees to more renowned clubs abroad. The list of his hugely profitable transfers is almost endless, including Mahamadou Diarra and Karim Benzema to Real Madrid, Michael Essien and Florent Malouda to Chelsea, Eric Abidal to Barcelona and Tiago Mendes to Juventus.

His skill in negotiating large transfer fees won him the grudging admiration of Sir Alex Ferguson, when the great Scot was asked about Benzema possibly moving to United, “Lyon’s president is a sharp man. He sold Essien for €38 million, Diarra for €26 million, Malouda for €19 million, Abidal for €16 million. And I congratulate him for that.”

The profits on such sales have been boosted by an increasing number of the players being sold coming up through Lyon’s training academy. In 2009 over 70% of the sales proceeds came from players trained at the academy, most notably Benzema whose transfer was alone worth €35 million. This has been assisted by the club investing €5 million in state-of-the-art training facilities, which were completed in 2008, with graduates such as Hatem Ben Arfa and Loïc Rémy being other prominent examples of the young talent graduating from the academy.

"You're having a Ben Arfa"

One of the main objectives given to Claude Puel was to smooth the transition of the young players trained at the academy into the first team and this strategy is starting to pay off with the emergence of the likes of Gonalons, Pied, Grenier and Lacazette. However, there has been a quid pro quo on the player trading, as the club has also decided to increase the stability of the squad compared with the past in order to facilitate the integration of the youth team exports with more experienced players.

Nevertheless, Lyon’s ascent has been in large part down to their ability to play the transfer market better than any other club in Europe, which was recognised by Simon Kuper and Stefan Szymanski in their thought-provoking book “Soccernomics”, where they dedicated an entire section to Lyon’s transfer market rules. These are essentially an extension of Aulas’ winning theme that was outlined above, owing more than a little to the “Moneyball” theories of Billy Beane, the legendary general manager of the Oakland Athletics baseball team.

The thinking goes like this: If you buy good players for less than they are worth, you will win more games. You will then have more money to buy better players for less than they are worth. The better players will win more matches and that will attract more fans (and thus more money).

"A lot on Puel's mind"

Lyon’s “magnificent seven” tips and tricks for the transfer market are as follows:

1. Exploit the inefficiencies of the transfer market. This means adopting an unsentimental approach whereby you sell any player if a club offers more than he is worth. As Aulas said, “Every international at Lyon is untransferable – until the offer surpasses by far the amount we had expected.”

2. Transfers should be decided by people who are at the club for the long-term. This means that Lyon’s transfers are decided by a group consisting of Aulas, the technical director, Bernard Lacombe, and whoever happens to be the current coach. As Emmanuel Hembert, head of the London sports practice of management consultants AT Kearney, explained, “A big secret of a successful club is stability. In Lyon, the stability is not with the coach, but with the sports director, Lacombe.” Lyon understand that the coach is only a “temp” better than most, as their seven consecutive titles were gained with four different coaches (Jacques Santini, Paul Le Guen, Gérard Houllier and Alain Perrin), while Lacombe has been at the club for over 20 years.

3. The best time to buy a player is when he is in his early twenties. Aulas explained, “We buy young players with potential who are considered the best in their country, between 20 and 22 years old. “ The theory is that the players are old enough to be nearly fully formed, but too young to be expensive stars. The other added benefit is that relative unknowns accept modest salaries.

"Bernard Lacombe - Lyon legend"

4. Try not to buy centre forwards. This is the most over-priced position in the transfer market in marked contrast to goalkeepers, who deliver most “bang for your buck”. In this way, the homegrown Benzema was given his opportunity and thrived on the responsibility, before making bundles for the club.

5. Replace your best players before you sell them. This avoids a panic purchase or a lengthy transitional period. This policy meant that Aulas could happily let Essien to go to Chelsea when they turned up with a wheelbarrow full of cash.

6. Buy Brazilians. Lyon have been very adept at securing footballers from Brazil, with former players including future internationals Edmilson, Juninho and Fred, while the current squad boasts Cris and Michel Bastos. The trick here was to send one of their past captains, Marcelo, to Brazil to act as an exclusive agent.

7. Help your foreign signings settle in. It is difficult to move to another country, but Lyon employ people to help their players relocate, find somewhere to live, learn French, open bank accounts and generally cope with homesickness. This sounds obvious, but many clubs did not provide such services a short while back.

Up until recently, this has proved to be extremely lucrative business for Lyon with net receipts of €21 million in the four years up to 2009 as purchases of €199 million were more than compensated by sales of €220 million. In that period, player trading generated an almost unbelievable €164 million profit. This was epitomised in the summer of 2009 when Benzema’s sale was the fourth highest in that window, though it was somewhat overshadowed by the megabucks splashed out on Ronaldo, Ibrahimovic and Kaka.

However, everything changed last season, when Lyon suddenly started to act more like Real Madrid by spending €96 million on recruiting six new players (Lisandro Lopez, Michel Bastos, Aly Cissokho, Bafetimbi Gomis, Dejan Lovren and Jimmy Briand), while only recouping €14 million, largely from the transfers of Kader Keita to Galatasaray, Fabio Grosso to Juventus and Anthony Mounier to Nice. This is a huge outlay for a club with an annual turnover of less than €150 million.

This trend continued this summer, when only Olympique Marseille came anywhere near to Lyon’s €24 million net spend in France, which included €22 million on the new glamour boy of French football, Yoann Gourcuff. All of a sudden, Aulas has loosened the purse strings and Lyon have become the big spenders.

"Lisandro - part of last summer's spending spree"

So why change the habits of a lifetime? This seemed to make no sense, especially when the policy had been working so well. Apparently, this is all about making the jump to the next level. The board explained the modified approach in the 2009 management report, “We decided to invest in experienced players in order to close the gap with the major European clubs”, as they saw an opportunity to close the disparity as other clubs were suffering more from the economic recession, given Lyon’s undoubted financial strength.

To an extent, this has not been such a bad move, if you consider the progress to last season’s Champions League semi-final, but it’s unlikely to be a permanent change in the long-term strategy, as the most recent management report re-affirmed the club’s commitment to its tried-and-trusted business model, “The trading target for 2010/11 will be to re-establish a significant excess of player registration sales over purchases.”

Whether this is as straightforward as it was a few years ago is open to debate, as the unfavourable economic conditions have definitely slowed down the transfer market with this summer’s spending in Europe’s top five leagues nearly 40% less than in the summer of 2009. OK, it is true that this may have been impacted by the World Cup starting at the same time that the transfer window opened, but there is little doubt that clubs have been hit by the financial downturn, so they now think twice about making expensive new acquisitions.

Having said that, Lyon’s focus on the transfer market remains laser sharp. This is confirmed by the club’s management report explicitly listing the market value of its players as €208 million (source – Transfermarkt), implying a potential capital gain of €74 million, after the book value is deducted. As this figure does not include an estimate for their younger players, they contend that the total value for the team is more like €220 million, which would suggest a capital gain of €86 million. It is extremely rare that clubs draw attention to this unrealised gain in their accounts, which only underlines the importance of player trading to Lyon’s strategy.

This is further highlighted when you look at the revenue from Lyon’s core business, which last year amounted to just €146 million. Not terrible by any means, but a long way behind Europe’s leading clubs, which is where they aspire to be. Lyon are the best placed French club in Deloittes Money League, based on 2008/09 results, which is one place ahead of their rivals Olympique Marseille.

However, the top Spanish and English clubs enjoy far higher revenue, while the German and Italian clubs also earn much more. Real Madrid and Barcelona generate almost three times as much revenue, while Manchester United earn more than twice as much and even a relatively unsuccessful team like Hamburg have a turnover higher than Lyon. There’s effectively a €50 million shortfall against the next tier of clubs (around €200 million turnover), which to date Lyon have traditionally made up by astute wheeler dealing in the transfer market.

This is abundantly clear when you examine Lyon’s revenue growth over the last five years – or I should say lack of growth. Their revenue has only grown 14% from €128 million in 2006 to last year’s €146 million and almost all of that growth came back in 2007. Although revenue did increase 5% this year, this was only after a steep decline in 2009. Over the same five-year period, expenses have risen by 52% from €133 million to €202 million. That’s a huge financial challenge right there and the only solution to date has been for the club to buy and sell its way out of trouble.

The importance of player trading can be seen very well in the above graph. If profit on player sales is considered as “revenue”, its contribution has been notable in the past few years, often double the money received from gate receipts. However, when that well dries up, as it did in 2010, the effect is evident and immediate.

However, broadcasting is still the largest revenue source with €78 million contributing over half of Lyon’s revenue. This is not the highest reliance on television money in the Money League, but it’s probably still a little too high for comfort. Revenue from the LFP (Ligue de Football Professionnel) and FFF (Féderation Française de Football) amounts to €49 million, while distributions from UEFA for the Champions League are worth €29 million.

Like every other club in Europe, Lyon’s broadcasting revenue is miles behind Real Madrid and Barcelona, whose ability to negotiate individual deals (for the time being at least) gives them astonishing TV revenue around €160 million, but it’s also at least €20 million behind other teams in their peer group. It’s difficult to see this situation changing any time soon (or ever), as it was touch and go whether the current French deal would even be as much as the previous one. In the end, the French TV rights were granted to Canal Plus and Orange under a four-year contract from 2008 to 2102 in a deal worth €668 million per season, which was slightly higher than the old agreement.

"Toulalan - younger than he looks"

The money is allocated as a mixture of fixed and variable components. The fixed element comprises 50% of the total media rights and is distributed equally among all Ligue 1 clubs, while the remaining 50% is distributed based on performance and media profile. This is fairly complex, so 28% is based on league position (23% for the current season and 5% for performance over the last five seasons); 19% is based on the number of games broadcast (14% for the current season and 5% for performance over the last five seasons); and 3% is intriguingly based on attacking play (le challenge de l’offensive”).

Much of the €10 million increase in TV revenue was down to Lyon’s successful run in the Champions League with UEFA’s distribution growing from €24 million to €29 million. These payments are a combination of performance (how far the team progresses) and a variable share of the TV pool. The latter is partly dependent on the relative importance of the French TV market, but also importantly how many French clubs take part in the Champions League. For example, Lyon estimated that if only two French clubs had qualified for the group stages in 2009 (instead of three), their revenue would have been €4 million higher.

Although Aulas has argued that failure to qualify for the Champions League would not be a damaging blow to Lyon’s finances, as they have plenty of money saved for a rainy day, he has also admitted that the club’s annual budget is built on the assumption of a “podium finish” in Ligue 1 and reaching the quarter-finals in the Champions League. Over the last three years, Lyon has earned an average of €27 million a season from Europe’s premier tournament, which could potentially be even higher in the future, as UEFA’s new three-year contract for 2009 to 2012 is up 34%. Given these figures, I would argue that the Champions League is very important to Lyon – about 20% of total revenue, in fact.

"Hugo Lloris - brilliant orange"

In contrast to television, commercial revenue fell 13% (or €6 million) to €43 million in 2010, the second year in a row that it declined, following a €10 million decrease in 2009 from the high point of €59 million. Again, although this might be pretty good for a French club, it’s still not competitive on the international stage.

In fact, revenue from sponsorship and advertising was down sharply this year. This was partly due to the recession afflicting all industries, but in fairness Lyon were also impacted by a couple of exceptional factors specific to them: the repeated postponement of the French online gaming law meant that new sponsor BetClic was not authorised to place advertising on players’ shirts; and the club made a once-off €4 million payment to Umbro as compensation for the early termination of their contract to supply kit.

The decrease in commercial revenue in 2009 was similarly influenced by once-off movements, with the previous year being boosted by a €3.5 million signing fee from Sodexo for the catering contract and €1.8 million in prize money from Lyon’s victory at the Peace Cup in South Korea. In addition, the club’s restaurant business was outsourced and its brasserie discontinued, leading to a €1.3 reduction.

"Bastos keeps his eye on the ball"

However, the club do expect commercial revenue to “rise substantially thanks to new contracts”. Lyon has signed a ten-year agreement with Adidas as their exclusive kit manufacturer, starting from July 2010, with the supplier paying a basic fee plus royalties based on product sales. Merchandising revenue is likely to increase, both in France and especially abroad, on account of Adidas’ extensive distribution network. The contract could generate gross revenue between €80 million and €100 million depending on results on the pitch.

As Mangas Gaming has now been awarded a licence to operate in France, the BetClic brand can finally appear on players’ shirts in domestic football. This is a four-year deal worth €5-7 million per annum, which runs from 2009 to 2013 and replaces the long-standing agreement with Accor and Renault Trucks.

In September 2007, Lyon signed a contract with Sportfive, valid for ten years from the delivery of the new stadium, whereby Sportfive will have exclusive use of all marketing, hospitality and media rights belonging to the club. In return, Lyon receive a €28 million signing fee upfront, which is paid in four annual installments of €7 million between December 2007 and December 2010. By the way, this is the same company that has put into place a similar funding arrangement for Juventus’ new stadium.

Finally, the club has ambitious plans to grow its brand internationally through the establishment of soccer schools outside France in Northern Africa, the Far East, India, the Middle East and the USA. This will help cement the idea of Lyon as a club known for training and developing elite players.

Thanks to Lyon’s tremendous performance in the Champions League, match day revenue rose €2 million to €25 million, but this remains one of the lowest in the Money League. In fact, only three teams in the top twenty have lower revenue from this stream: Borussia Dortmund, Roma and Juventus. This is obviously constrained by the smallish capacity of their ground, the Stade de Gerland, which only holds 40,500, though the average attendance is even lower at 35,600, which means a capacity utilisation of 88%.

Despite this failure to fill the existing ground, the club has planned a new 60,000 stadium, which is due to be completed in December 2013, as this should provide a significant uplift to their revenue. In the shareholders’ meeting in December 2009, the board specifically drew attention to the impact of the Emirates Stadium on Arsenal’s match day income, which has more than doubled to around €110 million since the move.

This is because the Emirates is a more modern and commercially orientated stadium. In the same way, Lyon’s project aims not only to increase ticketing revenue significantly, partly through more corporate boxes, but also to develop ancillary revenue from a leisure centre, hotels, restaurants, offices, a shopping centre, including a dedicated OL store for merchandising, and potentially naming rights.

"Here's to future days"

The club’s initial estimates of the investment required were between €250 and €300 million, but this has reportedly risen to around €350 million. The presentation to shareholders claims that this will be 100% privately funded via “innovative financing” with very limited impact on the taxpayer, but there are reports that €180 million of public money will be used, presumably to improve transport links.

Although there has been some opposition to the new stadium, the project has been boosted by the awarding of the Euro 2016 tournament to France. The proposed stadium is one of the 12 on the short-list and should benefit from a new law that is to be introduced with the aim of enabling France to honour its commitments to UEFA, which will accelerate planning procedures.

On the cost side, the wage bill rose by a staggering 17% to €112 million, though this was explained as being primarily due to performance-related bonuses for advancing so far in the Champions League. This is the same issue that has caused Barcelona so many financial problems over the last couple of years. To be fair, French clubs are hampered by what Aulas wryly calls “Europe’s most developed tax system.”

Even so, it is clear that the wages have grown too far, evidenced by the wages to turnover ratio of 76%, which is higher than UEFA’s recommended maximum limit of 70%. This ratio has been on a steady upwards trend over the last few years from a respectable 59% in 2006.

In the management report, the board explicitly states that it “has set itself the target of significantly reducing the payroll over the next two periods, as other French clubs seem to be doing.” This does not seem to be an idle boast, as they have already offloaded many high-earning players this summer, including former captain Sidney Govou, Mathieu Bodmer, Jean-Alain Boumsong and Frederic Piquionne. These sales might not have brought in much money, but they will go a long way to reducing the wages to a more sustainable level, cutting around €12 million from the annual cost base.

The trend in player amortisation, namely the annual cost of writing down the cost of buying new players, also reflects the modified approach to the transfer market. In the three years between 2006 and 2008, it hardly changed at all, rising slightly from €24 million to €26 million. However, in the last two years it has grown to €43 million “as a consequence of the club’s substantial investments,” increasing by €9 million (a chunky 26%) this year alone. This is still much lower than those sides that have spent really big in the transfer market, such as Manchester City €83 million, Barcelona €71 million, Real Madrid €64 million and Chelsea €57 million. Furthermore, if Lyon’s board carries out the plans that it has announced, then it might well have maxed out at this level.

It should be clearly stated that in spite of this significant player investment, the club maintains that it still has a “sound financial structure with surplus cash” with the summary report for June 2010 stating that the club has positive net cash of €15 million.

Unfortunately, we don’t have any more details behind this, but we know from last year’s annual report that the club had net cash of €62 million in June 2009, so the recent player purchases must have had some effect, as the net cash has dropped by €47 million in the last 12 months. Looking at those 2009 figures, Lyon had very little financial debt at that stage with only €42 million of bank loans, which were more than covered by €104 million of cash.

We should note en passant that the club also owed €36 million to other football clubs a year ago, though this was completely offset by €62 million owed to them by other clubs, leaving a net football surplus of €27 million. So, last year’s analysis showed that Lyon had a net surplus of €89 million per UEFA’s definition, which is very impressive. This year’s figures will not have been quite as good as that, but they must still be very healthy indeed.

In addition, the club has shareholders’ equity of €131 million, which has given it sufficient robustness to pursue its ambitious growth policy. To put this into context, Lyon’s equity represents 44% of the total equity of French football clubs. Much of this is derived from the club’s successful flotation in 2007 on Euronext Paris, after a change in French law permitted sports clubs to float on the stock exchange, which raised €91 million.

Lyon’s board directors own the majority of these shares with Aulas himself having the largest stake (34%) through his holding company ICMI, followed by Pathé and OJEJ (24%), companies controlled by Jérôme Seydoux, and a further 7% held by other board members. However, the percentage of voting rights held is even higher, amounting to around 76%: ICMI 42%, Pathé and OJEJ 29%, other board members 5%.

"The only way is up"

Even with this stability, the club has plans to further strengthen its financial capacity, maybe to help raise funds for the new stadium. First, the board will subscribe to a €40 million capital increase for one of the group’s subsidiaries, OL SASP, through a partial incorporation of its shareholder loan and, on top of that, the club will issue €25 million in bonds or similar securities that could give deferred access to share capital.

The club’s presentation to shareholders concluded that theirs was “an exemplary business model.” Although that might sound a little bombastic, there’s no doubt that the model has proven itself over several years, though it’s fair to say that it has been severely tested by recent events. Having achieved the first two phases of Olympique Lyonnais’ grand plan, Aulas now talks of a “new phase of development” which will use the new stadium project to “pursue our objective of moving the club to a higher plane.” The ultimate objective, written down for all to see, is to “win a European Cup before 2016.”

Aulas once said that it is only a matter of time before his team wins the Champions League. If they managed to do that, with all the financial disadvantages they have compared to the traditional leading clubs, then they truly would be the Kings of Lyon. Is it likely? Who knows, but stranger things have happened.

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